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Introduction 
While there has been a steady movement toward disarma-
ment, and for limitation in this and other lands, with peace 
pacts to prevent war, naval agreements, treaties and similar 
moves, there is still a definite need for consideration of 
our naval defenses. In this discusston, a compilation of 
public opinions and tendencies, as found in publications, I 
will te~1d to show there is considerable interest in our 
navy. 
This material is not projected as an argument against 
reasonable limitations, nor an attack: on those advocating; 
but to reproduce a part of the attitudes of public writing 
and speaking of our people. It must be granted that there 
is a tenable argument on either si(e of the naval question, 
and no brief is held for either. 
In order to bring this up to the title, there must be 
a broader presentation of one side than the other. No con-
clusions shall be made in definite form for the reader, nor 
can there by such done here. The reader, may if he chooses, 
I , 
draw conclusions as to which side he prefers. 
1 
CHAPTER I 
UNITED STATES NAVAL HISTORY 
Following the history of this nation we see that the 
Navy first came into existence with a fleet of privateers in 
the Revolution. Just before this time came the 'first naval 
engagement', under direction of Benedict Arnold on Lake 
Champlain. The privateers, operating as individuals, 
collectively did much damage to Englrtnd' s sea power, and un-
doubtedly did much to win an independent status for the 
American colonies. With the establishment of· the new nation, 
plans were made for a naval force, but nothing was done con-
cerning this until 1794. 
When Washington was inaugurated as President, there was, 
no Navy. The American commerce and shipping, however, were 
well under way. They met with continual attaclcs of pirates 
in the Mediterranean, es)ecially from the Barbary states. 
The situation on this point so aroused President Washington, 
that he sent the following message to Congress: 
To an active external commerce, the protection of a 
naval force is indispensable. This is manifest with regard 
to wars· in which a State itself is a party. But beside this, 
it is our own experience that the most sincere neutrality is 
not a sufficient guard against the depredations of nations 
at war. 
To secure respect to a neutral flag requires a naval 
force organized and ready to vindicate it from insult or 
aggression. This may even prevent the necessity of going 
to war, by discouraging a belligerent nation from committing 
such violations of the rights of neutrals, as may, first or 
last, leave no other option. 
2 
From the best information that I have been able to ob-
tain, it would seem as if our trade in the Mediterranean 
without a protecting force will always be insecure, and our 
citizens exposed to the calami ties from Wbich' numbers of them 
have been relieved. ~ 
These considerations invite the United States to look to 
the means and set about the gradual creation of a Navy. The 
increasing progress of their navigation promises them, at no 
distant period, the requisite supply of seamen, and their 
means in other respects favor the undertaking. It is an en-
couragement likewise, that their particular situation will 
give weight and influence to a moderate naval force in their 
hands. Will it not, then, be advisable to begin, without de-
lay, to provide an.d lay up materials for the building and 
equipping ships of war, and to proceed in the work by de-
grees, in proportion as our resources shall render it practi-
cal without inconvenience, so that a future war with Europe 
may not find ou~ commerce in the rame unprotected state in 
which it is fom1d by the present. 
The Congress received the message, and the United States 
Senate, on December 10, 1796, replied to the President's 
message, stating in part: 
We perfectly coincide with you in the opinion that the 
importance of our commerce demands a naval force for its 
protection against foreign insult and depredation, and our 
solicitude to attain that object shall always be proportion-
ate to its magnitude,2 
Following the orders for the first ships to be built, 
General Knox, Secretary of War and Navy under President 
Washing"ton, made up his own specifications for the start of 
the American navy as follows: 
These ships should combine qualities of strength, 
durability, swiftness and force as to make them equal, if 
not superior to any European frigate.3 ' 
1 Richardson, Messages and Pauers of the Presidents, I, 201. 
2 Ibid, 205. 
3 United States Haval Institute Proceedings, 296t 37. 
For the period of the War of 1812, the United States 
Navy was in deplorable c ortdi tion, compared with the sea 
forces of other lru1ds. When the second English war was de-
clared in June of that year, there had been no preparation 
in this country. On sea and land the contest was made up of 
a succession of petty individual actions. British writers 
said that the American Navy should be swept from the sea. 
During the sweeping process the Havy increased four fold. 
When Great Britain turned seriously upon the American force, 
and sent 14,000 men to Canada to settle the conquest, this 
force was met at Lake Champlain by a small band, and the sea 
fights on the Lake, under command of Macdonough, an epic in 
the naval history of this nation, saved the United States.l 
When war was declared England had 1, 000 ships -- and 
America had 6 frigates and 8 sloops and brigs. As England 
ruled the maritime world, she had relaxed her training. She 
had no reason to remain prepared as no one would bother her. 
Americans were training continually, and carried 1 t to the 
highest possible 90int. 
Roosevelt, in his nnaval War of 1812", cites this fact 
as an illustration of the value of naval preparedness in 
peace time. 2 
At the opening of the war, according to statistics in 
the writing just quoted, the American personnel numbered 12 
1 Roosevelt, Theodore, Naval War of 1812, ch. I. 
2 Ibid, chs. II, III. 
I 
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captains, 10 commanders, 73 lieutenants, 53 masters, 300 
midshipmen, 42 marine officers &~d 4,000 seamen. During the 
war the enlistments rose very rapidly. The report or the 
Secretary of the Navy, B. w. Crowninshield, April 18, 1816, 
stated that at the close of the conflict 14,960 men were en-
listed in the ·naval service and 3,715 marines. 
The ships of the American navy rated from 148 tons to 
1576, the displacement of the Constitution. This frunous old 
ship rated 44 guns. Many others carried only 12 guns.l 
Following this struggle little was done in the Navy. 
Periods of construction and neglect followed, bringing our 
story down to the Civil War period. We are familiar with the 
type of wooden ship used in the struggle, many steam pro-
pelled, but all armed with smooth bore guns. , 
Up to the time of the historic Merrimac and Monitor 
encounter the Constitution was the only ship of note in our 
Navy. She stands out as the embodiment of our effective sea 
power. Approximately 150 other ships made :up the United 
States Navy at the opening of the Civil War, many being 
destroyed by fire during the conflict, and others were being 
built during the war. 
When the Federals abandoned Norfolk the Merrimac was 
sunk. Confederates raised her and covered her sides with 
iron plates. The Untted States Navy knew this and dreaded 
1 Roosevelt, Theodore, War of 1812, chs. II, III. 
5 
her completion. Meanwhile the Monitor was being constructed 
on Long Island. This ship introduced the revolving turret 
to our Navy.l The Monitor was armed with two 11 inch ~ns. 
Armor on its turret was 8 inches thick. The ship cost 
$275,000 to build, and was completed in 100 days. 
March 8, 1862 these two new naval craft met, and that 
meeting revolutionized naval construction. Before the end 
of the war 60 vessels were built on plans of these ships, 
all in the United States.2 
The United States Havy consisted of 148 wooden ships, 
mostly left from the Oi vil War and of which only 48 were 
actually ready for immediate· service fifty-six years ago. 
The Monitor and Merrimac engagement, and twenty years of 
neglect had put this country out of the ·story as a. naval 
power. 
Rejuvenation of our Navy now took place in earnest when 
Congress passed an act on August 5, 1882. From this beginning 
our department developed plans for successive steps of growth. 
This growth finally culminated in the find battle cruisers on 
the shipways at the time of the Washington conference of 1921, 
and which were not completed. One feature of this new activ-
ity was the provision of the Congress rule that steel used 
should be of 'domestic manufacture' • This was a wonderful 
1 Standard Reference Works, V, Monitor and Merrimac. 
2 Ibid. 
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boost to American steel manufacture. 
An interesting feature in this connection, was the re-
port of the Secretary of the Navy, in 1882, that delay and 
great difficulty were being experienced by him in finding 
even two persons in civil life, with the established stand-
ing and reputation, as experts in naval or marine construction. 
This, of course, had been due to the change from an art to a 
science in the mruting of ships of steel instead of wood. 
The l!avy had no officers trained in theoretical archi-
tecture at this period. In 1879, however, the Secretary had 
sent two young officers to the Royal Naval College in Green-
wich, England, and the plan of sending two officers each year 
for twenty years was carried out. In 1901 a course of in-
struction for naval construction was started at Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. 
industrial life as well. 
This service had its advantages for 
In 1891 the first officer resigned 
from the service to take charge of construction work with .the 
William Cramp and Sons yard in building two battleships for 
the Uavy. 
In the Naval Appropriation Act of June 10, 1896, author-
izati.on was made for construction of a model basin at the 
Washington Navy Yard. It was constructed and is one of the 
finest in the world. In it models of ships projected, both 
for government use and private, may be given various tests 
for efficiency of design. 
As above mentioned, the steel for the new ships had been 
designated to be of domestic manufacture. At first no 
? 
manufacturer would undertake the job of making the special 
metals to the Navy specifications. Finally John Roach, of 
the John Roach Company of Chester, Pennsylvania, himself 
built a new mill and accepted the responsibility. Of course 
he was given the contract for four of the first ships •. His 
new mill soon supplied specification steel to five firms for 
naval shipbuilding. 
Great difficulties were met by his mill and later ones 
to meet the rigid specifications, and pressure was brought 
to bear to get the requirements lowered. They remained, ru1d 
finally satisfactory material was produced. From that time 
forward, the United States could produce as good steel as was 
found elsewhere in the world.l 
In 1885 the Dolphin was completed, the first of the new 
program. The vessel was put into commission, served 35 years, 
was decommissioned in 1921 and sold to private buyers in 
1922. 
Just before the ship was finished the Secretary of the 
Navy, Whitney, visited the yard and was told by Mr. Roach 
about the difficulty of forging satisfactory stern frames 
for the Chicago and other ships. He suggested casting the 
huge frames. However, no foundry in the country had anneal-
ing oven large enough. In 1886 specifications were made for 
a cast steel stern framework for the Charleston. Great 
oppoei tion went up, but in 1886 the Midvale Steel Works 
1 How the United States Navy Aids Indust~, Gov•t. Pub. 
8 
delivered a satisfactory steel casting weighing 6, 720 pounds, 
and this other epoch in sh4.pbuild.1. ng was opene'd.l 
About thi.s time the greater need for armor plate became 
apparent. Many novel experiments were made by the Havy 
ordnance department in using iron with nickel, chrome, 
vanadium, and other metal combinations to start out further 
steel improvements, until our national steel industry today 
leads the world, due to Navy needs. 
The first armor plant in this country was started by the 
Bethlehem Iron \Vorks at Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, as a result 
of a contract agreement between Lieutenant William Jacques 
of the United States Navy and Sir Joseph \Vhi tworth of the 
Whitworth Fmmdry of England. This plant got its first con-
tract from the American government for naval armor on June 1, 
1887. Shortly after this event, the Ohief of Ordnance 
visited the plant and induced them to try to make gun forgings 
for the Navy.2 To this time, gun forgings for those larger 
than six inch were purchased in England. In 1890 the work 
was undertaken, as experimental, and the guns of the Oregon 
and Massachusetts, used in the Spanish American war, were 
American products. As basic steel developed acid, open 
hearth steel was better, but insufficient ores in this 
country necessitated developing mines in Sout.h America. 
Ouban ores also met the requirements. 
1 How the United States Navy Aids Industrz., Gov' t.Pub. 40-50. 
2 The Navy in Peace Times, Gov• t. Publication, 53-54. 
To handle these new guns in their mountings, the 
Waterbury hydraulic speed gear was developed. 'This type 
of gear toda.y, used commercially, keeps automobiles on the 
highways. Commercial springs were found inadequate to 
handle heavier recoils, so special alloyed springs were 
designed. Today many phases of the commerclal life of our 
nation are benefitted by these researches.l 
9 
In 1881 President Hayes started this new era by a re-
quest to Congress for a new Uavy. Cleveland went into office 
on a platform o-::>posed t c the 'pro British' plan which had 
surrendered our control of sea power, and he started a pro-
gram of five new steel ships. Under Harrison the Navy grew 
rapidly, and in 1891 the famous White Squadron was sent to 
Europe to show the rising naval power of the United States. 
In 1888 the trouble in Samoa, whi.ch almost made a vrar 
with Germany, helped to create a desire for a 1-Tavy. The 
Venezuela affair, in 1895, again directed critical attention 
to our Navy. Admiral A. T. Mah:m, naval writer, probably 
did more to bring the lravy to the consciousness of the 
American people than any other individual, with possible 
exception of President Theodore Roosevelt. 
Following these incidents, the Havy was reorganized, 
under direction of Roosevelt, then in the Department, so 
that by the time of the Spanish American War, an effie tent 
Navy was provided for this country. Its activity in that 
1 Op. Oit., 57. 
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short encounter needs no elaboration at this point. Suffice 
it to say that its accomplishments brought the United States 
into prominence as a world sea power. 
Shortly after Roosevelt's connection ·with the Navy De-
partment, be made an address· at the Naval College, in which 
he said: 
To build up the fighting qualities, the lack of which 
no nation can exist, '111e ask for a great Uavy. We feel, 
partly, that no great nattonal life is worth li.ving if the 
nation is not willing to stake everything on the arbitration 
of wa1·, rather than to submit to the loss of honor and re-
1 nown •. 
By 1916 the United States had changed its ideas and, 
under direction of the Wilson administration, had launched 
upon the road of construction, leading to the building of 
the greatest naval force that any country had hoped to own. 
This activity was further motivated by difficulties ex-
perienced with Lloyd George's refusal to accept American in-
terpretation of "freedom of the seas" in the famous Fourteen 
Points, at the Peace Conference. 
According to official tables, given to the World Pub-
l:tshing Company for use in its World A_:tmanaq_, in 1916 the 
United States Navy had a fleet of the following ships: 2 
First line battleships 11 
Second line battlesh\ps 25 
Armored crui sere 10 
First class cruisers 5 
Second class cruisers 4 
Third class cruisers 16 
1 Mission and Needs of the United Stat.~s Navy, 30-50. 
2 ' 
World Almanac, 1919, 760. 
Monitors 7 
Destroyers 63 
Torpedo boats 18 
Submarines 38 
Gunboats 28 
Transports 4 
Supply ships 4 
Hospital shlps 1 
Fuel sh~.ps 20 
Converted yachts 14 
Unserviceable ships 21 
When the construction program of 1916 was introduced 
into Oongress, there were under construction in this 
country for the United States Navy the following ships: 1 
Second line battleships 6 
Destroyers 11 
Submarines 35 
Transports 1 
Supply shlps 1 
Fuel shtps 2 
ll 
When the U:.ti ted States actu.a.lly entered the World War 
in 1917, the lifavy had been greatly augmented, and its per-
sonnel increased, but principally by new recruits. At the 
close of the War the United Sta tea was a naval power in the 
strongest position, for the first time in :Lts history. For 
instance, on November 1, 1918 the United S ta tee Uavy had, in 
full commission, a total of 1, BOO vessels -- nearly six 
ttmes the number on the lists in 1916. 
The regular navy lists for 1917-18 showed a total of 
778 vessels, of which 58 were armored ships, 562 unarmored 
fighting ships (presumed for submarine control) 158 non-
fighting ships. In addition 36 interaed German ships had 
been repaired and fitted fo1· service, and about 1,000 
1 World Almanac, 1922, 762. 
l 
_, 
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privately owned ships (including 83 Dutch shi9s) purchased 
or chartered were either fitted or were fitting for naval 
service. About 740 of these latter were actually put into 
servioe.l 
While the country was increasinr; its naval strength 
greatly, most of this constructi:)ll had been on what is known 
as auxiliary surface craft. Many submarines had also been 
constructed. War stocks had been accumulating and the na-
val personnel composed 32,000 officers and 550,000 enlisted 
men.2 
Official figures show that on November 1, 1922 the Navy 
had in commission the following:3 
Single caliber battleships4 16 403,450 tons 
Mixed caliber battleships 23 308,146 
Battle crui sera • • • • • • • • • • Armored cruisers 8 111,900 
Monitors 7 24,964 
First class cruisers 4 36,765 
Second class cruisers 4 25,065 
Third class cruisers 15 47,820 
Destroyers 93 94,583 
Torpedo boats 17 3,147 
Torpedo vessels 15 6,275 
Submarines 79 29,886 
•renders 17 98,860 
1 Standard Reference Work, VI, 100-101. 
2 Knox, Dudley W.,"Defense of Unlted States Naval Policy1l 
Ourrent History, June 1925, XXII, 339-344. 
3 World Almanac, 1923, 686. 
4 Single caliber battleships use only one cnlib er gun in 
all turret mountings, while upper turrets on mixed 
caliber ships use smaller sizes. 
Gunboats 
Submarine chasers 
Mine sweepers 
Transports 
Converted yachts 
Sup-ply ships 
Hospital ships 
Fuel ships 
Special service ships 
Unserviceable for war 
37 34,710 
300 23,100 
14 13,300 
5 57,295 
12 8,711 
5 33,900 
6 34,097 
21 248,989 
13 83,891 
15 43,336 
13 
In addition, there were under construction or author-
ized, the followine; naval unit s:l 
Types 
Single caliber battleships 
Mixed caliber battleships 
Battle cruisers 
Second class cruisers 
Submarines 
Destroyers 
Gunboats 
Patrol boats 
Submarine chasers, 
Mine sweepers 
Hospital stlip 
Fuel shi}.Js· 
Special service ships 
Transports 
Tenders 
The relative strength of the 
fore the Washington conference:2 
Type u.s. G. B. 
Battleshtps 33 46 
Battle cruisers 10 
Cruisers 19 21 
Light cruisers .. 67 
Aircraft car-
riere .. 6 
Submarines 107 185 
11 
•• 
6 
10 
77 
232 
2 
58 
36 
35 
1 
3 
2 
• • 
•• 
Author-
ized 
2 
• • 
• • 
•• 
9 
12 
•• 
• • 
• • 
.. 
• • 
• • 
1 
3 
naval pow.ers in 1921 be-
France Japan Italy 
17 11 9 
.. 4 • • 
9 9 4 
. . 8 .. 
. . l •• 55 17 74 
1 World Almanac, composite tables, 1920, 1921, 1922, 1930. 
2 Ibid. 
14 
The main it ems under construe tion were: 1 
Type u.s. G.B. France Japan Italy 
Battleships 10 .. 4 8 4 
Battle cruisers 6 .. . . 8 •• 
Light cruisers 10 • • 6 21 • • 
Destroyers 115 •• . . 56 10 
Submarines 59 • • 9 46 7 
. Allowing a year and a half to have these completed, 
added to the preceding tables, and the reader can easily 
see what the neet of the United States could have been by 
June, 1923 and by July 1924. A few of the ships in the 
above tables were finished and put into commission prior to 
the Washington conference. 
When Roosevelt came into the Presidency, he stated in a 
message to Congress that . II ship for ship, the A me ric an Navy 
must be better than any other in the world". Later in his 
career, he stated that II the Navy offers 1).8 the only means of 
malcing the Monroe Doctrine anything but a derision". 
When Germany was suing for peace, and was willing to 
accept the fourteen poin·ts, the European allies did not agree 
with the United States because they claimed so many of the 
points were vague and meantngless. American interpretations 
of them were made with Wilson's consent. The point of free-
dom of the seas was explained at length and flatly refused by 
Lloyd George for England. 
Wilson replied that if the British would not accept it, 
they could c oun t upon the certain fact tha. t the United States 
1 Op. Cit. 
15 
had materials a.nd equipment to buil.d up the strongest naval 
force that the world had ever seen-- 11 as strong as our re-
sources will :permit and the lcind tbe people desire to seen. 
As ably stated by Mr. o. A. Tinker: 11 We were no longer 
a nation open to easy burglary, nor were we de:iant, but con-
vinced that we were our own b0st friends" .1 
Following the conference the United Sta tee actually to ole 
the treaty into serious consj.deration, and began destroying 
the potential naval power. There were seventeen ships sold, 
scrapped or sunk; seven of those that were practio.ally com-
pleted were sold a.s junk. These were to have been 43,000 tons 
each, and would have been the stro;:1gest of this class afloat. 
Also there were six battle cruisers contemplated to back up 
this formidable first line -- plans Wel~e now changed, four 
were sold a :.d two converted into aircraft carriers. 
In all the building, there bas been nothing partisan in 
development of the Navy. During a tour of the Middle West, 
in 1910, Theodore Roosevelt said: 
The Navy is not an affair of the sea coast. There is 
not a man who lives in the grass country, or along the Great 
Lakes, or the Missouri that is not as keenly interested in 
the navy as if he dwelt on the New England coast, or the 
Gulf Ooast or Puget Sound. The Navy belongs to all of us. 
The following table shows the comparative sizes of 
main categories of the five powers November 15, 1931. 
1 
Tinker, C. A., 11 Navy the Right Arm et! the State Depart-
ment", Current History, October, 1926. 
Types Great Britain United States 
Battleships 18 555,050 15 453,900 
Aircraft carriers 6 115,350 3 77,500 
Large cru. i sere 19 183,686 8 72,900 
Small cruisers 30 139,140 10 70,500 
Destroyers 26 33,745 71 83,700 
Submarines 48 49,919 65 58,220 
Types Japan France 
Battleshius 10 298,400 6 133,134 
Aircraft carriers 3 61,370 1 22,050 
Large cruisers 8 68,400 5 50,000 
Small crui.sers 17 81,455 4 27' 011 
Destroyers 77 92,285 38 61,903 
Submarines 67 70,973 35 29,002 
At the time of this table's compilation, the tons 
being built by the main powers were as follows·: 
Types 
Aircraft carriers 
Large cruisers 
Small cruisers 
Destroyers 
Submarines 
Types 
Aircraft carriers 
Large cruisers 
Small cruisers 
Destroyers 
Submarines 
Great Britain 
••••••• 
• • • • • • • • • 
4 28,000 
21 28,756 
2 2,400 
Japan 
1 
4 
1 
9 
5 
7' 600 
40,000 
8, 500 ' 
14,987 
8, 269 
Tables from World Almanac, 1932, 369. 
United States · 
1 
7 
• • 
5 
3 
• • 
2 
3 
19 
53 
13,800 
70,000 
...... 
contracted 
3,800 
France 
• • • • • • 
20,000 
17,326 
46,071 
54,028 
16 
17 
A noticeable feature of the recent years has been 'the 
marked increase in the costs of the Arnerican N·avy. The 
following table shows the general upward trend of our peace 
time ~Tavy. Of course there must be placed with this table 
the understanding of the increased cost of materials, labor, 
rates of pay and other conditions which, no doubt, are re-
flected to some extent. 
The cost of new constructions can be referred to in a 
later chapter, with criticisms af' the IIBig Navy Pa1·ty11 that 
there is not enough attention being given to our fleet. Per 
capita coste however w1.11 be very low. 
Year 
1885 
1890 
1895 
1900 
1901 
1902 
1903 
1904 
1905 
1906 
1910 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
19l8 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
Cost of the United States Navy, 1885 to 1931. 
~Tew con-
struction 
1,591,500 
4,842,140 
10,459,211 
10,659,155 
10,644,217 
14,392,921 
21,807,999 
31,403,948 
36,894,266 
31,764,556 
24,736,599 
19,532' 806 
24,930,490 
24,630,999 
26,135,389 
31,990,664 
28,677,332 
44,858,781 
259,904,940 
366,215,760 
171,210,758 
155,896,585 
88,420,186 
38,102,059 
40,384,841 
27,371,834 
Maintenance 
operations 
5,561,431 
6,296,735 
7,681,676 
15,880,268 
19,287,285 
20,204,704 
24,987,293 
27,870,477 
29, 378, 7:39 
29,306,259 
46,490,042 
48,781,692 
49,242,628 
49,154,008 
53,416,710 
55,324,768 
56,533,425 
77,024,242 
242,619,389 
421,909,851 
242,282,188 
222,451,492 
201,925,028 
151,557,316 
148,957,769 
139,474,276 
Shore station 
improvements 
301,000 
1' 646,106 
964,706 
5,252,054 
8,221,092 
7,756,334 
9,230,294 
11,461,733 
13,615,147 
9,389,183 
8, 614,768 
10,504,405 
9,862,719 
7,443,132 
7,918,746 
7,191,804 
6,117,922 
8, 608,971 
136,292,028 
116,316,452 
87,310,649 
42,571,978 
35,701,269 
19,725,519 
16,546,726 
17,410,626 
Marines 
565,143 
611,4:23 
801,873 
1,589,992 
2,364,903 
2,393,830 
2,552,038 
2,996,679 
3,289,515 
3,635,697 
5, 920,027-
5,270,777 
6,663,814 
5,758,531 
6,811,465 
6,417,980 
6,699,327 
14, 6:39,787 
46,325,393 
75,870,495 
37,863,408 
33,863,408 
27,406,140 
25,187,998 
24,598,999 
23,353,508 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
.1931 
18 
Cost of the United States Navy, 1885 to 1931, Continued. 
16,852,119 
19,238,789 
24,737,522 
34,250,641 
32,205,085 
29,727,504 
146,370,977 
145,605,391 
194, 799, 215 
201,806,051 
160,702,434 
128,635,792 
9,012,324 
8,945,688 
6,577,269 
8,440,922 
10,389,171 
12,146,185 
23,630,488 
21,512 '149 
27,275,124 
45,398,930 
24,302,950 
22,527,076 
The above tables are reproduced from similar tables 
given in the World Almanac, 1932 edition, page 370. These 
figures are obtained from the United States Navy Department 
and, barring typographical error, must be assumed to be 
correct expenditures by our government. 
OHAP"1'ER II 
OUR HEED OF A NAVY 
The highest duty of a State is self-preservation. 
Self-preservation is for the State an at·solute moral ob-
ligation. Therefore, it must be made clear that of all 
moral sirls, that of weakness is the most heinous and des-
'9lcable. ·The sin of weakness is a sin against the Holy 
Ghost. 
-- Treitschke 
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Briefly in the foregoing chapter we have reviewed some 
of the history of the growth of the Navy of the United 
States. In th ts chapter it i.e ·olanned to give reasons why 
there is a need for a l~avy now, in the ::)ast, and the probable 
continuance of suqh necessity in the future. As a reason for 
the existence of a Navy, allow us to divert your attention to 
the quotation heading this page. Briefly, this is one reason 
-- that of defense. Others that will be treated here are 
freedom of the seas, sea power, adequate merchant marine 
facil1 ties, prestige of the nat ion, value to the diploma tic 
service, and foreign pol icy of the nat ion, training for 
citizenship, and lastly, for use under conditions brought on 
by war. 
Sea Power and Freedom of the Seas 
Since the davm of this nation, we have been contending 
with other nat inns, particularly Great Britain, in regard to 
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the freedom of the seas.l The questi.on started in colonial 
days, continued durL1g the Revolution, as was to be expected, 
was carried on by Great Britain after the nation was set up, 
and in 1812 an inconclusive war was carried on 1'\Ti th Engla:.1d 
over such a question. In the Civil War the same questi.on 
popped up again, and again in the World Yvnr. In this last 
conflict there was a grave possibili. ty of this nation enter-
ing the struggle against Great Britain, but Germany stupidly 
diverted the wrath to herself, and the United States entered 
with the Allies in their "iVar to end Vfar 11 , to make the world 
11 safe for democ:+acy11 -- and a thousa~1d other selling slogal!s 
used for the time. 
This nation has never been strongly inclined tow·ard 
building a 1 Arge navy; it turned 1 ts interests more to 
commercial and shipping programs. The people have asserted 
their rights to trade as they wish, and have resisted e'fery 
effort of nations to unjustly curb that right, even though 
those nations be involved in a war.2 However, Lieutenant 
Frost contends, it has never been held t:na t the rights of 
neutrals are unrestrtcted. 
Referring to a discussi(m of the subject by James T. 
Gerould·, 3 I would sumnarize the early history of the struggle 
of the nations interested in the question in this manner: 
1 Gerould, James T., "Freedom of the seas-- the Crux of 
Disarmament", Current History, February 1929, 729. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid .. 
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In the Fourteenth century the Consolato del Mare was issued. 
Then came the Mare Liberum of Grotius to combat English claims 
to rights on the North Sea. This was answered soon by John 
Seldon's Mare Clausum, followed by a statement of Catherine 
II of Russia that free ships made free goods. France answered 
with "enemy ships, enemy goods". Later the British Admiralty 
claimed that enemy goods, contraband or not, found in neutral 
ships, constituted lawful prize. Contraband has never been 
fully determined. 
During the Crimean 1.,ar, President Pierce asked that the 
powers of Euroue agree on the point of 11 free ships, free 
goods". In 1856 the powers intereeted met at Paris and de-
cided (1) to end privateering, (2) to eliminate "paper'1 
blockades, (3) to except from captu.re enemy goode in neutral 
ships, or neutral goods, if not contraband, in enemy shi·oa. 
The United States, having asl~ed for such action, \Vas not 
asked to attend, and refused to accept the decisions, but 
two years later did agree, with the proviso that there be 
included a statement to the effect that "private property, 
of subjects or cittzens of belligerent nati()~1s, on the high 
seas, shall be exempt from seizure by an armed public vessel 
of any belligerent nation, exce'Pt they be contraband. 11 There 
was nothing done about the request. 
Later, when the Uorth maintained its blockade of the 
Southern ports, in the Civil War, the policy of continuous 
voyage was introduced into the question of freedom of the 
seas. Precedents of such a policy came back to the United 
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States fifty years 1 ater to put our government to consider-
able trouble to save American ships from capture by the 
Brit :teh.l 
When the Hague Conference met in 19d7, the United States 
tried to get an adoption of a policy of freedom of the seas, 
except in cases of effective blockades. The British favored 
doing away with contraband.s, and both failed. However, con-
traband was defined at a meeting in London two years later, 
but the decision never came in~o full force in internntionaJ. 
law.2 
Sea power is linked with freedom of the seas. W'e have 
numerous examples of such a condition in the past history of 
the world. Freedom of the seas to Germany would have changed 
the complexion of the World Ylar. Freedom of the seas allm"i'ed 
the British empire to rise to the heights that it has 
attained. England rules the sea lanes. Napoleon and other 
continental Euro,ean leaders never put foot on English soil 
because of the fact that the balance of sea power was against 
them. The Engli eh Navy did not ne·ed to bombard seacoast 
towns, nor stage raids on the continental countries, and it 
did not, but the presence of power existed and acted as a 
deterring factor in any plans for conQues "i·S of the Brit ish 
Isles. Sea power has always been a factor in the greatness 
1 Gerould, J. T., "Freedom of the Seas -- the Crux of 
Disarmament" , Cur rent History, Febru:.:U:y 1929, 730. 
2 Ibid. 
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of a nat 1. on. 1 
Sea power may be com}Jared to a chain of three gigantic 
lines; commerce, merchant marine, and navy. The strength is 
no greater than the weakest link. In the history of the past, 
nations have pushed their way to comma!H.Ung positions in two 
WR.ys; by mili ta:uy power or by sea power. 
To Americans the development of overwhelming military 
power is reuulsi.ve; while our boundaries have been pushed 
across the continent partially by employment of troops, the 
use has been so slight that to most Americans the conquest 
of the West has not had a military a.spect. The use of sea 
power as a means of increasing aatioJ:1al strength has not met 
with the same objections. 
While we do not believe in taking property by force, we 
do not see why we should not compete for trade in every mar-
ket of the world. In cases of emergency, our traders do not 
hesitate to call for protection of their leg:i. timate interests 
by force, and our gover.!j\ment has repeatedly used the Navy to 
afford such protection. tj 
Let us briefly summarize the importance of sea power. 
Discovery eras were led by Spain and Portugal. These 1.1.c'1.ti.ons 
had sea power, but their interests were dominated by the 
military angle only. They were more interested in capturing 
terri tory and enslaving the inh.a.bi tants than to make commerc-
ial contacts and build up trade with them. .The Dutch, however, 
did build up sea power and carried on commercial enterprises 
with newly discovered lands. Following the divisi.on of the 
world by the Pope, there was left no 11 open door" la·1d for the 
Dutch. They had to be able to defe~1d their tr['.ding ex-
peditions so their trips were both commercial and nava1. 
1 Knox, Oapt. Dudley W., Our Stake in Sea Power, U. s. 
Naval Institute Proceedings, no. 256, 29-41. 
2 Frost, Lieut. Oomm. H. H., Sea Power, U. S. Naval In-
stitute Proceedings, no. 256, 54. 
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Sea power built the Hetherlands in to one of the great powers 
of Europe. Later the Dutch became very wealthy and forgot 
that sea power presupposed a navy to protect the commerce, 
and the English power rose in place of the Dutch. 
Once England had gained ascendancy, the DUtch descent 
from a greo.t power poe it ion was rapid a'l.d inevitable. Eng-
land became the great commercial power. It is true that 
much of the early rise to power was due to semi-piratical 
attacks on ships and posseesi.ons of other lands. With the 
Dutch power gone, English Navigation Laws practically ruined 
her merchant marine. During the following years the British 
Navy became the main factor in her power. Bri t~dn early 
learned the lesson that a Navy was vi tal to sea power and 
security, while commerce made only for prosperity. 
sea power acquisition helped build the American nation. 
From the date of their founding, the American colonies took 
to sea commerce. In 1698 a colonial governor wrote to a 
friend in England: 
I believe that there are more good vessels belonging 
to the town of Boston than there are in all Scotland or 
Ireland, unless one reckon herring boats. 
The American colonists early learned the a.rt of ship-build-
ing (in wooden ships it was art), and by 1702 one-third of 
the ships flying the British flag were American made. This 
early start and training in seamanship stood the colonies 
in good stead durtng the Revoluti on.l 
1 Frost, H. H., Naval Institute Reprints. no. 256, 54-62. 
r ( 
f 
r 
I 
I 
t 
' 
25 
Sea power has taught lessons down through the years of 
history. We have already mentioned the loss of American land 
to a rising sea power. Fr;;mce learned the lesson of inade-
quate sea power in the loss of her colonia~ empire. Evm 
England learned that decisions can be forced in sea actions; 
for example, the two actions now pointed to be historians as 
decisive in our early history -- Lr:1~ce Champlain and Yorktown.l 
Benedict Arnold led the first naval engagement of the 
future United States in the combat on Lr;_ke Champlain. The 
defeat to the English here paved the way for Burgoyne's de-
feat 1 ater and the subsequent alliance vri th France. The use 
of the French fleet, under De Grasse, who outwitted the 
English at Y0rktovm, brought the end of the Revolution. Th:i.s 
was our nation born with the aid of sea power, contends 
Captain Gatewood. 
In the war of 1812 victories on the Great Lakes, a 
second vi.ctory on Lake Cro.mplain, and numerous conquests on 
the high seas were practically the only outstanding fert.ures 
in anything toward a dec:i.sion for the United States. With-
out these two lake victories, it is doubtful if the United 
States could have even obtained a draw out of the war. 
Blockading of the South won the war for the Union in 
1865. In the Spanish American War, troops were delayed in 
getting into and out of Cuba because we had inaclequa te 
merchant marine facilities. Troops were brought baclc from 
1 Gatewood, R. D., Sea Power a.nd DestinY-_. Naval Institute 
Proceedings, 291:5, 28-32. 
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the Philippines and Cuba in Spanish ships chartered for the 
purpose by our government.l 
In the World War we learned, in addition to the rest of 
the world, the value of sea power. Shall we throw a·way our 
1 earnlng, or shall it be applied? Real shipbuilding was an 
art, which it doubtless became. With the adoption of iron 
and steel to hulls, tP.e art became submerged by science. 
Within the last year scientific tests on a •bulbous• hull and 
bow have been made, and found to uphold that style of design 
as cutting down resistance and allowing greater speed 
effictency. 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, architectural 
officers were sent to Europe to gain information concerning 
naval architecture. '.rhey gradually built up designing in 
this country until today our marine designers can hold their 
places with any natlon in efficient designing. It might be 
interesting to note here that the old 'fexas was built from 
plans purchased fl•om an Englishman .. 2 
The reason. for maintaining sea power is a simple one. 
1 Overstreet, Capt. L. :M., Merchant Marine, Naval Institute 
Proceedings, no. 296, 46. 
2 Gatewood, R. D., Sea Power and American Destiny. 
Richard Gatewood, father of the quoted wri. ter, was the 
first Cadet Engineer sent to the Royal Haval College in 
Greenwich. Two officers were sent each year for 20 
years, studying in Glasgow, Paris, or Greenwich. (See 
Navy as Leader in Sh·i.p Construction, U. B. Gov' t Pub.) 
UavaJ. Institute Reprint., 29(-3, 28-32. 
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As a neutral in time of war, our commerce should be continued 
\Vi th those nations which are our customers. If' this movement 
is defin.i tely checlced, such a halting might bring disaster to 
many of our industries. To carry on this trade, shipping is 
a necessity. If '\Ve depend upon others to do this for us, and 
one of these carrying nati one be at war, 1 t is highly probable 
that our transportation problems would be neglected in favor 
of their own.l 
We cannot depend upon belligerent nations, or interested 
ones, to car1·y our goods sati.sfaotorily in time of \var. If 
this is necessary, we might be forced to submit to onerous 
terms, if we got serv4.ce at all. For an example of this we 
can refer back to several occasions of the last war. 
We know how the belligerents withdrew the:i.:r shipping 
during the early stages of the World War, leaving our ship-
ping terminals blocked with merchandise that could not even 
be unloaded from the :railroad cars in which it had been 
shipped to the docks. Then, as the powers concerned in the 
confl i.ot began to lose merchant shipping, the necessity of 
sea power became of greater impo1•tance. When a war exists, 
no mere law will protect commerce that is sea-borne. Since 
trade with neutrals is a vi tal necessity to belligerent na-
tions, each will feel the necessity of preventing the 
neutrals from supplying the enemies. Then, mere law must be 
supported by a very r eal and adequate force that we call the 
1 Frost, H. H., Naval Institute Reprints. no. 296, 54-02. 
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Navy. neutral rights under international law must be pre-
served.l 
The League of Nations provides that any member nation 
that starts an aggressive crunpaign shall be penalized through 
infliction of a boycott. The United States is not a member 
of that orga-d.zation, and in such an event might hesitate to 
submit to such orders. Without adequate sea power of the 
three categories, it might be forced to acquiece, but diplo-
matic stands would be mai·\tained through naval prowess.2 
Ohief amqng our -policies is the one based on "freedom of 
the s eas 11 • This is a point in which the need of a Navy is 
apparent to defend this policy; also to defend American 
commercial rights in both peace and war. Our f;reign commerce 
exceeds that of Great Britain, which leads, however, in amount 
of shipping under her own flag. We fell into a disastrous war 
in 1812 because we could not defend our rights on the sea, and 
our shipping. Since the participation in the World War, this 
nation has a large merchant marine, al t:aough not large enough, 
and this means that such an arm of our sea power cannot be 
allowed to go undefended. 3 
In the Oiv n War the United Sta tee developed and pro-
mulgated the doctrine of "continuous voyage" whereby goods 
1 Lansing, Robert, "Outlawing War", Independent, OXIII, 
95-96. 
2 McLaren, W. A., "Navy as Effective Agency in Diplomacy", 
Our rent History, XXI, 570-57 4. 
3 Knox, D. W., "Defense of Haval Pol icy", Current His torz, 
XXV, June 1925, 339-344. 
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on the high seas, intended for enemy consumption, could be 
held as lawful prize. In the recent war, Great Britain ex-
tended this doctrine. In the future, in case of war, we may 
expect the enemy to strike at our seaborne commerce wherever 
found, and \Ve will probably wish to do the same to him, is 
the opinion of Steed aad Gerould. 
In this regard the function of the Navy is to deny the 
use of the sea for civil or military traffic to the enemy or 
his friends, the while it is kept open for our own use. For 
this reason battleships are necessary to secure free fields 
for cruiser operation. The mere nresence of the great fleet 
of Engla;1d in the North Sea prevented the German fleet from 
at t;acking English commerce. The powerful Austrian fleet 
was kept in or near home ~;Jorts for the same reason, and did 
not strike a d.eci.sive blow of any kind during the conflict.l 
It must be remembered that combatant shi-f)S fight, nor 
for the lone reason of overcoming each other, which is but a 
small purpose, but for the more ulterior puroose of command-
ing sea lanes and wrecking the commerce of the opponents. 2 
In the Washington conference, Bs.lfour spoke with em-
phasis on the needs of the Bri ttsh, in response to maritime 
communications, and declared that cruisers, otner than 
battleships, were matters of cons ·1.deration of experts. 
According to his later writings in the London Times, 
1 Steed, W., "Freedom of the Seas--t··e Crux of Disarmament", 
curre~1t History, XXIX, 720-727. 
2 Ibid., 727. 
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December 1928, he said: 
The quest ion between the United s·t-atee and Britain was 
not one of ton:1age so much as it was one of the freedom of 
the seas, whether it v.ras legitimate to blockade, because 1 t 
stood to reason that the United s~ates Navy was in a position 
to be able to break a blockade against any nation with which 
she had extensive commerce. The Bri tisb are an island 
people and remember the Spantsh Armada, the threats of the 
Napoleonic wars and the German blockade, but have forgot ten 
the War of 1812. The average American child knows more 
about that war than the educated Englishman. We do not see 
why the United States needs much of a Navy, but we cannot 
see why anyone would question the British right to have a 
very adequate Navy.l 
In answer to such arguments several American writers 
brought out the point of the need of freedom of the seas. 
According to one writer, this nation bas, since its begin-
ning, contended With Great Britain on this point. James 
Gerou1d stated: 
We have been primarily interested in commercial in-
terests, and we demand that those interests be unmolested. 
We have asserted our rights to trade as we wish~ and will 
resist efforts of nat:i.ons to curb those rights. 
Wickham Steed, English writer, said in substance, in his 
article, that freedom of the seas has been a useful slogan 
in history for some time. The control of world trade, 
comme roe, colonies, and the like have all been British 
because of her control of sea power and freedom of the seas. 
In the war the Germans made use of the slogan, the 
British took it up, and the Americans incorporated it into 
1 
Steed, W., "Freedom of the Seas", Ourre:·lt Hi sto :g_, 
February 1929, 721. 
2 Geroul d, J. T., 11 Freedom of the Seas -- the Orux of 
Disarmament", Current Historz, Feb., 1929, 727-730. 
a point for peace negotiations as follows: 
Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside 
territorial waters, alike in peace and in war, except as 
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the seas may be closed in whole, or in part, by internation-
al action for the enforcements of international covenants.~ 
What is a Navy for? Fundamentally to build up sea 
power, and to exist p arti.ally for the support of land 1Jower. 
It is nat true that the Untt ed S :a tes could be self support-
ing. Serious interruption of our oversea transportation, 
by the infringement on our freedom of the seas, could soon 
bring about a complete disruption of our complex economic 
l1.fe, privation and suffering for many of our people as to 
be comparable in gravity to hostile invasion. In the World 
War, Russia, whose natural resources exceed those of the 
United States, collapsed because her access to the sea had 
been cut off. Sea power ts undoubtedly an alloy of many 
forces,. and not the least of these is access to the sea and 
the ability to maintain, at least to a certain extent, some 
control of the sea.2 
Sea power of Britain beat France in the Napoleonic wars, 
when Napoleon waged nwa.r to end warn. Sea power influenced 
Germany in the period of 1893 to 1914, and has influenced 
Japan since 1917. England built up a navy because her people 
were sea-minded and of the sea history of the nation. It 
also gave protection to the commerce of the nation. 3 
Sea power is merely the expressed ability of a people to 
conduct a mercantile and martial transportat:ton, by sea, or 
overseas, of ideas, persons, and materials, more or less ex-
tensively both in war and in peace. It aria es from the de-
sires of the people to have products from diverse lands in-
terchanged. Sa:·eguarding these interests, policiug the seas 
in peace, and controlling them in Vtar, calls for naval power. 
Maritime trade is the parent of shipping power; shipping 
power is the parent of naval power, and these two are the 
principal constituents of sea p~rer. 
-- W. H. Gardiner, 
Pres. U. s. Navy League 
1 
Xnox, D. W., "Defense of U. S. Naval Poltcy", Current 
His to 1':{. June 1926, 339-344. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Gardiner, W. H., "Atlantic and. Pacific Sea Power", 
Our rent Hi story, October 192 2, 11-16. 
It'·' 
Navy Aide national Prestige 
The prestige of this nation rose tremendously with the 
visit of the 'White Squadron• to E'l.l.::ope wllen the !Tavy was 
rejuvenated. Then with decisive defeat to Spain, our stand-
ing rose higher. With the round-the-world trip of 1907 the 
United States assumed a world pow.er standing in the eyes of 
every nat ton where the ships "showed the flag". As long as 
the feeling exists that there is something to the idea that 
migbt is right, the grim combatant ship carries the ~_;restigc 
of the nation it represents.! 
In the Orient the people looked to see something come 
from the Washington conference as an aid to the prestige of 
the whites, as they (the whites) had always embodied that 
feeling. Prestige is a-oparently bu.il t upon sure power and 
on decisive action, in Oriental minds. They had looked in 
vain to the Peace Conference, so hope lay on Washington. 
With the cutting down of the United States Uavy, the 
prestige of this nation dropped in the East. This was an 
unfortunate occurrence for us.2 
This reasonable feeling of prestige upholds every 
consul' e land in every land. Often action must be decisive 
to have its effect. If the consul has no national prestige 
1 Wilbur, C. D., U. S. Government Reprint 296, 1-5. 
2 Peffer, Nathaniel, "Aftermath in the Far East'l Century, 
May 1922, 83-85. 
behind him, many of his actions might be seriously handi-
capped.l 
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The United States Navy is but a potential agency in the 
execution of American foreign policic s, and it is only 
natural that a great nation like ours will have many 
policies that will dtrectly affect the business man.2 
Serious students of history attribute the integrity of 
territory in Ohina to the nopen doorn policy maintained by 
the United Sta tee. It is interesting to note here that not 
only has the Uavy been the chief instrument in the perpetua-
tion of this policy, but that a naval officer was primarily 
responsible for the establishment of the principle over 
three-quarters of a century ago.3 American people can, by 
these occurrences, realize that the mission of the Havy is 
being continually fulfilled without bloodshed. 
Repeatedly since the war, in turbulent regions of 
this hemisphere, and on oooasions in the other, the appear-
ance of the American flag from the masthead of a cruiser., or 
the truck of a destroyer, has given those troubled with the 
spirit of unrest cause for reflection, with consequent stop-
ping of hostilities and restoration of order. The Hear East 
was unhealthy in many ways following the World War. The 
1 Wilbur, 0. D., Oommerce and the Flag, U. s. Gov•t. 
Reprint, no. 296, 1-3. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Kearney, Oommodore. 
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condition was aggravated by a war betw·een Greece and Turkey. 
American interests in the region were sertGu.sly jeopardized. 
The United Ste.tes Navy came to the rescue with several 
destroyers, basing at Constantinople, and operating in the 
region until fa.ir play and justice were the regular order of 
the day. The appearance of the American ship, with the 
prestige of the nation represented by it, always had a most 
stabilizing influence in allowi:ig our diplomatic representa-
tives in the localities to handle conditions and our busi-
ness people to c·mtinue in l-egitimate commerci.al tra;·1sactions.1 
The doctrine of a supreme iJavy, not to make war but to 
preserve peace, not to be predatory bu.t to shield free de\rel-
opment of commerce, not to u:·;set the world, but to stabilize 
it through the T'romotion of law and order, has been demon-
strated as sound. For years Britain has given us demonstra-
tions thr:t n:val armaments are not necessarily provoc::;.tive of 
war. During the past hundred years the mere· presence of the 
Royal Navy has been sufficient to deter other nations from 
interfering with her home life.2 
Use For Defense 
Another function of our Navy, hinted at in the above 
1 United States N~in Peace Time, U. S. Gov 1 t. Pub., 1-6. 
2 Ibid. 
paragraph, is that of defense, both of our coast and our 
commerce. A function also is the defense of the United 
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States' policies and ideals, as well as the preservation of 
our sovereignty, and the prohibition of necessity of accept-
ing dictation from other nations having other ideals and 
morals. The Uavy protects the consci.ence of the nat;on, up-
holding its right to do right as it sees the right, not as 
some other nntion might see it. We can cite the immigration 
laws as one example of this right.l 
The Navy is a ~art of our sea power, and a by-product 
of sea power must be coast defense. A treaty-sized }Tavy, 
operating from Hawaii, would protect the entire coast 
against in vas ion; if operating from Cape Cod or the Virgin 
Islands it would be able to protect the entire eastern coast. 
However, for such sea power battleships, airplanes, cruisers, 
,.., 
submarines and other auxiliaries must combine to make it • .:::. 
Here it may be well worth a moment's reflection on the 
fact that every grt>nt center of population in our nation is 
located on, or close,to, easy water transportation, with the 
controlling centers on sea coasts. At such pointe we have 
concentrated half the total population of the country, and 
more than half the aggregate wealth. The British very 
properly <ivell upon their peculiar geographical condi t tons 
and the economic strtJcture of thei.r empire, which calls for 
1 McLaren, W. A. ,"Navy As An Effective Agency In DiplomacY", 
Current History, Jan. 1925, XXII, 570-574. 
2 Salisbury, W., "American Haval Efficiency", Current 
History, April 1922, XVI, 33. 
maintenance and protection of coast defense and sea routes 
for transportation. Substantially the same arguments hold 
good in the United States, yet it is very seldom that they 
are advanced, probably because they are not felt difficul-
ties, or probably not well understood.l 
The distance from England to Canada is about that from 
New England to Texas, while the trip from Boston to Oregon, 
via Panama Canal, is about that from England to India or 
South Africa. From Maine to Alaska, through the canal, is 
equal to that from Australia to England. Australia to 
India is less than Los Angeles to Boston. With these 
comparisons, is it not easy to see the point of England's 
particular necessity of greater protection to more commerce. 
Did you ever compare the size of our ocean-going internal 
commerce? Excluding the trade with the Philippines and on 
the Great Lakes, our aggregate domestic sea-borne commerce 
?. is considerably over 100,000,000 cargo tons per year."" 
This figure is substantially equal to our total im-
ports and exports under all flags, to foreign countries by 
sea. In addition, if this coast-wise traffic is to be 
properly evaluated, we should include the frui ters from the 
Caribbean and Central America, and oil tankers from Mexi.co. 
These two items will. increase the volume nearly twenty-five 
1 Knox, D. W., Our Stake In Sea Power, Naval Institu!~ 
Proce!dings, No. 296, 38-40. 
2 Ibid., 40. 
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percent. Here is a point of commerce defense that cannot and 
must not be overlooked,l 
Most of our Americans have little true co•\ception of the 
extraordinary volume of our domestic seaboard commerce, or 
its potent influence on most of our gr<::at industries, and a:re 
therefore quite unable to appreciate the consequences of its 
serious interruption. Successful blocking of this traffic 
would greatly dislocate business, and bring about hard times 
on a scale beyond anything the nation has ever experienced.2 
Therefore, we maintain that security of this coastwise 
shipping is a cardinal point for the maintenance of our 
adequate Navy. Within the last ten years we have seen 
columns of printed material as to why Bri te.in needs numer-
ous swift cruisers to protect sea lanes, sea trades and sea 
communications, yet scarcely a word have we read about the 
points just mentioned in connection with American trade, 
with greater internal ocean commerce. We have one less 
vital point, in that we are the better able to provide the 
bulk of foodstuffs in necessities, than Engla~ld can possibly 
do. 
By virtue of the British system of nava.l bases, a 
British man-of-war built for defense purposP.s only, 
operating from a base in the Western Atlantic could ~lay 
havoc with our coastwise trade. On the other hand, complete 
absence of American· bases in the Eastern Atlantic denies to 
our trade any defense, or retaliatory measures, that would 
1 Op. 01 t., ·4o. 
2 Ibid. 
I 
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aid in distracting attention. This is the attitude held by 
Captain Knox. 
It is, or should be, easily manj_fest to the average 
person, that the rarely mentioned, seldom considered, little 
appreciated, but nevertheless very important coastwise trade, 
not to mention the valuable foreign trade of no mean propor,· 
tiona, c rmsti tute a coge 'lt reason and a c01upelling argument 
for a vi tal • stake' in sea power, and defense, superior to 
that of any other na.tion.l 
The Un:tted States is the most conservative great nation 
of the present time. It has the most to eain from peace and 
the most to lose from war. Umler these conditions, a func-
tion of the American Navy is to stabilize the Kellogg Peace 
Pact by making it inadvisable for other nations to resort to 
war as an instrument of national policy. Here again we 
build up a defense for our nation and its ideals. 
Defense and national safety are, and should be, rather 
synonymous in their conveyed meaning. Article VIII of the 
League of Nations Covenant recognizes nat i.onnl safety in 
the following statement: 
The maintenance of peace requires the reduction of 
national armaments to the lowest point c,-;nsistent with 
nattonal safety, and the enforcement of ,international 
obligations. 
This document, therefore, puts emphasis upon defense through 
its reference to "national eafetytt. 
1 Gatewood, R. D., Naval Ineti tute. Proceedings, no. 296, 
28-32. 
39 
It is said that the United States has no naval policy. 
To some extent this is true. However, we have had some 
sort of naval policy since the time of Washington. Every 
Prest dent has felt the need of a proper Navy, and yet none 
has given us a policy applicable to our ~ituation. We have 
always had need and reasons for defense. 
To sum up the arguments of this section, allow the in-
clusion of a few statements concerning the foregoing con-
tentions. Admiral Roger~ says that: 
the only reliable defense of our country is the armed might 
to sustain our rights and su.pport the sanctions of interna-
tional law against evil-disposed na tiona who wish to wrench 
the law and thrust upon us the obligations of their devise-
ment ''i thout our consent. 
International Law and Defense 
In international law moral sanctions prevail, since 
there is no.supernational power to exert physical sanction. 
The effectiveness of any law is the moral or physical 
sanction that underlies it. Physical sanction is the most 
common, and is the prevailing means of law enforceme·1t. 
1\1oral sanctions are those imposed by an individual upon him-
self, and they depend upon his sense of justice and duty to 
do what is right.3 
It is the good faith of nations and their sense of 
obligations and standards of interne.tional morality that 
1 Niblack, A. P., "New Naval Fronts", Current Historx., 
Nov. 1925, 234-237, XXIII: 
2 Rodgers, W. L., "Shall America Arm?", Forum, LXXIII, 636. 
3 Lansing, R., "Faliacy of Outlawing War11 , Independent, 
CXIII, 95-97. 
40 
give vitality to the laws of nations, and in any way justify 
the application of the word "lnw11 to the princ'iples and pre-
cepts which have come to be recognized as those which should 
regulate intercourse between civilized states. However, it' 
a nation does not respond to moral obligations, if its gov-
ernment is inspired by immoral purposes, what remedy is 
there 1 eft except an a:p~)eD.l to arms for protection and de-
fense? Will the morality of the issue help the unarmed and 
defenseless state? It is the only me:ms in which a nation 
may act to prevent an unscrupulous or ambitious neighbor from 
taking away its independence or sovereignty, or perhaps only 
its possessions. All the declarations of the world will not 
prevent the use of f'orce.l Submission and passive resistance 
will not solve the problem. They \vill not save the life of 
a nation that has been invaded by armies or navies of an 
enemy that is bent upon its destruction. It is unfortunate 
that in this day and age of civilization, after the years 
of the preaching of Christian pract:ices and Christian vir-
tues that such commentary should be made, but it is feared 
that such statements are all too true. 
According to Robert Lansing, Secretary of State in 
Wilson's cabinet, war cannot be outlawed, because under 
certain condi tiona it is the only me ana of preserving 
national life; and may often be the only means of protect-
ing the rights of the nation to which it may be entitled. 
1 Op. Cit., Aug. 16, 1924. 
~l 
This law then is the supreme law of self-preservation. If 
all nations· were or could become, moral and responsible to 
moral sensibilities, there would be something to the eta te-
ment -- outlaw war. But unfortunately for the peace of the 
world civilization has not attained so high a plane, nor 
does the condition seem imminent.l 
When a government is controlled by a determination to 
acquire territory and power, and seeks to accomplish this 
aim by might, war is often the only means that offended na-
tions can protect their independence from destruction with, 
or by which they can attempt to keep from destruction. The 
nation against which the aggression is used first is the 
one that has the weakest defenses, or is grossly unprepared. 
The prepared nation, ready to hurl back the invaders at a 
moment's notice, is usually the one that is left out of such 
schemes. If our Navy were cut down to half its present 
size, it is doubtful if the time would be far distant before 
some aggressive nation would not move to take an advantage 
of such a condition.2 
Society is interested in staying the aggressor. If we 
can prevent aggression, there will be no need of the plea 
of self-defense. We must bear in mind that ware come seldom 
from mass movements, but generally as results of political 
1 Op. Oit. 
2 Ibid. 
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schemings.l 
President Wilson said, 11 Peoples do not malte war". The 
peoples of the nations did not make the W'orld War. Had they 
been consul ted., or even informed of some of the facts, there 
might have been no war. It was forced upon them by a few 
men.2 
Land armaments are costing the taxpayers more by far 
than navtes. They are also much more perilous to peace, and 
afford no better protection, in general condi tiona by and 
large, if they offer as much. The readers of for~ign dis-
patches, during the past few years, cannot help noting the 
facts that all wars, in all parts of the world, in progress 
or threatening are land wars.3 
We hep.r a great deal about the cost of an adequate Navy. 
This is a good argument, because the costs, in the aggregate:, 
seem very high. In the terms of the salesman, placing the 
cost of the article down in terms of daily expenditure, let 
us see how it would work out. For adequate protection --
that is a Navy that is effie ient, and one that is 'almost 
big enough', it is maintained by some of the naval lvriters 
that this difference would cost the N:1r th Dakota wheat 
farmer four cents, yet his per capita grain export is worth 
1 Borah, W. E., Answer to Fallacy of Outlawing War, 
Independent, September 13, 1924, 147-149. 
2 Ibid. 
3 iMorse, S. B., Eagle Or Ostrich, Inde-oen\~ent, Feb. 14, 
1925, OXIV, 1-8. 
fifty dollars. The average Iovra. farmer pays seventy-five 
cents per y~ar for naval protection, and an average of 
thirty-one dollars for life insurance. The people of the 
United States paid out in a recent year about two ru1d a 
half billion dollars for premiums on all kinds of insurance. 
We can hardly justify a nation's spen.ding $100,000,000 
on inadequate given valu~~s, even though those values may not 
be tested. If our Navy is not adequate, as often challenged 
by experts and others, it could not fulfill its mission in 
time of war. In 1902 Germany decided that she would have a 
real navy for protection to her growing outside interests, 
and a building program started. Great Britain also had a 
building program under way. When the war came, Germany's 
navy was "al rrost big enough". However, 11 almost big enough" 
is just about worthless. Germany lost control of the sea 
at the start, then her colonies, then commerce, and then 
the war. 
In looking back at Germany's pre-war experience in 
building a fleet many German editors think they see weak-
nesses in the American navnl policies and issue friendly 
warnings. They admit that ~nerica must equip herself 
with adequate naval protection because of her business in-
terests, "but everywhere you go you will run into England, 
who rules the sea with her fleetu. 
Another German editor states that England and America 
might make a naval combinRtion for their own protection. 
He says: 
Surely, but England does not make combinations with 
second great powers. American prosperity Will J!.Ot last 
forever. Indeed, it.may now seem to be faced with a 
crisis. Economic competition is hopeless for them as long 
as England rules the sea. A little war anywhere, and Eng-
land wo~ld wipe out the cornrnerc ial fleet of the United 
States. 
Merchant Mc:;.rine 
Now for the last link in this chain of sea power --
merchant marine. We are all aware that the American colo-
nies early developed into wonderful shipping centers. 
Their ships were better destgned, were faster, and handled 
their cargoes better than many others, and soon captured a 
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large share of the business of the world. In the period of 
the War of 1812, most of American shipping disappeared from 
the seas, coming back again shortly afterward. This con-
tinued until the period of the Civil War when our merchant 
marine again went down. From this low level it revived 
very slowly, getting its great impetus only during the 
\Vorld War. 
It is true that tn 1900 no American ship sailed from 
any of our ports fc)r Russia, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the 
Hetherlands, Italy, Hungary, Greece or Turkey, although we 
had considerable business with these nations. In that same 
year only two vessels left our shores for France, and then 
returned in ballast. One ship sailed for Belgium in that 
1 11 German Discovery of America's Naval Peril", Literary 
Digest, J1me 8, 1929, 14. 
2 Gatewood, R. D., Sea Power and Destiny, Naval Institute 
Proceedings, no. 296, 28-32. 
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year and likewise returned in ballast.l 
The \Vorld War gave us a $3,500,000,000 lesson. We know 
how our export trade was paralyzed for lack of ships, how 
the South Was crucified on a cross of 11 no boats11 with its 
cotton piled high on docks, its business men in the hands o:f' 
the banks. The Germans saw clearly and felt the menace of 
the allied sea power. They certainly accomplished prodigious 
feats of r-trms on land, but that was not enough. As they 
could not have free access to the sea, they soon began to 
feel the sure, slow strangulation of death settling upon 
them that our South felt in. the Civil War.2 They were driven 
to desperation, finally forcing the United States into the 
. war against them. \Ve built ships; built them as ships had 
never before been built. Th:l.s nation performed a. miracle 
with shi.ps, and incidentally with thetr cost. It is a known 
fact that comparatively few of our men were sent overseas in 
our own sh i.ps. They went over in allied ships and paid well 
for the transportation. We were on the side that bad the 
balance of sea power. What would have been the result had 
the power been reversed? Germany saw that her ruthless 
submarine campaign could not win; that sea power had cast 
the deciding vote in the conflict.3 
Our merchant marine must provide vessels that every 
1 Gatewood, R. D., Sea Power and Destiny, Naval Institute 
Proceedings, no. 296, 28-32. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid, 
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modern navy is lost without; it must provide a seafaring 
personnel, .with training, upon which the 1-Tavy may draw in 
time of emergency; it must also provide a means of bringing 
in and taking out our products. Our sea power is one of 
our most precious possessions. Are we going to protect it? 
Developing a merchant n:arine naval reserve personnel 
is perhaps one of the most important th:tngs -- a vital nec-
essity, and a valuable asset -- to tl1ia country in generru, 
to defense in particular, and for the advance of an ade-
quate ~Tavy. This is one endeavor that the American people, 
regardless of ideas toward a big Navy, should conscientiously 
support.l 
We are fully aware that national security, in peace as 
in war, depends upon prosperity. The government that nev•=t 
fosters security is not conducive to a prosperous populace. 
History can clearly indicate the nations that have risen or 
declined in world affairs influence in direct proportion to 
the manner in '7hich they have maintained not, '-)nly navies, but 
have held the commanding places in world trade, accomplished 
mainly through the medium of a merchant mari (le. Nations that 
enjoy today a real outstanding position are those that have 
acquired a commanding place on the s•"a. We cannot hope for 
a great national development as an exception to this general 
condition. If this is ne~lected we can neither hope to 
escape the fate of other nations who have lost rightful . 
1 Leigh, R. H., Plea for Merchant Marine Reserves, Naval 
Institute Proceedings, no. 296, 20-23-. · 
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places on the sea. Without an efficient merchant marine no 
. nation can maintain an effici.ent Navy.l 
Such a thought must have been in the minds of the men 
who created the Shipping Act of 1916 providing for the crea-
tion of a naval auxiliary, a naval reserve, and an American 
merchant marine. In 1923 the President said to Congress, 
11 we must have a merchant mRrine which meets our requirements, 
and we must pay the c·Jst of its service." In 1925 he again 
made this clear in his statement, "The maintenance of a mer-
chant marine is of the utmost im-oortance for national de-
fense and s e.rvice of our corrunerce11 • 
The total cost of the me.rchant marine's oueration in 
1927-28 was estimated at $16,000,000, which is .. one-half of 
one percent of the total appropriations of the Federal 
government, while $94,000,000 was contributed at the same 
time for federal aid to highways. One cont.ribution of 
th:ts service can be cited here; that during three months of 
the British coat strike in 1926, ships of the U.S. Merchant 
Fleet Oorp. carried abroad 1,700,000 bales of cotton out of 
a total ex'l')ort of 3, 600,000. A nat tonal merchant marine is 
vital to our national security. If it is to be effective it 
must be an accomnlished fact. It must be a builder of. trade 
in times of peace an influence for peace in times of danger, 
and an effective and direct aid in time of war. 2 
Navy and Foreign Policy 
It is maintained by Secretary Wilbur that the United 
States consists of more than just the land areas; that to 
estimate its worth we must consider its ocean-borne assort-
ment of goods, it fabrics of international friendship and 
goodwill, the merchant ships on the seas, the milroads on 
the land, all the visible and invisible network of interna-
tional trade whlch is a vi tal part of the nat ion. He claims 
that this is not only necessary for the nation, but 
1 Dalton, A. 0., Merchant Marine Vt tal to Security, U. S. 
Naval Institute Proceedings, no. 206, 17-19. 
2 Ibid. 
protection is necessary for this part of our prosperity. 
He goes further and states that this defense 1m.st be 
prepared at all times to be ef:fecti ve in any part of the 
world. He said, in par~: 
<:.8 
We cannot depend upon a third party to look after our 
interests. We may often wonder why some services are ren-
dered by the Navy. Some little outburst somewhere, American 
lives or property are jeopardized, with Euro9ean interests 
included. Hardly before the general public may be aware of 
such an occurrence, the message comes home that "the Marines 
have landed and have the situation well in hand". Gunboats 
protect by patrol a thousand miles of river in Ohina, 
watching for bandits. 
Our Navy knocks with a friendly hand upon the door of 
every natton. Its potential power upholds the hand of every 
oonsul,
1
minister or other diplomatic representative of this 
nation. 
This last quotation brings the reader another factor for 
.maintaining a Navy-- that of assisting in the. foreign policy 
of this nation. :Ho relations may be entertained on an equal 
b2.sis unless the parttes have res:pect for each other. Res-
pect must be a basis for policy. Res:JeCt for our flag and 
the nat: on for which 1 t stands must be real. Lack of that 
has caused unfriendly rel ati :ms and sea fights on the seven 
seas of the world. Through our hj_st~)ry we can see the flag 
being carried into s~a battles to win respect for it. 
It is often true that.our neople, as well as the naval 
officers, forget that the Navy is a political force as well 
as a military one.2 The men of the N:.vy are roving 
1 Wilbur, 0. D., Commerce and the Flag, Naval Institute 
Proceedings, no. 296, 1-5. 
, 
2 Schofield, F., Heart of the N~, Naval Institute Pro-
ceedings, no. 296, 9. 
diplomats, may create very friendly relations with nations, 
or may create potent causes of war in some small country, 
without knowledge of those in authority back home. :t:ravy 
officers sometimes act as governors for possessions, The 
Virgin Islands have been under a Na.vy officer since their 
purchase in 1916. 
In 1823 we served notice on the world that a new 
definite foreign policy had been established in this 
country and adopted by Co 1gress. It may be summarized in 
its present day effectiveness to the point that we are 
opposed to encroachment of any foreign power upon the in-
dependence of any American state under any guise, or to the 
acquisition or control of any additional territory in this 
hemisphere. In order to maintain this policy Congress 
increased the number of steam vessels for the Navy, with 
longer cruising radius. Thus, in support of a foreign 
policy, our Na~ry was increased. The explicit acceptance 
of this policy by the maritime powers of Europe and later 
amicable adjustments of negotiations on claims against 
countries in this hemisphere, was probably a forerunner to 
England's friendly qo-operation in the Washington confer-
ence.1 
Today our foreign policy of :mrsuing commercial ex-
pansion is taking us into delicate paths. We are the 
1 Sherrill, C. H., "Monroe Interpreted", Forum, Dec., 
1923, 2166. 
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richest nation of the world. Our foreign trade and credits 
have grown to enormous proportions. There is ~rdly a spot 
where our interests do not go. The creditor nation is, 
however, not the popular nation, and. in this expansion we 
are facing politico-economical alliances made to hinder the 
advance of our commerce. 
We need not be reminded that this· nation occupies a 
place in the political organization of the world which de~ 
mands tact and firmness in oru diplomacy. Our present 
prosperityl depends upon our foreign trade. If that 
prosperi-ty is to be maintained, then the trade must be 
continued, our policy must be one of friendly trade, and 
it must have protectim. The Navy is one of the instru-
ments that the government keeps which exists for the pro-
motion of the general welfare of the land. 2 
It is maintained by Mr. Tinker, 3 that since the 
Washington Conference in 1921, the powers signing the 
treaties have projected large programs for ships not 
limited by the treaty, which we all concede the truth. 
This nation alone, in strict observance of the spirit of 
the treaty, has been left far behind in naval security. 
So that, if, in our desire to secure prosperous peace, and 
in the observance of large and increasing naval armaments 
1 The time referred to is the year 1926. 
2 Tinker, 0. A., nnavy the Right Arm of the State Department", 
Ot~rent History, October, 1926, 53. 
3 Ibid., 52-60. 
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abroad, we wish to be successful, it will be necessary for 
us to chan;;>:e our policies. 
\'ii th our widening horizons the main purpose of the 
Navy is to keep peace, insure against war, and be an emissary 
for the spread of American ideals. Naval officers have been 
sent to the embassies and legations over the world since 
1882 as naval attaches. Often they have performed meritor-
ious services in gaining information or in making friendships.l 
Commerce and Policy 
Our first case of this was when John Paul Jones was 
sent as a special diplomatic agent to France and Denmark 
when this country first became a republic. The first rights 
for intercourse in China were secured by a treaty demanded 
by Commodore Kearney. He had found, at the end of the 
"Opium War", that England was forcing a treaty upon China, 
making tariffs against all other nat ions. He demanded, and 
received, treatment for the United States as:a "most 
favored nat1.on 11 • This paved the way for a oom!1lercial treaty 
in 1844. Perry visited Japan in 1854, and Commodore 
Schufeldt in 1882 made a similar visit to Korea.2 Naval 
officera as a class are well fitted for diplomatic missions. 
The tasks assigned to the above men, in addition to Decatur, 
1 
"Navy's Achievements in Diplomacy", U. S. Navy in Peace 
Time, 161-165. 
2 McLaren, W. A., "Navy as an Effective Agency in Diplomacy", 
Ourrent History, Jan., 1925, 570-573. 
Wilkes, and hosts of others, ma.J.tes a glorious chapter in 
one hundred and fifty years of spotless naval records, and 
one 'vhich is the best amplified in the present century. 1 
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Navies are not advocated simply because of their use 
in war. It is true that they are built with that idea pri-
marily in mind, but it is only one factor. Admiral W. D. 
Rodgers stated: 
We cannot 'be sure that we will need such instruments again, 
but the Kellogg Pact which renounced 11 war as an instrument 
of national policy" has yet to prove its efficacy, since it 
would seem that no nation could pledge future generations 
any more than a man could pledge his children.2 
If the propagandists against sea power are sincere, 
what would they propose in the interest of world enlir.:hten-
ment, as an alternative in the matter of adjusting our for-
eign polio i es in a. world of competing nat tons, maintaining 
large armaments, and envious of our economic wealth? 
Inasmuch as we have become a nation. that is dependent upon 
commerce from overseas for much of our prosperity, the 
abandonment of protective armaments or a disarmmnent by 
example -- two plt=:~as of pacifists -- could only result in 
loss of sea power that very likely would bring political 
trouble and material privat i.on, according to statements of 
O.;. A. Tinker, who has been mentioned before in this chapter. 
Nations with sea frontages and sea interests must 
1 
"navy Achievements in Diplomacy", U.S. Navy in Peace 
Time, 161-170. 
2 Rodgers, W. D., "Functions of the ~Tavyn, American Year-
book, 1930, 284. 
protect them. The necessity for a naval force of course 
brings up questions of pur,ose, size, resources, and main-
tenance. The answers to the questions, according to 
Graser Schornstheimer,l constituted the naval policy.of 
53 
the nations. Others go further and say that the navy should 
be like the ideal of it proposed by Theodore Roosevelt --
My object is to keep America in trim so that fighting her 
shall be too expensive and dangerous a task to be lightly 
undertaken by anybody. 
The Navy is a great laboratory of ci tizm ship, of dis-
covery, of aid to industry. The Navy puts its dependence 
for the average job upon youth. It does not depend upon 
hereditary classes. Most of the young men who enter the 
Na.~ry have not had the chance to find a place in business or 
indu.stry.2 Yet it is said that few of them that leave the 
service do not carry with them knowledge and proficiency 
that will be of benefit in everyday life. Every year, 
thousands of untrained boys enter the Navy, finish.up their 
enlistment, and retmre as skilled ~nd experienced in many 
lines. The officer personnel is more permanent, but many 
do retire to private life, and make the best of our ci ti-
zens. The lJaval Academy is one of the finest educational 
institutions in the country, and turns out fine, upstanding 
and outsta!J.ding, disciplined young men. 
As the great majority of the officers remain in the 
1 Navy in Peace Times, U. S. Gov•t. Pub., 136-140. 
2 Ibid., 135-140. 
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service, let ns see a few of those who have retired, and are 
well knmvn. They are: John W. \'leeks, forme.r Secretary of 
War, Curtis D. Wilbur, former Secretary of the Navy, R. B. 
Howell, Senator from Michigan, 0. E. Weller, Senator from 
Maryland, Robert Thompson, Lawyer and philanthropist, ship-
builders such as H. L. Ferg1•son, Lewis B. Nixon, Joseph W. 
Powell, Henry G. $mith, men prominent in the economic side 
of life such as Walter M. McFarland, Edward J. Berwind, 
Part Benjamin, W~ B. Duncan, men connected with science, such 
as Prof. A. A. Michelson, Matthew F. Maury, George W. Little-
hales, William L. Emmett, Stuart W. Cramer, Frank J. Sprague, 
W. H. G. Bullard, W. F. Durend. Even in literature we can 
cite two well known men -- Cyrus Townsend Brady and Winston 
Churchill. 1 
Health Service 
Before leaving this chapter, allow a few references to 
another service of the Navy -- that of health and sanitatton. 
The main function of the Medical Department of the United 
States Navy is, of course, to keep its 1)ersonnel in good 
health. Small-pox and typhoid fever have been practically 
eradicated from the Navy. 
Safety in aviation in the World Vla.r and in the Navy 
service since is due to a large extent to "aviation medi-
cine". Altitudes undreamed of a few years ago are now 
1 "Education of Officers", U. S. Navy in Peace Times, 
135-140. 
reached in apparent comfort due to tremendous advances in 
preventative medical examination and care. 
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Following the Spanish American War, this nation took 
over great responsibility in the tropics. In this con-
nectir)n we find the battles against yellow and other 
fevers. The work of Major Reed, General Gorgas and Doctor 
Carter, in eradication of yellow fever, is outstanding. 
In hie dispensary at Cavite, Admiral Stitt laid the 
foundations for his authori tattve work on tropical medi-
cines. 
At the time of the interference of the United States 
in Haiti, very poor sanitary conditions were prevalent. 
The residents of Port au Prince had forgotten that the 
city had ever been clean. They had apparently lost all 
... 
conception of personal hygiene. Epidemics ran rife. 
Visitors to the island now, who can compare the work of the 
. " 
Navy medical men with what existed, are forcibly aware of 
the changed conditions. 1 
In Samoa the medical effie ere of the ~Tn.vy have been in 
charge since 1899. The PO"[.)Ula:bion there is nm"¥ incrf'asing, 
in contrast to many native populutione in Pacific islands 
because of contact with the whites. It is said that twenty 
years ago every nattve had hookworm. Tutuila was the lo-
cation of the discovery of the parasite Necator Americanus, 
found to cause the New W'orld hookworm. Now the hookworm 
1 Navyts Contribution to Citizenship, U. S. Uavy in 
Peace Times, 145-150. 
. ...... 
I.·. 
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disease is under complete control. Yaws, at one time very 
prevalent, has been practically eradicated. In probably no 
other tropical. region has the work of eliminating elephant-
iasis been so well handled and so successful.l 
Guam, when coming into American control, apparently 
had no ideas of the meaning of san:l.tntion. Practically the 
entire population was infested with some sort of intestinal 
parasite. Yaws were common. Gangosa was very prevalent. 
Tetanus was killing half the babies before they were many 
months of age. The mortality rate was exceeding the birth 
rate; the po-pulation was slowly drifting toward extinction. 
Within one-half a year of birth-rate protection, tetanus 
neonatorum has ceased to be an important factor in infant 
mortality. Yaws is now completely controlled, gangosa has 
practically disappeared. Guam is one of the few places in 
the world where veneral diseases do not exist. Control of 
these diseases is absolute. lJo member of a ship's crew, 
coming into port, who cannot pass an examination is allowed 
ashore, unless he stays in the jail during the visit of his 
ship.2 
The Virgin Islands, apparently presenting a olean 
appearance, were found to be flourishing locations for 
intestinal troubles. No country in the world could boast 
1 Navy's Contribution to Citizenship, U. s. Navy In Peace 
Times, 146-159. 
2 Ibid. 
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of better laws on veners.l diseases, still they were common. 
Three hospi tale in the islands, at time of tra:1:sfer to the 
Untted States, were found to be mainly old people's homes. 
Sufferers of pell.agra were common sights. Today there are 
three modern, up-to-date hospitals, with corps of native 
nurses, trained under local supervision, in attendance. 
Pellagra has been practically removed as a cause of death. 
Typhoid f·ever has not been reported since 1918. In St. 
Thomas the death rate from gastro-intestinal infections 
dropped 85 percent in two years. Malaria has dropped al-
most to extinction.l 
A report of the Danish health authorities of the Virgin 
Islands, some years before the group became American 
possessions stated: 
The America:1s have had wonderful success in fighting 
small-pox in Porto Rico, but still more credit is due them 
on account of the excellent manner in which they are fight-
ing yellow fever there as well as in Cuba. During the 
reign of Spain over these islands, by the neglect of it, 
they were a continual source of danger to the whole West 
Indtes; yellow fever was always present, and every so often 
1-t appeared in epidemic form in Havana. The United States 
has done a Herculean job in clea:-ling out thi.s Augean stable, 
but it has been done and the United Sta 'Lee c~m refer with 
pride to the results. 
The Amerieane have succeeded in a few years in practi-
cally stamping out yellow fever in both Porto Rico and 
Cuba. This has also been a great help to the Danish Is-
lands, and St. Thomas has learned a lot from this work. 
There is probably no thing that strikes home to such an 
extent as a marked decrease in death rates. The spirit of 
1 Navy's Contribution to Citizenship, U. S. Navy In 
Peace Times, 149-152. 
good will as a c·:msequence is put into the hearts of the 
people, and slowly spreads to n eif:hboring lands, and the 
ultimate effnct is incalculable.l 
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The combination of this part with the summary on the 
Navy is -perhaps entirely without justification. However, it 
may not be so far amiss, in all ways with linking up with the 
statement of Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., who said: "For the 
sake of our children, and their children, we must build up 
and ':n-operly maintain our treaty Navy.n 2 
Navy Aids 
The Chicago Trt..£_~ stated: 
The Federal government can be trimmed down. Its ex-
penses can be reduced. Excessive taxation can be brought 
within reason, but to impair defenses when its diplomacy 
goes loco is such folly as sometimes is not survived by 
nations exposed to such actions.3 
Oaltr.in Coolidge in a remark, while President, said 
that "the country can never be relieved of the responsi-
bil i ty of national defense." Our Navy has always been 
more than an arm of wartime defense, as has already been 
stated. The assertion of President Coolidge, on October 
19, 1924, is still potent with truth. In part he said: 
All the money ever ex-oended on tbe Navy has been 
1 United States ~Tavy in Peace Times, U. s. Navy Dep 1 t., 
145-152. 
2 Building Our Treaty Navy, Nnvy League Pamphlet, 3. 
3 Is Our Navy Headed For the Rocks, Literary Di_gest, May 
17, 1924, LXXXI, 8-9. 
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returned to the community several times over in direct stim-
ulus to industrial development. We may be sure that in the 
future the Navy's services to industry, and the' arts of 
peace and science, will corpletr::ly justify its maintenance 
in the highest efficiency. 
It is maintained by F. D. McHugh2 that idealists over-
look, or are ignorant of, the fact that for every dollar 
spent on this servtce nati :.,nal dividends are enormous. 
The Navy, in this regard, as the perspect tve would certainly 
be lost, certainly needs no war to justify its existence, 
for its activities are far greater in value to commerce and 
industry in times of peace than. during any period of hoe-
til i ty. Mr. McHugh says: 
It is a fact that American naval progress a<1d American 
industrial progresc are so closely linked that, in many 
fields, the. latter has actually been an outgrow-th of the 
former. Our Uavy is a vast marine laboratory, stimulating 
research and fostering scientific progress a:1d industrial 
achievement. 
Beca.use of our well recognized commerc :tal rights, we 
are entitled to and should have a Navy second to none .other 
in the world, and since we are not an aggressor nation, 
Americans can feel confident its power would not be misused. 
The Literary _Digest claims a warship a peace labora-
tory,Z using the Colorado as example. From its designing, 
it claimed, much progress would be made in new ships for 
merchant shipping. An interesting feature of the ship 
cited was the fact that from a forward sneed of twenty-one 
1 Op. Cit. 
2 U. S. Navy In Peace Times, 62-68. 
3 
"Warship a Peace Laboratory", Li.terary Digest, Sept. 15, 
1923, 15. 
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knots the ship can be brought to a full stop in three min-
utes -- almost as good as "four wheel" bralces. buraluminum, 
now one of the most imuortant metals in industry, has be-
come an industrial product because of research in the Navy 
for airship use. Rad:totelephone was another industrial in-
strument developed, and teletypes, now in police use, were 
devised by the Navy for receiv-ing messages from airplanes 
and putting them on typewriters for transcription.l 
If we could be convinced that the nations of Europe 
will refratn from attacking a defenseless America, or if 
we believe that nations will recognize the justice and piety 
of our foreign policic::s, and that internati.onal jealousies 
and avarice have been abolished, avers Hr::rbert c. Pell,2 
then we would be able to dispense with the Navy. He claims 
the Navy is being attacked on all sides by insidious propa-
ganda. It tells us that the Navy is a challenge for war, 
an unbearable expense, and that wars are improbable. \Ve 
should therefore forget the dead past and the living future. 
We might be reminded that dominance in commercial and 
political lines for centuries lay with England, and inter-
national law was ultimately founded on British ideas of 
justice. The position was taken because of the superior 
foroe of the British fleets, 
1 How the Navy Pays its Way, Literarr Digest, Feb. 3, 
1923, LXXIV, 66. 
2 Pell, Herbert 0., Why A Navy, North American Review, 
coxxx, 425. 
not just conceded by other nations because of its beaux 
yeux, or because of any general recognition of .superior 
virtue. 
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Mr. Pell argues further that if the President of the 
United States is of the opinion that England is better able 
to hold this ultimate power, ra tber than the United States, 
then he is justified in pushing the Navy down to lower 
levels. If we have the idea that the 'mother country' is 
going to rush to aid its errant daughter, then we have no 
feason to waste money to provide agai.nst possible danger. 
If we believe that this country is not fit to conduct its 
own foreign affairs, then we can build a.n excellent argu-
ment to destroy the Navy, and to abolish consular and dip-
lomatic services. He says: 
Then we could maintain a few gentlemen in London who 
could appear, from time to time, at the British foreign 
office and humbly request that England look after ~ome 
American interests, if we could conceive of any nation be-
ing so wicked as to oppose them. 
I believe that war is a possibility. The most expen-
sive victory costs less than a cheap defeat.· This is axio-
matic. Although not always dispensing heavenly justice, 
the United States is, I believe, as fit as any other 
country to ascent to the control in affairs of interest 
that England enjoyed in all parts of the world undisputed 
in the Nineteenth century. It is impossible for any nation, 
a.s commercially great as the United States, with connections 
abroad, to continue to exist unenvied in a calm and distant 
sphere. If we take our place in the world, we will have 
enemies, and if we have enemies we are very likely to have 
quarrels. 
Do not imagine that English politicians are any more 
virtuous than Americans, that they are more noble or con-
siderate of the public good. Both countries are governed 
by men whose main anxiety is to stay in office, and who can 
remain in office because of the1.r appeal to the community 
at large. Can you imagine a politician like Lloyd George 
suggesting to the British manufacturer than a few pence 
per pound could be taken off his income tax if he would 
consent to sacri.:f'ice the British Uavy and British dominion 
o:f' the e ea? 
Allow me to emote from a speech by myself, delivered 
in the House of Re-presentatives on :february 10, 1921. 
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11 We will never again have the opportunity that we now have. 
Thts is a fact we cannot avoid. Our choice is whether it 
'.:rill be the United States or some other country. The 
chance of becoming, without a struggle, the most powerful 
nation of the world has never been given before to any na-
tion. I know of no people who can be so safely trusted 
with this power than my own, and we must not forget that 
this power must lie somewhere and be the possession of some 
people. If the people fear this responsibil1 ty, 1:£' they 
mistrust their own character, or if the governing group is 
right in believing that one percent of our income tax 
means more than C0 1.1trol of the world, then it is proper 
that the Navy be scrapped and we resign ourselves to be-
coming a workshop and a center of production with no 
thoughts of real importance.l 
If must be remembered that from the Battle o:f' Trafal-
gar to the German challenge of 1914, the British had no 
major engagements in naval lines, unless the war of 1812 
could be so classed. Wooden ships gave way to ironclads, 
and they in turn to steel. Boys in England grew old 
enough to join the Navy as midshi.pmen, grew up in the ser-
vice, became Admirals perhans, and their so 1s followed 
them in the servi.ce, and no nation dared challenge their 
might. In spi.te of this fact the British Eirpire has had 
very little peace, for taking the Empire as a whole, there 
have been hundreds o:f' small fights. Yet mighty hosts of 
France or Germany did llOt cross the English Channel at any 
time, because there was great likelihood of a British 
squadron arriving on the scene before men could land.2 
1 Pell, Herbert C., Why A Navy?, North American Review, 
CCCXXXIII, 427-428. 
2 Ibid. 
In the opinion of several writers the United States 
must adopt a policy either like Britain or Chiria. Great 
Britain has been operating on the principle that no com-
bination of international conditions could. justify her to 
trust combinations of nations to handle the maritime con-
trol of the world. She has always given her gold to her 
allies on demand, but never to build up navi.es. The re-
snlt is that for a. thousnnd years, England has had only 
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one hostile invasion. Because of the strength of her Navy, 
Great Britain has afforded her people at home security and 
comfortable living probably more successfully than any other 
nation. 
Previously to the start of ·the World War, British spokes-
men were claiming that they had no interest in a war with 
Germany. When the independence of Belgium, guaranteed by 
the British Foreign Minlster twenty-five years earlier, was 
threatened, England saw that the value of her signature must 
be upheld at any cost. About ten yea.ra ago England, with 
others, guaranteed tne independence and integrity of China, 
yet there is not a single -person who has the slightest 
idea that this faith will be upheld, according to Mr. Fell's 
argument. The United Sta:es, through treaties composed by 
0. E. Hughes, also guaranteed China's independence. These 
treaties may not have given the country much power in the 
world, but they did aid a lot in giving the Republican 
party power at home. 
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The United States pledged its solemn word in them to 
uphold integrity in Ohi.na, but there will be found very fe\v 
people who were recently in favor of going into China to 
protect that pledge, All have made gestures and shaken 
fingers at Japan. Japan, being courteous, refrained from 
thumbing noses at the protesting ambassadors, and politely 
explained that they were not even thinking of waging war on 
China, but just trying to maintain order.l 
Our pacifists clamor for this country to rely on 
treaties, and then ask that we violate our own. Ho nation 
will keep a treaty longer than its intrrests are served or 
clemand. Treaties are stat-ements of policy. English people 
could not understand how we could sleep in America when 
Belgium• s neutrality 1vas being violated, but we have not 
heard of any reports of suffering from insomnia over China's 
recent troubles, and it is highly doubtful that sleepless 
nlghts would exist in other nations, should the United 
States also follow the easy path of China, and rely on 
treaties of Christian nations, instead of armed ships. Is 
it any wonder that China is now looking to Russia?2 
We admit and agree that it would be fine to see rules 
of international justice, que_rrels settled in international 
courts, and differences settled peacefully on pri::1ciples, 
and by courts able to enforce decis1.ons.· Until such a time 
1 Op. Oi t. 
2 Ibid. 
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is possible, we must realize that involved nations will 
settle disputes, and the ultimate argument is force. This 
ma.y be regr~~ttable, bnt it ap:)arently is true, 
Peace is desirable, and at preseat must be maintained 
by power, with justice enforced by strength. This is true 
in our own cities or nation, a11d must be true interilat:l..on-
ally. If inter:1ational power or civic power and strength 
do not lie in any hands, and are ready to be seized by any 
irrespons:t bl e, selfish or reckless combi :1a t ion set up for 
the purpose, does it not breed envy, fear, hatred, and war? 
Is there any phase of human relationships in which rivals 
who recognize no superior have not produced contests? Use 
sports, love, bus1:1 ess as examples. 
I have tried to state this clearly. Whether I am 
right or wrong in my decision to support the U,]ited Sta~;(:·s 
ac,·ainst any other nation, I Am ri r~ht in demanding th[:~t our 
people realize the nature of the quest·\on, a.nd. under8tand 
that they are voting for sometbirig more import::::at than just 
the lowering of a tax, employing men or putting them out of 
work; they are voti.ng on the momentous question, yes or no: 
Do you believe that your country rather than some other 
should be first in the world?! 
If Oongress is intelligently interested in national 
defense, a present defi.ciency can be regarded without 
terror, because for the present, at any re.te, there is no 
prospect of an at tack. 'l'he nat ion' s re;8l danger has al-
wayE; been
2
the lack of a policy as much as the lack of 
armament. 
While the League of Nations is taking up the peaceful 
settlement of differences, and outlawry of war, and the 
1 Op. Cit., 431. 
2 "Airplane Rumpus", Literary Digest, March 7, 1925. 
.... 
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economic ax is cutting down our national defenses, remember 
the statements of the French General and historian, De 
Segur: "Universal Pf.ace is a dream of the wise, war is the 
history of mankind". · 
1 Niblack, Albert P., New Ne.val Fronts of the World Powers, 
November, 192 5, XXIII, 234-23~ • 
~~ ... 
CHAPTER III 
OBJECTIVES m" THE NAVY 
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In Secretary of the Navy Denby 1 s report to Congress in 
1922, he said in part: 
The Navy of the United States should be maintained in 
. sufficient strength to support the policies of this nation. 
guard its commerce and protect its co:1tinenta1 and overseas 
possessj_ons. It is believed that this policy is sound and 
not subject to question. It should be tru.e fox all time and 
under all condi tiona. We had to ado-pt a general policy, 
under the treaty, which is --
11 To create, maintain and ouerate a Navy second to none, 
and in conformity wtth ratios for capital shi.ps established 
by the tx~aty". · 
This policy can still be quoted and used as a basis of 
operations. There are apparently no results of propaganda 
of a destructive nature evidenced, nor is there any tendency 
to overbuild. Following this statement of our policy, we 
mtght look at a stateme·,-lt of policy of one of our Senators, 
given in a speech in the United States Senate. He refers 
to the attitude on cruisers in this light: 
The protection of our commerce devolves naturally, 
in a large part, on cruisers. For that reason it would 
seem that they must have a large cruising radius, so that 
while they spend mo.st of thetr time on their stations, 
they would still have enough fuel in reserve to get to a 
home port. The bigger the cruiser, naturally the greater 
capacity for carJ~ying fuel. 
The eight inch gun cruiser has nothing to fear from 
any surface craft, except a battleship, or perhaps an air-
craft carrier. With her speed, she can keep out of way of 
these more uowerful vessels. The fact that we have not 
appropriated for them does not indicate that thei·r 
necessity is not fully appreciated. It is due to the 
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fact that the people believed that building these necessary 
ships WotJ.ld be in viola tinn of our treaty obl i.ga tions,l 
Senator F. H. Gillett, of Hassachusetts, a pacifist, 
stated in a Senate discussion: 
While it is disgraceful to contemplate war, yet so 
long as other nations prepare, we cGnnot be a helpless, un-
resisting booty to the first well-armed aggressor. We can-
not forget that nations have grieveances ag::.>.inst us. Many 
will be our debtor for generations, and our wealth will make 
attractive prey,2 · 
In answer to several qut"'3st ions as to ships needed, 
Admiral Pratt, chief of the Bureau of Oper:-tions of the 
Uavy Departme:1t, stated: 
Nobody expects to have all the ships in times of peace 
that might be needed in time of war, but what we need i..s a 
nucleus of a fleet so that it could be adequately used to 
train a number of men to ue rform all the tact i.cal exercises 
required to keep our fleet in shape. · 
On July 30, 19~~9, President Hoover answered a letter 
from Commander Po.ul V. McNutt, of the Amertcan Legion, who 
had protested lost partty'could only be regained by eith~r 
building cr·uisers ourselves, or getting Britain to scrap 
some of hers. Hoover stated that 11 The policy of parity as 
enunciated by our naval authorities as a com'?lete defense of 
the United Statc;s in any contingency, and that defense is all 
that we ask". 
1 Senator Heflin, of Alabama, Congressional Record, LXX, 
part I, pages 1057-1058. 
2 Menace of Anglo-American Rivalry, Literary Digest, 
January 5, 1929, C, 5-7. 
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General Objectives 
Under general objectives of the navy, we must consider 
them under the limits placed upon signatory powers by the 
naval treaties now in force. The London trc•aty of 1930 
placed a reachable limit, a point to be reached by 1936. The 
Washington treaty put a limit to cut down to and not exceed. 
Powers agreeing to the limits of both must be presumed to be 
following the spitit of the treaties and other agreements. 
As a basis of this chapter on objectives, I will list 
here the following things for consideration, and we will 
n.nd that most of them have suffered from neglect of some 
chara.cter. 
Naval bases strong enough to maintain themselves under 
stress for a short time, and large enourrh to accomodate a 
rea.sonable portion of the fleets of war shi.ps, auxiliary 
craft, and to render service to merchant ships. 
A fleet of battle cruisers commensurate to a 
balanced Navy. 
Auxiliary craft sufficient to render necessary services 
for our Navy. 
Development of the weak portions of the operations to 
maintain naval efficiency. 
Modernization of capital ships still in need of such 
service. 
Skeleton organizations of naval reserves, and officers 
trained and capable to handle emergency fleets that may be 
needed in time of war; this list to be made up of graduates 
of the Naval Academy who ha·H~ gone into civilian activities 
but still young enough for call; also men who have been 
trained in merchant marine service, partially or entirely 
under governmental supervision. 
Replacements as needed or nECessary. 
Building up the merchant mnr:tne, for commerc·ial pur-
poses and also as uotential auxiliaries in time of 
necessity. 
70 
Adequate personnel needed to keep the Uavy at the high-
est point of efficiency. 
Placing of navy yards, bases and sup·Jly stations lVhere 
they can give service to the Uavy that needs it, rather than 
as uol 1 tical expenditures for Congressmen seeking to gain 
reeiection. 
General Policy 
The general policy of the Navy, as it has been stated 
by Sworetary Denby, came into being with the adoption of 
the Washington treaty. This policy came into its own when 
our claim for f1 Havy second to none in number of ships, and 
one and two-thirds stronger than the nearest naval power 
was recognized, This ··policy Wfl.s adopted~ and because of its 
nature as a treaty became a part of our goV':)rnmental pol'lcy, 
accepted by other nations, and given standing in internation-
al law. 
Application of this policy, in direct language, then 
would mean that our Navy would be as strong as Great 
Britain 1 s in numbers and tonnage, and one .iand two-thirds 
stronger than Japan's. However, we cannot hope to have 
equality ·'"1 th Gro ~·t Britain, nor t i1e presumed advantage 
over Japan, becru1se both are insular countries, while our 
main seacoasts are \1idely separated by continental areas. 
The Panama Canal now changes this to some extent. Japan 
has several naval bases near home waters. Britain has a 
neoltlace of naval bases around the world, within easy 
steaming distance from points where hostilities might de-
velop. (See map in Appendix for such locations~) 
Formerly it was possible to maintain one fleet, when 
no power menaced our Paclfic interests. We now maintain 
only one fleet, but it is made up of all our ships, for 
easier administration, but this one ·f:'leet must be practi-
cally on a two power standard. The tren.ties say that we 
should maintain our capital shi•;s for certain periods, as 
must the other nations. It is possible that when these 
?1 
neriods e:>..rpire the desire for replacem·'::lt may turn to large 
· cruisers instead. The present ships, in measures of dis-
placements, maintain our ratio of power.l Displacement in 
any sense, can .ot be an exact measure of efficiency. No 
capital ship in the British navy maintains a gun smaller 
than 13.5 inch, while some of ours mount only 12 inch guns. 
Japan's capital ships carry 14 inch guns. It is true that 
a few of our ships carry 16 inch guns, largest allowed, 
but they are only a limited numb·:::r. Our ships then are 
outgunned and are slower. Many therefore could not stand 
up in battle lines within range of their enemy without 
serious chances of dangerous results, and they could not 
well retreat, as they could be overtaken and shot down.2 
1 
2 
Oapital ships are designated as those ships carrying 
guns larger than 8 inch, or a displacement over 10, 
600 tons. The Washington treaty applied only to them. 
Speed of the ships discussed is 20 and 21 knots, 
British capital ships all have 22 c.md 23. 
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Therefore, a tenable point can be raised -- what good are our 
capital shL;s in present conditions? Yet these· ships repre-
sent 20 percent of our ratio in capital ships. {Remember 
reference is made only to the ships that are almost obsolete 
and still must be maintained.) 
According to our 'Big Navy Party' therefore, our 
ratio is 4 to 5 to Great Britain and 4 to 3 to Japan, 
instead of the 5-5-3 ratio that we are told exists.l One 
possible solution is the elevation of the b~ns to increase 
range. This will be discussed a bit later, 
Construction of cruisers of 10,000 tons or less, 
mounting guns of not over eight inch bore is not prohibited 
by the treaties. Lacking these ships, we cannot give our 
merchant marine the adequate.protection it needs. The 
cruiser, due to increased speeds, is the beet type for com-
merce protection or raiding. In this connection take the 
record of the German raider "Emden" of only 3,000 tons, 23 
knots speed and mounting only four inch guns. This one 
boat destroyed more allied commerce than any fifteen Ger-
man submarines. 
At the present time we have no quantities of cruisers 
like either Great Britain or Japan, and only a few have 
been constructed, all of them under dimensions of British 
ships. For a period of seven years, 1916 to 1923, Congress 
did not authorize nor appropriate for a single cruiser, and 
none were in existence in our Navy that were of modern 
1 Sho:rne:~heimer, Glaser, Our Nay;y tArready For War, Curre:1t Hlat·.'rz, Jan. 923, XVII, 6c,lJ:-o31. 
oonstruot:\.on.l 
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Senator Hale, 2 in a speech in the Senate :tn February 
1929, stated that not a single cruiser had been authorized 
by Congress since Hny 1928, although at the time it was 
aclcnowledged thnt this country needed f·Jrty of these naval 
units to reach parity. Since that time six have been con-
structed.3 
Cruisers are offensive and defensive. They are ca-
pable of making a smashing defensive campaign, which is what 
an offense needs. Passive defense can be obtained from 
submarines. Here again we are weak, as we have no fleet 
submarines. Gunboats are vulnerable, so cannot be classed 
as defensive weapons. They are peace-time ships. They 
help maintain the Monroe Doctrine in the Caribbean ports 
~nd keep down bandit raids in Chinese waters. 
Naval Bases 
A naval base is actually a protection for ships from 
natural and other causes, a place where shi.:ps can be re-
fitted, provl stoned, repaired or built. One of the big 
factors in this work is adeauate drydocking facilities. 
The base facilities of this nation are few in number and 
under present conditions partially inadequate to handle 
1 Senator Heflin. 
2 Senator Hale, Congressional Record, LXX, part 1, 1060. 
3 F:i.rst one launched in 1929. 
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many of the ships. 
We can list Guanta.namo, in Cuba, which is unfortified, 
no drydocks, few fa.ctli ties and not large enough to shelter 
many ships; Balboa, Canal Zone, has one drydock and only a 
few facilities. for repair or maL1.tennnce; San Diego, 
California, has a harbor large enou::rh for submarines and 
desgroyers fleets. The channel is not large enough for the 
largest vessels to enter, and the p.ort is not fortifies; 
San Franci.sco, California, has one ·of the best hnrbors in the 
world, large enoup;h to p}:·otect the entire fleet. It has, 
however, only one commercial drydock large Enough for the 
large ships. Mare Island, Cal if :rnia, has extensive 
facilities in every way, but the channel is very narrow and 
for the largest vessels may be dangerous. 
Bremerton, Washington, has two large docks and all 
other exte:r1si ve repair and maL1t enance fac il i ties, but 
extensive fogs and the currents of Puget Sound are handi-
caps. This base can hru1dle all the ships at once in peace 
times, but might be unable to do so under war condi tiona. 
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, has one drydock, one submarine 
slip, the most extensive fueling faciiitiee on the Pacific, 
but not much repair materials. The water area is not ex-
tensive enough, but the fortifications are in good condi-
tion. Honolulu, Hawaii, has only a small harbor and the 
only fleet anchol~age is at Lahaina Roads, which is not 
fortified, protection being possible only by use of mines. 
One cruiser dock exists at Cavite, Philipnines, but . f 
I 
~ 
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Manila Bay could shelter the entire fleet. By the conditions 
of the Washington treaty no work C1'.J.n be done in· the Philippines 
to better conditions. Th·:·re is a dock and basing facilities 
at a point forty miles north of Corregidor Island, but all 
materials must be transported from 1··1anila by boat. 
On our eastern coast are sever<:u yards and repair sta-
tions, the largest and best that we have, but for all our 
discussions, our ,,veaknesses f')r t:,(:; future lie in the 
Caribbean and Pacific areas. Preventing our building up 
of naval bases in the Pacific, the Washington treaty cuts 
down the efficiency' of our fleet operations. I 
The non-fortification provisions of the treaty render 
the Philippines and other WestPrn Pacific islands useless 
for bases at Dresent. This point is, strangely, contended 
by Viscount Curzon of England.2 Potential supply bases 
are seen in the Virgin Islands, the islands directly off 
the coast of Central Amer lea, leased by this n Rt :i.on. It 
is, of course, problematlc if any of these aTe developed. 
In answer to a statement on e(luali t.y by Elihu Root, 
Vice Admiral Harry S. Knapp said: 
There is no trace of eoui ty in Article Nineteen. We 
are the losers in respect to posttion and resources. The 
treaty marks decreased influence in the Far East, and im-
pairs international prestige of the United States.3 
1 Goes, Capt. 1-T. H. , Naval Adequ.~·cy, Scientific American, 
Sept. 1928, CXXXIX, 220-224. 
2 Scammel, J. C. , British l'Ja~ral Base at Sin2;anore, Current 
History, October 1923, XIX, 114-118. -· · 
3 Schornatb.eimer, Graser, Janan' 's Naval Mastery of Asia 
Current Eis~, August 1922, XVI, 744-752. 
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Naval bases have been an important factor in all con-
ferences. Importance of these bases is recogni-zed, and has 
been, since the time that the f:i.rst great power made dis-
tant terri tory its posseesi.on. M:.ny of these bases are de-
fended, and it is maintained thn.t because of their im"9ort-
ance, more defenses should be allowed. The Japanese intro-
duced the subject of naval bases at the Washington confer-
ence, and argued that naval bases were as importa ;t as ships 
in e~raluB.ting navies. 
In discussion of parities, e:xruninati ~m of the bases of 
Gree.t Britain and the United States will show that these two 
·navies can never reach parity because of the differex1ces in 
these ent<-lblishml'mte. Of course, this nation has never had 
need for naval bases in such locations and numbers, so there 
can be no oversight laid on our Navy Department for such 
condition.l The bases represent a real policy of the British. 
If the United States develops a naval policy, it cannot do so 
without recognizing -oolic ies of .:Sri tain and :J'a.pan. The 
British naval pol i.cy has never been affected by that of the 
United States. She has always maintained a two-standard. 
fleet, and bases were counted as great factors in such 
pl8ns. Even with such a powerful fleet and provisions, no 
continental power has ever suffered unlawful interference 
1 Goes, Capt. N. H., Naval Adequacy, Scientific American, 
September 1928, OXXXIX, 220. 
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from the British fleet. 1 
Cruisers 
Talk of strength of navies must be in relative terms 
only. We cannot try these organizations out in any manner, 
except a war, to prove our claims, or to disprove others. 
The relative strength must also depend upon what part of 
the world the comparisons are to be made. In Europef.l.n wa-
ters the British fleet is more powerful, in our own waters 
the Amerioa.n fleet will surpass either British or Japanese, 
while in the Far East the Japanese' will be_ outstanding. 
This is as tt should be. 2 In direct cornparisons, we can . 
match up ship for ship, talk of displacements, guns, weights 
of main or secondary bro8dsides, personnel, speeds, ages 
of units, and so on to other details. The folloviing table 
1
.'7111 demonstrate what I mean in this regard. Considerat:l.ons 
must be made for the intangible factors that cannot be set 
down on paper. 
Other factors enter into this comparison thA.t cannot 
be given, such as seamindedness of the crews, rates of pay 
and promotions, terms of enlistments, reenlisted members of 
the crews, service of the officers, and like factors that 
would probably have a great effect on the effi.ciency of 
handling the individual units. 
1 Bywater, Hector C., Dismal. Prospects of Limiting Arma-
ments, Atlantic Monthly, Nov. 1924, CXXXIV, 672. 
2 Soammel, J. 0., British Base At Singapore, Current 
Histo~, October 1923, XIX, 114-118. 
r , 
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I use in this table the Northampton o+ the United 
States fleet, built in 1930; the London of the ·British 
fleet, built in 1928; Haguro of J;ypan built in 1929; Du-
nuesne of France built in 1929; •rrento of the Italian fleet, 
built in 1929. These ships are as near the same age as 
poeetble, eo that fa.ctor cannot militate against any. 
1Torth London Haguro Du- Trento 
Hampton quesne 
Displacement 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 10,000 
Length 600' 633' 630 1 626' 640' 
Beam 67 1 66 1 57 1 63' 67' 
Draft 19. 5' 20' 16.5 1 20. 5' 19' 
Ratio of length 
to beam 8.96 9.74 11.05 9.94 9.48 
Guns-Main battery 9--8• B--8" 10--8" 8--8" 8--811 
3 Trip. 4 twin 2 trip. 4 twin 4 twin 
Mounted turrets turret 2 twin turret turret 
Secondary battery 4--5 11 4--411 4--4. 7" 8--311 16--4" 
Torpedo tubes 6 8 12 6 8 
arranged triple quad. twin triple twin 
kind train. train. tra.in. fixed 
Airplanes 4 1 4 2 2 
Catapults 2 1 2 1 1 
Sp~ed 32.7k 32.25 33 33-36 35 
Horsepower 107,000 96,000 130,000 120,000 150,000 
Cruising radius 10,000 11,000 14,000 5,000 
Men 620 650 592 650 
Officers 45 40 30 42 
Table made up from information in Scientiftc American. 
Cruisers Summarized 
The table just presented shows the fairly equal com-
parison of one crnlser of each of the five powers. The 
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idea must not be drawn, however, that nll the cruisers of 
these powers are of 1 ike sizes. As mentL,ned they are simp-
ly illustrations of the newer of the 10,000 ton cruisers of 
the big gun class under tbe treaty lind tations. Remember, 
also, that the United States has only six of these ships. 
Deficiencies tn the cruiser strength of the United 
States were planned to be overcome at Geneva in 1927. On 
the contrary, we had no trading nressure to offer, so 
nothing was acconnl i shed. One of the a(~ vantages of the 
conference was the eudcatio·,1 of our people on the values 
of sea power. Our people did learn that cr1.1isers are not 
always constructed for the ~mr?OBe of oversea conauest, or 
combat. They found out nlso that navies are not just 
coll ectl o:1s of sh i.ps, a•1d that they canr10t be separated 
from naval bases, fuel stations, repo.ir facilities, armed 
auxiliaries or merchant marines. 
Our nr!t ton emerged from the meet with its principles 
intact,· nothing gained except just n~ted in the preceding 
paragraph. We are not build1.ng a naval organization with 
the idea of it being a challenge to others. 
We desire to build a Navy to meet the demands of the 
treaties laid doi'm for us. Our Uavy is entirely at the 
mercy of politics and politicians. Four or five Congresses 
!I' .,. 
j· 
may do various things to a nc.tvc:;.l progr<=.cm before it is 
actually put into o-perati.,n. Thi.s natt-.n found· that it 
cannot forever bask in the sun, under the nrotection of 
the guns of the British fleet. Even China accuses the 
United States of crawling behind the p,:uns of the British 
fleet.l 
We want a well-balanced -program put into operation. 
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Snch a program will depend upon a well defined program, which 
will take into account our lack of cruisers. It should pro-
duce some definite action. Politics must be eliminated from 
our fleet. If they are not n:-.:w placed, naval yards and 
bases should be lee ated where they will be of most value 
to our fleet.2 
"N;:Val policy is based on, and designed to support, 
national polic:\.ee and interests," said Commanders. P. 
Fulin:wider. 3 After examining condi t L:m of bases, essen-
tis.l ships, fleets, rele.tive strengths and posi tiona, we 
nP.tu.rally must have questions arise as to the remedies to 
correct things tha.t are not as they should be. 
Treaty Conditions 
The Washington treaty left considerable latitudes in 
1 Carter, John, Where Do We go From Geneva, In<ipendent, 
August 27, 1927, CXIX, 199. 
2 Ibid., 200. 
3 Fulinwider, Comm. A. P., U. S. N., American Yearbook, 
1931, 292. 
r···· 
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most of the naval construction. Japan, for example, turned 
the mrmey that was to have been used for battleships into 
the following -- 2 aircraft carriers, 16 light cruisers, 24 
destroyers leaders, 27 destroyers, 33 submarines. Thi.s 
seems to give her the strongest submarine fleet afloat. 
Great Britain completed the two battleships that were allowed, 
and in addition, 2 aircraft carriers, 24 light cruisers, 1 
destroyers leader, 10 destroyers and 15 submarines. The 
Un:t ted States, in the same period, constru.cted 6 o:rttisere 
and 6 submarines. There was no attempt to replace obsolete 
materials, or to modernize the aging capital ships.l 
It might be well to keep i~ mind th~t since the 
Washington conference, Great Britain and Japan saw it de-
sirable to plan· for the largest possible cruisers, although 
they were not always built to plans. It is asserted that the 
United States plan for the first Geneva conference was sound, 
because it led better to balanced fleets, and provided for 
replacing of old ships. The failure of this conference 
turned more attention on our Navy, eo that the Departme::1t 
submitted a building progrmn to Congress in December 1927, 
recommending 5 aircraft carriers, 25'light cruisers, 9 des-
troyers leaders, 31 ,submarines, all to be built by 1935. 
This makes a comparatively small program, when viewed be-
aide those of the other nowers, and also taking into con-
sideration the ,.-,beence of building during the years 
1 Goes, Capt. N. H. , Na,ral Adequacy, Scientific Ameri_<?l!:!!:.• 
CXXXIX, 519. 
following the Washington conference. The leader's were the 
Only new shtns going into the Navy, as the submarines and 
cruisers were rep lac erne11t s. 
As this introduction mat'ked the new drive toward a 
'treaty Navy', I will give here the estimated si.zes that 
would have resulted from such a program going to its com-
pletion, pr·oviding Gre~'t Britain and Japan di.d no building 
before our program was completed.l 
Gr. Britain United States Japan 
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Aircraft carriers 5 93,100t. 7 135,000 2 53,850 
Light cruisers 63 406,810 43 405,000 27 196,205 
Destroyer leaders 18 31,500 9 18,000 24 40,800 
Submarines 87,000 84,000 78,156 
In the conference Great Britain desired 650,000 tons of 
cruisers to the United States 400,000.2 Our trade routes are 
nearly as important as the British, and as we have not the 
bases, our tonnage should equal hers, to offset the differ-
ence. A solid basis for peace is a force, limited but 
adequate to national needs. If it is not lim.ited, it will 
soon lead back to competitio·n.. A fleet is an instrument of 
policy, but to be effective it must be adeQuate. Moderniza-
tion and balance are the ways that we can plan to build our 
Navy to prevdnt war or aggression. 3 
1 Op. Oi t., 522. 
2 Carter, John, Where Do We Go From Geneva, Indeuendent, 
August 27, 1927, CXIX, 199-204. 
3 Is Our Navy Headed For the Rocks, Literary Digest, 
May 17, 1924, LXXXI, 8. 
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In comnarison to the tables given on page 101, which 
were based on estimated programs tlmt were severely cut, we 
can look at the following table which is the maximum ton:1age 
limits laid down by the London. tre2.ty of 1930, which will be 
taken up in a later chapter. 
Gr. Brit. Unit. St. Japan:l 
Capital sh i·C)s 474-,750 462,400 26':3., 750 
Aircraft carriers 150,000 150,000 81,000 
Cruisers, with guns 
larger than 6" 146,800 180,000 108,400 
Cruisers, with guns 
smaller than 6" 192,200 143,500 100,450 
Destroyers 150,000 150,000 105,000 
Submarines 52,700 52,700 52,700 
Total fleet tclnnage 1,166,450 1,138,600 714,300 
In 1931, tbe five leading nations had the following 
total tonnages:2 
Great Britain 
United States 
Japan 
France 
Italy 
1,250,247 
1,251,840 
850,328 
628, 603 
403,905 
These figures include every kind of' craft, from 
largest to smallest, while the treaty figures given on 
preceding page from London treaty, are for the named 
categories only. In the list just above, as far as the 
1 J'oreign Pol fey Aeeooiation Reports,· VII, No. 20,· 
:366. 
2 Ibid. 
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United States is concerned, lists a number of ships past the 
period of commission, that have not been decommissioned. 
According to the Foreign Policy Associ.ntion this includes 
some 77,850 tons, while Britain's llst includes only· 3,920 
tone :past com:dssioned 1 if e • 
. If the present ton:1age is comoared with the tonnages of 
1914, it will be seen that the American o.nd Japanese fleets 
have been incfeased, while those of Greet Britain, France and 
Italy will show decreases.l 
To bea_r this statement out, the Association, in its 
Foreign PolicY: Reports, based on figures gi.ven to the League 
of Nations, shows the following construction of naval units 
during the im:c-ecliate past: 
Ships built Gr. Brit. u. s. 
Oapi tal shi.ns 18 555, 05QU.. 17 
Aircraft ca.rr iers 6 115,350 3 
Cruisers, 
Cruisers, 
Destroyers 
Submarines 
over 6 11 16 155,296 8 
under 6" 36 170, ()t_;5vv 11 
143 155,550 256 
57 55,30le 107 
three listed for disposal 
One listed for a training ship 
three are over 20 years of age 
two are over 20 years of age 
four are being built 
one is over 20 years of age 
one is over 20 years of age 
523,800 ...... 
77,500 
79,400x 
75,900a 
273, 360c 
76,880f 
Japan 
10 298.400 
3 61,270 
10 84, 120v 
20 93,375b 
99 111,885d 
57 70,973 
.. 
lt'tt 
X 
v 
vv 
a 
b 
c includes 23 coast guard. boats, ::9 that o.re over 
d 
e 
f 
16 years of age and 11 others for disposal 
two are over 16 years of age 
one lost at sea since table cmr,piled 
forty listed for disposal 
Now in contrast, there are being built in these three 
countries the following shins, according to the same 
1 Foreign Policy Association Reports, VII, no. 20. 
-----.>:.~' 
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references: 
Gr. Britain Un. States Japan 
Aircraft carriere . . . ...... 1 13,800 1 7,600 
611 gun cruisers 1 8,400 13 127,400x 4 40,000 
Lees than 6" gun • • • . . . . . • • . . . . . . . 4 34,000 Destroyers 21 28,820 . . ••••••• 20 30,136 
Submarines 7 5, 825 3 3,800v 13 18,569 
x 4 appropriated for but not etal·ted 
v 2 appropriated for but not started 
The Foreign Policy Association Reports, of July 24, 1929 
states that there were 33 cruisers built, building or 
appropriated for in the United States. The authority for 
the figure is given in a compilation of their own for the 
United States Senate Naval Committee use in 1929. The Senate 
paper compiled quotes a total of 22 light cruisers, with guns 
smaller than six inch, yet the figure in the table on page 
103. taken from the same source reports only 11, yet the 22 
were all reported as built. The United States should have, 
according to the 1929 report, 112 submarines built and 2 
under construction, but the 19q0 fig~res show only 107 built 
and 3 building, and 2 of these were not started. The same 
figures show 262 destroyers, while the 1930 figures show only 
256 and credit 23 of these as Coast Guard boats. 
This comparison seems badly out of place, but if every 
person writing on the Navy uses a different method of eval-
uating the figures used, and it seems many do, we can hardly 
place dependable confidence in any. Some sort of a measur-
ing device for these classes of ships should be adopted, with 
a universal tise, eo that there may be reliable information 
obtained. Perhaps a score card rating could be used. 
Upon such a rating card a. definite number o·f points 
could be allowed for each cruiser built and commissioned, 
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for instance 100 points for each unit built within a year of 
rating. As 20 years is agreed as the age limit then 5 pointe 
deduction would be made for each year of service. There 
should then be set up a total of allowable points as the 
ratio basis. Further allowance should be made for displace-
ments, main batteries, secondary battery, speed, complement, 
cruising radius, and a factoring number alloted for ratio 
under the treaty allowances~. The scoring could perhaps be 
done by a small neutral commission of experts,· with access 
to government records and lists. This could be accomplished 
in a short time and definitely pin down all discussions and 
unsound information, the same time it would provide a sound 
basis from which to plan ru1y programs desired and if ratios 
are to be maintained, each nation would be accurately guided. 
It is said that the 10,000 ton cruiser came into being 
in this manner: The British had only four large cruisers 
built, none of which met the specifications announced by 
0. E. Hughes at the Washington conference. They had oaly 
7.5 inch guns and displacement around 9,000 tons. The pro-
posal then was to make a limit of 10,000 tons and an 8 inch 
gun limit. This proposal was ado~Jted. 
Now shortly afterward Germany produced her •vest- · 
pocket' battleships, really cruisers of 9, 000 tons, accord-
ing to the Washington definition of a standard displacement 
. ·.i 
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ton, heavily armored, powered by Diesal engines making 26· 
knots, with six 11 inch guns, mounted in two triple turrets. , 
Four of these were contemplated, and if built and com-
missioned, they would be the start of a fleet that would 
soon dominate the Baltic. The power would soon be felt; 
no cruiser of any nation could stand against their fire, nor 
in turn do them much harm.l 
As mentioned, there was a new treaty made in 1930. It 
obanged to some extent the operation of the others, then in 
force. Under the new treaty, a few salient facts were 
disclosed: 2 
Japan obtained better ratios because she attended a conference 
called by Great Britain and the United States. 
Japan had outbuilt both these countries in submarines -and 
was able to do some dickering of her own. 
Japan had outbuilt the United States in cruisers, had a 
9-6 ratio with Great Britain in destroyers and nearly a 
5-3 ratio with the United States. 
Japan's program is only equalled by that of Germany in the 
last few years before the World War. 
After the 1921 conference the United ~tates scrapped valu-
able ships, agreed not to build naval' base.s, and had the 
idea that the ratio would extend through the entire program. 
Instead of holding out for a 5-3 ratio, we were barely 
holding out from a 10-7 ratio. We built 66,000 tone of 
aircraft carriers to 61,700 tone for Japan. If the United 
States program is not accelerated before 1936, Japan will. 
be equal in, and perhaps superior, many lines. 
By 1936 we should have, according to treaty analysis, 
1 .Foreign Policy Associ~tion Reports, VII, no. 20. 
2 Analyzing the 1930 Naval Treaty, Scientific American, 
July 1930, OXXXXIII, 16. 
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a 5-3 ratio in eight inch gun cruisers, at present it is 
8-1 in favor of Japan, and it is a prospect that in 1932 
it will be 12-10 at the best, with the United States on the 
short end. In six inch gun cruisers, Japan has 20 to 10 for 
the United States. By the terms of the treaty, if the 
United States built to proper ratio on the eight inch gun 
ships, then we can build the six inch gun ships only on a 
ratio of 10-7. We are inferior in submarines, but Japan 
will grant us parity. By carrying out the program, with 
slight modifications, started before the Washington con-
f'erence, Japan went to the London conference able to insist 
on her demands. No group of pacifists weakened Japanese 
arguments.1 
In face of such a condition, Congress should start a 
building program, now to extend only less than four years 
to attempt to gain a part of the treaty strength allotted 
to us to reach by December 31, 1936. 
On February 2, 1931 the New York ~erald-Tribune pub-
lished an editorial on the Navy, in which was stated that 
the "United States Navy is 13.7% below treaty strength, 
the British Navy is 1.6% below treaty strength and the 
Japanese Navy is only about • 8% b.elow •11 In connection with 
this statement, the J..Tavy League stated on April 7, 1932, 
1 Op. Oit. 
~ As this material was printed in the Scientific American 
in 1930, allowance must be made by the reader. 
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that the United States Uavy was only 69~~ of its treaty quota 
strength, the British Navy 85% and the Japanese ioo%. As 
these quotas do not become binding until 1936, a nation may 
now be over the limit. 
In 1926 our Navy had less than one-half the number of 
men for proper manning of its aircraft, and had only 50% of 
its equipment. Since then progress has been made rapidly, 
and with additions of dirigibles, it is well up on the list. 
It is still short of what it should be~ according to naval 
authorities. It is planned that aircraft be handled by 
cruisers. 
Personnel 
According to our ratio, there should be 121,957 men in 
~he service. Actually we have less than 90,000. To mod-
ernize our capital ships and keep them in operation will 
require more men. To build new ships means to increase en-
listments. It is useless to_ talk ships unless they can be 
operated after they are built. The day a ship is commia-
sioned is about two years too late to start training its 
crew. 
Archibald Turnbull, retire.d,l says that the United 
States now has a naval policy, that of surrendering naval 
bases, giving up ships, operating only one-third of its 
destroyers, and skeletonizing its personnel. After lift-
ing its voice to avert war, it is now content to destroy 
1 Turnbull, Commander A. D., Battleship versus Airship, 
OUrrent History, April 1925, XXII, 10-17. 
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the force that gave the voice carrying power. 
In order to keep its ships operating, the'Navy must 
have efficient and trained men. The general impression is 
that every man in the service is on a ship. Such is not 
the case. It is necessary ~o have neal~ly 500 men on shore 
for every 1000 men on ships. In the British and Japanese 
Navy service there are from 600 to 700 men on shore for 
every 1000 on ships. We operate with less shore service, 
because more men, in our reduced state, are needed to try 
and keep as many ships in operation as possible. We ha.ve 
no Naval Reserve from which to draw. Keeping within a 
treaty is all right in peace times, but a war puts an end 
to treaty obligations.l 
Senator W. S. King recently stated that this nation 
had no real naval policy, and that until one could be 
developed, no sound constructive program could be made. 
This sentiment was also seen in the reports of Secretary 
Wilbur, while he was head of the depaTtment. 
After one of his reports along this line, the ~ 
ramento Bee stated: 
Our battle fleet is in poor condition, due to long-de-
ferred maintenance. Five of our battleships only are fit 
for full service, they are not fully manned. 
The Tacoma Ledger also remarked that it was not the 
numbef' of ships on the naval lists, but the condition 
1 Lansing, Robert, Fallacy of Outlawing War, Independen~, 
August 16, 1924, CXIII, 95-97. 
those ships were in, their fighting and defensive power, 
and their crewe. "A Navy is not good," it stated, "un-
less it is at its beet, and good as the best." 
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A statement of the Raleigh News end Observer, at this 
point reminded, 
"Oux government goes about reducing i te/ ability for 
defense without reducUng the causes of wax. Until a way 
is·found to prevent war, no nation can, nor will, rendex 
itself impotent to defend itaelf. 11 l 
Gun Elevations 
A step of modernizing the ships can be taken in the 
elevation of guns. We can quote here fxom a discussion 
on this subject by Hector C. Bywater, Brit,sh naval ex-
pert and writer. We must be awn.re of the fac.t that the 
main battexies of the ships axe those mounted in tuxrets, 
mounted fore and aft, movable and with elevating devices 
to handle the great guns. The general elevation of these 
guns is about fifteen percent. The demand is now fox a 
new elevation from 20 to 30 percent. Demand: for this ex-
tension of vertical mobility has been based on the state-
ments that the British ships have higher angles of gun 
fire, with resulting longer range. 
Extreme limit of elevation has been reached at 42 per-
cent, but this is not practical or is it advantageous. 
Let us review a bit of the history attached to gun ele-
vations. 
1 
The first guns mounted on ships had no elevation. 
Is Our Navy Headed For the Rocke, Literary Digest, 
May 17, 1924, LXXXI, 8-10. 
The whole carriage was immobile. The elevation was se-
cured by the listing of the ship, and moving the whole 
ship was necessary to bring guns to bear on the enemy. 
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Roll of ships also aided elevations. Then came some slight 
arrangements for elevation. Recoil was taken up by slings 
of rope hawsers. Later slide carl'iages came irito use, and 
with this an elevating ratchet arrangement, allowing the 
dangerous rise of ten to fifteen degrees. 
In the rejuvenation period, following the Civil War, 
when naval ideas were upset, hydraulic recoil buffers 
were put into use o~ the larger guns. Yet in 1878, the 
British attack on the Dardanelles was not successful, for 
one reason, that no guns could be brought to bear on the 
Turkish forts above the water. Then elevation plans took 
decided turns. Between this time and shortly before the 
World War many experiments were made with turret guns, 
using as much as 40 percent angles. But the less of time 
in reloading, downward crash of the recoil, and the greater 
areas in the turret walls that were left unprotected were 
factors working against this extreme elevation. Germany 
was the only nation trying to use 30 degrees or more, and 
just before the war she cut down to 18 degrees. 
In the British fleet the 1 St. Vincent' class used 
12 inch guns on a 15 degree elevation and capable of an 
extreme range of 20,000 yards. In the 'Orion' class the 
13.5 inch guns needed 20 degrees to make the same range. 
In the later 'Queen Elizabeth' class the 15 inch guns used 
~·· 
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20 degrees and reached 24,000 yards. 
The first major engag:ement of ti:1e World War, the 
Dogger banks, the firing started at 19,000 yards. In the 
Falkland engagement, German gunners tried for hits at 
21,000 yards. The new 'Hood' class of British ships bad 
designs for 30 degree elevation, with carrying range of 
30,000 yards. It was found, however, that the downcrash 
was too great, longer gun parts were necessary and it was 
highly problematic if the extra angle was actually worth 
its net gain in range. 
The Ordnance Department of the United States Navy 
is now experimenting in getting extra ranges and ele-
vations by using stream-lined shells, like those used by 
the German long-range bombardment guns. Longer ranges 
could be obtained by reducing the factors of safety by 
using heavier charges of propellants, and may also be ob-
tained by use of flooding tanks to list the ships. 
In ·theory hits can be obtained up to the limit of gun 
ranges, but in actual practice the percentage of hits drops 
very rapidly after the distances reach 75% of possible 
range, dropping to practically nothing at the extreme range, 
unless they be chance hits.l 
The following tables show the ranges of the capital 
ships of the United States Navy and the British N~vy. 
1 Bywa.ter, Hector c., Elevation of British Guns, 
Scientific American, July 1923, CXXIX, 26-28. 
United States Navy 
Ships 
3 battleships 
2 battleship·s 
2 battleships 
6 battleships 
2 battleships 
2 battleships 
Gun Caliber 
sizes length 
1611 45 
14 50 
14 50 
14 45 
12 50 
12 45 
Degrees 
elevation 
30 
30 
15 
15 
15 
15 
Range 
in yards 
32,000 
34,000 
22,000 
20,000 
22,000 
20,000 
It will be noted that increased caliber length will 
increase range. 
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(Caliber length is a ratio of measurement between the 
length of the gun barrel and the bore of the gun.) 
British Navy 
Ships Gun Caliber Degrees Range 
sizes lengths elevation in yards 
2 battleships 16" 42 30 32,000 
10 battleships 15 42 20 24,300 
4 battleships 13.5 42 20 23,800 e battleships 15 42 20 24,300 
1 battleship 15 42 30 30,000 
1 battleship 13.5 42 20 23,8001 
Gun sizes were limited by the Washington treaty to 
16 inch sizes. These guns are capable of handling shells 
at a fair rate of speed, but are expensive to build and 
to install. They do not have the range of a 50 caiiber 
15 inch gun, nor even a 14 inch gun. The only advantage is 
that the shell is larger, 1040 pounds, so that it can handle 
a larger explosive charge and have greater piercing ability-. 
The question of increasing gun elevation bas been 
brought up several times in Congress, but has been blocked 
by Presidential action. Coolidge alWRys was opposed be-
cause of protest by Great Britain, although the British 
1 . 
Op. Cit •. 
guns had the elevations that were desired for American 
ships. Secretary Hughes did not consider the 'change of 
elevation as reconstruction. The Richmond Dispatch 
commented on this item, 
11 ~Tothing stands in the way of elevation except President 
Coolidge and his policy." 
It ma.y be stated in leaving this discussion that 
this modernization step of gun elevation has not been 
done as yet, even though it is pointed out it will in--
crease the range of our ships' guns. 
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In connection with this modernization, it was planned 
to armor the decks against high-angle fire or aerial bombs. 
"Blistering" the hulls then would be necessary to maintain 
proper bouyanoy. These bulges would also protect against 
mines or torpedo attacks. .Oil burning boilers are needed 
in six of the battleships that are still coal burners. 
Submarines. 
At the Washington conference there was·a strong fight 
made on the use of submarines. America held out for 
90,000 tons, so it must be probable that our delegates 
looked upon this typ~ as a defensive unit. 
In 1804, when Fulton laid his plans for the submer• 
sible before the British Admiralty, Earl St. Vincent stated 
that it was an instrument that the British, as rulers of the 
sea did not want. "If it is successful," he said, 11 it will 
deprive us of it. (control)" Events of the World War almost 
proved this prophesy. Ho type of warship now existing can 
do what the submarine can do. It is possible for them to 
be built of large enough cruising radius to cross the 
Pacific. It is no secret that Japan has constructed some 
larger than those built by Germany--a regret from the 
British point of view. It may create a precedent. If in 
some future date Germany may assert her right to build 
this type again it may not be easy to see where her claims 
could be easily denied.l· 
Replacement Program 
There may be a few fa.cts of a replacement program 
that might not be entirely clear. The Navy League, and 
other organizations, look at these facta rather dubiously. 
For example, between the close of the Washington conference 
and the London conference, the United States laid down 
86,120 standard tone of seagoing combatant vessels. Britain 
laid down 271,125 tone and Japan 249,903 tone. France laid 
247,000 tone and Italy 129,997 tone. In other words, each 
of the four main naval powers averrtged nearly three times 
as much as the United States. Spain has risen in naval 
circles, and has been building as fastfas either Italy or 
France. 2 
Excluding all vessels listed for disposal, but in-
cluding all else built, basing the tonnage totals on the 
1 
2 
Bywater, Hector 0., Limitation of Armaments, Atlantic 
Monthll, February 1922, OXXIX, 259-269. 
Army and }Tavy Journal, editorial notes, 1930. 
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London treaty the United States is, according to estimates 
of the Navy Leagu.e, between 13 and 20 percent below quota 
allowances, rather a high estimate. It has been usually 
conceded that the United States Navy was around 80 percent 
of quota strength. 
This problem can. be classed under one of two heads--
building out to treaty quotas and then maintaining that 
quota by replacements, The following table, compiled by 
lbhe Navy League on February 4, 1931, is offered for il-
lustration of replacement costs: 
Ships 
Capital ships 
Aircraft carriers 
Large gun cruisers 
Small gun cruisers 
Destroyers 
Submarines 
~ron-combatant 
aux11t!ar1es 
Airplanes 
Total 
tons 
453,500 
79,800 
150,000 
70,500 
150,000 
52,700 
563,228 
Oost 
:pr ton 
$1,100 
1,500 
1,700 
1,850 
2,800 
4,000 
175 
Replacement 
Value 
$498,850,000 
l19,700,000 
255,000,000 
130,425,000 
420,000,000 
210, 80o,:ooo 
98,546,900 
Navy type 1159, with average replacement cost per 
plane of ~~33, 000, average age 5 years, average 
yearly replacement cost ~~7, 649,400. 
Total combatant tonnage 956,500 
Total replacement cost ~1,771,586,900 
Annual average replacement cost ~~104, 256,131 
It needs to be taken into consideration at this 
point, that the United States did not have a modern cruiser 
and quite a collection of old vessels at the time of the 
Washington conference. During the period of nine years, 
1921 to 1930, the United States has built or is building, 
fifteen cruisers included in the above totals. The annual 
program of replacement for the past few years has practically 
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been $38,000,000. This is about one-third the amount 
estimated as necessary. A deduction can be made that either 
the estimate is too low or else there will be a tremendous 
bill to face at some future day. 
now we may look at replacement in another wa_y--deduot 
from the replacement annual cost (~1~104, 256, 131) the average 
annual replacement costs of the vessels built since 1921, 
namely $24,434,400, leaving a balance of ~79,821,731. This 
can be taken to mean that while there is some naval ac-
tivity on replacement, the Navy is slipping backward about 
$40,000,000 per year,~ if deterioration can be thus guaged 
in dollars. 
One argument is, however, that thE;lre can be no re-
placement on capital ships during this period. True cmd 
we can thus out off $25,000,000 from what should have been 
spent. Nevertheless these will need replacing later, fu~d 
other ships could nmv be built to clear financial decks 
for action when replacements begin in 1937. This is when 
eleven ships named in the Washington treaty are presumed by 
that instrument to be replaced. In 1931 it was estimated 
that expenditures of ~~297, 000,000 would be necessary to 
bring the Navy up to treaty strength, and $496,000,000 to 
replace all the averaged vessels. 
General Reflections. 
The limit of 35,000 tons on battleships cannot be 
defended on any military grounds. Some naval authorities 
---------..,·~'"-'-
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in Europe say that the ideal battleship would have a dis-
placement of 57,000 tons. Great Britain was going toward 
that size with the 'Hood' class of 43,000 tons displace-
ment. 
Admiral Sims stated that America's povrer and program 
brought sanity to a war-sick world, but still in belliger-
ent mood. In connection he said: 
If this nation continues great--! mean potentially great--
w·e may turn the world from the ideals of war. If we sit 
snugly by and are content to a.llow our power, e..ctual or 
potential, to rust at the docks, we will soon become a 
negligible factor as a world force, and will be so treated. 
Senator Salisbury stated that our Navy must be as good 
and as well prepared as a.n.y in the world. Every gun must 
be ready, and we must have an educated naval reserve officers 
list to draw upon in an emergency. We must show our deter-
mination to live in pea.ce, even though we must fight to do 
eo. Then, he prophesied, the world, ltnowing this stand 
would see to it that naval holidays were long, and armaments 
would be still lower.l 
With the linli tation conferences laying down the basis 
for policies, it was easy enough for Congress to formulate 
a building· program for a balanced Havy. It might be false 
economy to fail to live up to these standards, is the con-
sensus of opinions of many naval men and writers. In March, 
of this year, Admiral Frank Upham, Chief of the Bureau of 
1 Salisbury, Willard, (former Senator from Delaware,) 
American Naval Efficiency, Curent History, April 
1922, XVI, 32-33. 
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Navigation in the ~Tavy Department, stated that a reduction 
of naval personnel and strength was made after' the London 
conference, at a time when our strength was not nearly up 
to that allowed by the treaty. He said "it is a serious 
impairment to an arm of our national defense." 
Upham was answered by President Hoover, who stated: 
He had been informed by officers in the Navy Department 
that our present fleet 11 is adequate for coast defense, 
and that if it is brought up to treaty levels it would 
be an economic injury to our people, and a threat a.gainst 
our neighbors that would be a good ca.use for ill will." 
In a short time following this statement of Hoover's, 
Admiral Pratt, highest ranking officer of the Navy, testi-
fied in a Congressional hearing that the Navy "was falling 
apart." The Navy League, through its president, asked 
President Hoover that if our neighbors had agreed that the 
United States ~;:~hould have a specified strength, and that 
at present if had only about 70 percent of that strength, 
where would there be reason for a righteous cause for ill 
will in building up the deficiencies. The organization 
also asked if we had cause for ill will because they were 
keeping their parts of the agreements. 
In his !~Tavy Day speech, delivered October 27, 1931 
President Hoover said:l 
The first necessity of our government is the maintenance 
of a Ua.vy so efficient and strong that, in conjunction with 
our Army, no enemy may ever invade our country. 
:::.· .. ·. 
1 Navy League bulletins, Building Our Treaty Navy. 
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The London Times in January 1929, stated that: 1 
The United States is the judge of its own requirements, 
and· the figures it has chosen to describe its cruiser de-
ficiency will not, and cannot, act as a stimulus to. naval 
construction here. 
On Armistice Day, November 11, 1931, President Hoover 
stat!d: 
Peace is a product, first, of preparedness for defense;: 
second, patient settlement of controversy; third, dynamic 
development of forces of good will. 
American commerce has grown greatly in the past fifteen 
years, and that commerce should be given protection in time 
of peace or war. The actual danger of an attaclc on Ameri-
can shores is remote, but possible This does not offer the 
main reason for a Navy, quotes the Literary Digest. Our 
traditional policy has been neutrality. The St. Paul 
Pioneer Press said that "our need for a Navy is primarily 
for defense of our rights as an innocent bystander.n2 
In commenting upon his requests for a naval building 
program, Secretary Wilbur said: 
The country is not alarmed, it is simply insistent that the 
Navy be kept up to its treaty ratio~ 
Comment on this by the Philadeluhia North American 
was that "the truth is the ratio adopted does not prevail, 
and the pretense that it does causes controversy." The 
Cincinnati· Post stated that "the ratio is just a fiction 
of the most dangerous sort." 
1 
2 
Op. Oi t. 
Billions For A Uaval Program, hl terjr.z_pigest, 
January 28, 1928, XCVI, 9-11. 
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Then the New York Herald Tribune added that the capital 
ship was not a fleet. It remarked that "we would remain. 
behind only if we elected to remain so, or did not bring 
the other nations down on ratios of auxiliaries.nl 
The Literary l2,i_g_est on January 24, 1925, comments in 
substance, that was hard to understand why there was any 
use to attend naval conferences to determine power of 
navies, unless this nation proposed to keep up our end of t 
the agreements. 
War may come to this nation in the future, as it has in 
the past, is as certain as that the nation endures. There 
is only one way to assure ourselves of future peace or 
safety or welfare. That is to be strong enough to command 
for ourselves the peace that no other nation would command 
for us, to command it by means of a naval defense which 
would be such that the world v1ould find it impregnable. 
Only those have rights that dare to defend them.Z' 
The general policy enunciated by Secretary Denby and 
corrobra ted by remarks of Senator Hef1 in in the United 
States Senate, can still be quoted as a basis for building. 
The Senator's remarks have already been gi v·en. Upon these 
various statements we may place some of the objectives of 
the Navy. 
1 
z 
Literary Digest, XCVI, 9-11. 
Long or Short Range Navy, ~erar¥. DiKeet, January 
24, 1925, LXXXIV, 7-9/ 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISARMAMEWr AND LIMITATIOn CONFERENCES 
The first attempt, or suggestion, for any move 
toward disarmament on the part of the United states 
started with the suggestion by Alexander·Hrunilton, made 
to President Washington on April 23, 1794, according to 
Charles E. Hughes' discussion. Hamil ton made the sug-
gestion that an agreement be made between the United States 
and Great Britain regarding armament on the Great Lakes. 
This idea did not materialize into a fact until the Rush 
Bagot convention completed in 1817. 
Movements that led up to the Washington conference 
of 1921 might be based on the rescript issued by the Czar 
of Russia in 1898, which document convened the first Hague 
. \ 
Conference. The fondest hope that the Czar held was that 
the growing weir;ht of armament, which was i~poverishing the 
peoples of nations, might be lifted from their shoulders. 
He did not, however, see that armaments were not so much 
the cause of troubles as they were symptoms. 
The conference that he thus called met in 1899 in the 
Dutch capital. It passed the following resolution: 
The conference expresses the wish that the. governments take 
into consideration the proposals made at this conference, 
and examine the possibilities of an agreement as to the 
li'mi t of armed forces, by land and by sea, and war budgets. 
Between the first conference, 1899, and the second, 
1907, the governments paid no attention to these suggestions, 
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but went on increasing their armaments at unprecedented 
rates. The only utterances against this military activity 
were made bJr the President of the United States and the 
Prime Minister of Great Britain.1 
Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman said, in a speech in 
London in December 1905, that "Britain should place her-
self at the head of a League of Peace to limit armament." 
Roosevelt wrote in a letter, April 1907-, to the new 
York Peace and Arbitration Congres~, that: 
11 The most practical step in diminishing the burden of ex-
pense caused by increasing size of naval armament, would 
I believe, be an agreem~nt limiting the si~e of naval 
!hips hereafter built." Fourteen years later this idea 
became a reality. 
Great Britain and the United States were the only 
cou~tries_reserving the right to bring up the discussion 
of armaments at the Second Hague Conterence. Russia gave 
up the championing of such a cause, and in the meeting 
actually moved to bar it from discussion. The conference 
was in session eight weeks before the armament discussion 
could be brought onto the floor, and at that time Great 
B rtt_ain moved: 
Great Britain will be ready to commnr..icate ench year, to 
the powers that will do the same, its plans of construction 
of new warships. Such an wxchange of information will 
facilitate an exchange of views between the governments, 
and the reductions, by which common agreements may be 
reached. 
1 
2 
Hc!t, Hamilton, What Has Been Done To Limit Armament, 
Independent, Nov. 5, 1921, CVII, 123-124. 
Ibid. 
, ... 
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Great Britain was given the support of the United 
States. Germany, Russia, Austria and Jnpan announced 
that they would not take part in any such agreement. 
Thereupon the delegation from the United States proposed 
the following:· 
The Second Hague Peace Conference confirms the resolution 
of 1899, in regard to limitation of military expenditures, 
and declares it is desirable that the governments resume 
serious examination of th~ question. 
This motion was lost and the movement laid on the 
table by a majority vote of delegations present.l 
Various moves were started in different countries, 
but no headway was made. Then on June 24, 1910; the 
United States Congress passed the Bennet bill, which pro-
vided: 
A committee of five appointed by the President of the 
United States, to consider the expediency of utilizing 
international agencies for the purpose of limiting armaments 
of nations by international agreements, and to constitute 
the existing navies of the world as a combined inter-
national force to preserve peace. 
For some reason President Taft never appointed a 
committee for this purpose.2 He did, however, ask Theodore 
Roosevelt to find out from Great Britain and Germany 
their i.deas on the limitation of armaments. Roosevelt 
was told, by the Kaiser, not to "meddle with affairs that 
did not concern him." 
1 
2 
Op. Oi t. 
Ibid. 
'i'J 
After the Treaty of Versailles, follo,ving the World 
War, the idea began to take definite shape for' a disarm-
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ament conference. As a result of several possible •surveys' 
of the situation, President Harding issued an invitation 
for a meeting of the main topics, one of these being naval 
limitations. 
The main one of these surveys was made by the League 
of nations. On February 10, 1920 the League of Hations 
had begun to operate. A permanent armnmen•ts committee 
was appointed by the Council, but before muGh action could 
be obtained from the committee, the Assembly met on November 
15, 1920. Anticipated actions on armaments did not mater-
ialize, as the United States and Germany were not members 
of the Leagtle. 
Article Eight of the League covenant declares that: 
11 The maintenance of peace requires the reduction of na-
tional armaments to the lowest point consistent with na-
tionaJ. safety, and the enforcement by common action, of 
international obligations." 
In this connection the proposal was passed in the Assembly 
meeting, in 1920, that the armaments committee suggest to 
the member states not to increase military strength for a 
period of two years. The Assembly also recommended that 
a body of political, sociaJ. and economic experts 1be added 
to the armament committee, which was done. This augmented 
body now sent out its appeal to the Lea~ue members. 
Twenty-seven replies were received on the appeal. 
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T\vo -- Austria and Bulgaria -- said that the Versailles 
treaty limited armaments sufficiently; three-- Sweden, 
South Africa and Brazil -- were non-committal; fifteen 
accepted the suggestion in some manner, all with reser-
vations dep·ending upon the action of other members; seven 
rejected the idea entirely. Thus, when the Assembly met 
in September, 1921, the Armaments Committee through its 
chairman, Vi~ani of France, reported that it found the 
world not ready for disarmament, and it did not trust 
justice enough. It stated 11 Disarmament and peace must 
come, but not yet." 
The committee praised the United States for issuing 
the call to the disarmament conference to be held two 
months later at Washington. The United States was also 
blamed for not having acted upon the St. Germain conference 
of 1919, by which armaments were to have been controlled. 
In discussing the coming conference at that time, Frank 
H. Simond writing in the Review of Reviews said; 
The idea seems that the reduction of armaxnente will not 
affect the Pacific question. In consenting to reduce 
armaments, no nation will consent to surrender interests 
such as markets upon which it must depend to feed its 
people. 
The World's Work, issued just before the conference 
opened, stated editorially that "there is not going to be 
any diear~mament, unless the open domr policy is ratified 
by Great Britain and accepted by Japan." This statement 
was answered by 0. M. Bishop, writing in the new Yorlc 
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Evening Post, who said: 
The open door policy, announced by the United States in 
1901, and accepted by all powers, has had little attention 
paid to it. The open door does not exist. The door has 
'been closed in Manohurt.a for sixteen years since Japan 
acquired control of the South Hanchurian railroad. 
Archibald Hurd, writing a pre-conference article in 
the Fortnightly Review, said: 1 
If the conference is to be confined to a discussion of 
standards of naval strength then its success will be seri-
ously affected because this country's (England) Havy, in 
addition to protecting sea communication, guards the ocean-
washed frontiers of all various nations and dependencies 
of the British Crown. · 
This same writer quoted from a recent speech of 
Winston Churchill as follows: 
OUr position is highly artificial. We are an unarmed 
people. We are the only power in Europe which does not 
possess a large army. We cnw.1.ot invade any continental 
state, we have not the power, if we even wished to do so. 
This English writer, in his articles, put forth the 
following ideas-~ it is an unhappy augury of the success 
of the assembly that the public opinion in the United 
States, in all innocence we may 'believe, should have been 
seiz·ed with a false conception of the naval situation;· 1 t 
is suggested that the British fleet is responsible for the 
large expenditures in the United States; it must be evident 
that there is no excuse for the idea that the British naval 
policies should be responsible for tax burdens in the 
United States. 
1 Hurd, Archibald, Washington Conference and Naval Issues, 
Fortnightly Review, I1Tovember, 1921, 717-722. 
r 
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Continuing his dixcussion of the pending gathering, 
Hurd stated: 
It is essential, if the Washington conference is not to 
fail, that all misconceptions be swept away and a clear 
atmosphere created. The primary subject for discussion 
is 'Pacific and the Far East' for armament depends upon 
policy. As a second subject, armaments--but armaments 
cannot be discussed as separate compartments of water, 
land and air, but must be considered as a whole. 
Washington Conference. 
The Washington conference for the limitation of 
armaments assembled in Washington in Uovember, 1921, in 
response to the invitations sent out under auspices of the 
United States government. Charles E. Hughes, United States 
Secretary of States presided, and he was the person who 
voiced the proposals of the United States for naval dis-
armament. 
As previously mentioned, there had been a great wave 
of interest in shipbuilding sweep the United States in the 
years immediately preceding. Uow, · according to the state-
ments of observers, by 1921 this enthusiasm was on ·the wane. 
OWing to inadequate apprbpriations from Congress, l.~·Jst of 
the ships under construction were considerably behind 
schedule, and it even began to look doubtful that some 
would be completed at all. To c~~cel a naval program, which 
had been so expensive, without gaining anything, would have 
been both unetatesmanlike and expensively wasteful. The 
lessons of the World War had caused a real building program, 
based on a new doctrine. 
~·· 
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As Captain Frothingham maintains, the United States 
Navy had been addicted to the idea that e;uns won battles 
and that the mobile ~ountings for transporting those guns 
needed strong protection. Hence the Navy had heavily armed 
ships and these were protected by extremely strong armor. 
Great Eri tain, however, had been influenced more by etybes. 
The result was that the British found themselves in 
the poei ti.on o of having a fine assortment of body designs, 
out with the United States actually having the strongest 
fleet in the world. Further, it did not seem that there 
was a chance for Britain to catch up.l It is well known 
that battleships are not just improvised, and the ~nerican 
plane had actually been working. 
The sudden realization, in Europe, that the United 
States ha.d the superior! ty in naval forces was a dist1."1ct 
shock. Europeans decided that America had gone imperial• 
istic. All sorts of things now were credited to the 
United States, because we, as a nation, had been indiffer-
ent to certain outside intereste. 2 
Then more of a shoclc was given to Europe when !.~r. 
Hughes proposed to put this great fleet down to an eoual 
with the British. The whole question of naval limitati on 
1 
2 
Turnbull, Commander A. D., The United States A Second 
Class 1Taval Power, Current Historx:, March 1924, 
XVIII, 969-983. 
Frothingham, Capt. T. G., Power Behind Disarmament, 
Independent, Ma.y 5, 1928, CXX, 422-23. 
was settled at once. This meant that much of our modern 
equipment was scrapped, while Great Britain, because of 
presumed inferiori~y, was allowed to scrap old material 
and build new. Trouble between the two nations was in-
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conceivable, so the comparisons were made simply on a basis 
of defense.l 
Great Britain, ruler of the seas for years, is credited 
with having resigned her superiority in battleships. Rear 
Aruniral Fiske, of the United States Navy, denied that she 
did it voluntarily. He claims that it is not certain that 
she could have maintained any supremacy had the United 
States at this time contested it. That the British re-
signed actual naval supremacy may be truthfully denied, be-
cause of the fact that they still p.ossess it. They have 
wisely determined, also, to keep it. Civilians persist in 
ranking ships in tonnages, in face of the fact that it is 
men who wage war. Ships and guns are only the tools with 
which men make war.2 
In developing this idea, Admiral Fiske said: 
The British Navy is superior to the American Navy in numbers 
of men and their training. The officers can be classed as 
equals in skills, but the enlis.ted men are not, for the 
reason that enlistments rw1·as high as 12 years in the 
British Navy, and only as high as 4 years in ours. This 
is obviously a. crushing handicap. 
l Op. Ott. 422-424. 
Fislte, Admiral B •.. A.,., The Strongest Uavy, 
Current Historz, June 1922, XVI, 557-562. 
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If the battleship is the backbone of the fleet, we are 
allowed equal strength with Britain. But of the necessary 
auxiliaries we have :practically none but destroyers. The 
British Havy is to be out to 98,500 men, the American NRVY 
to 86,000. The British figure does not i:.1clude 8, 000 in 
the naval air force, British Colonial Navy, Colonial re-
serve, Royal Indian Marines or the Coast Guard. Our 86,000 
includes all enlistments. 
Imagine the two nations at war, navies operating against 
each other in waters equally distant from both countries. 
We could cancel out the battleships, then all other factors 
of equal strength. This being don.e, Britain would still 
have left considerable numbers of battle cruisers, and 
other armed. ships that could proceed to blockade new York, 
or the other coast porte, without any particular opposition.l 
In considering the American proposal, before it was 
made, there were two arr~ments in favor of cancelling the 
three-year building program. It was evident that America 
was taking certain risks, unless the other nations '"Tould 
tal-ce the same action. An international pact was necessary. 
The plan was submitted at the psychological moment. The 
countries were fir: ding the building programs very heavy. 
If the plan had not been successful, it is doubtful if the 
Japanese government, for example, could have completed any 
plan. It is almost certain tha.t the ruinous competition 
would have forced a strike at America, when Japan felt that 
its power was sufficient, or bankruptcy and civil rebelli.on 
in one or more· of the countries would have resulted, accord-
ing to the l<:een naval observer, Hem:tor Byv~ater. 2 
1 Op. Cit. 
2 Bywater, Hector C., Limitation of Armament, Atlantic 
Monthly, Feb. 1922, OXXXIV, 672-680 
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Edwin L. James, writing in the !rev1 York Times said, 
Ylhen this nation offered to g{:~re up its ne.val euperiori ty, 
we were financially able to achieve, England and Japan 
were agreed, France was forced into the agreement and 
Italy- accepted, because it put her on an equality with 
France, and did not interfere with her plans. 
In mentioning France, we must bring her into the 
agreement, because France represents the main land arma-
ment of Europe today, and to be successful in future dis-
cussions, P. W. Wi1H30n says, land armaments cannot be left 
out of' considerations. Wilson states that conscription 
cannot, like shipbuilding, be con<realed. It must be em~ 
bodied in the public law:s to make it enforceable, and thus 
becomes a subject for international discussions and pacts.l 
It was asserted by AdrairaJ. Knapp, of' the United States 
Navy, that the naval power was the main force of America, 
and that she was reducing it without any return in kind 
from the other nations. In the conference land forces 
were not affem:ted and, he held, land forces more than naval 
forces, stirred up hostilities or carried them along. 
The United States ga"e up her right to better her position, 
w·i th no like return, and \'Vi th waning military prestige 
comes waning political prestige, and this treaty marks the 
decrease of influence in Asiatic or Oriental countries. 
The United States was preeminently and pcitentially the 
most powerful naval force in the world. The eleven capi-
tal ships that we scrapped. from the stocks gave us that 
position. In sacrificing them, we sacrificed three to 
one;·. in sea pov1er, for all the other nations combined. 
~reoessi ty for naval power still exists. We forget that the 
1 Wilson, P. W., ~rext Step In Disarmament, Independent_, 
Nov. 26, 1921, CVII, 199-201. 
power we are able to exert is the full extent of our in~ 
fluence in foreign affairs. The usefulness of. a Havy is 
not limited to war times. · How often by a show1 of force has the United States avoided a potential war? 
114 
In defense of the Washington conference treaty, Rear 
Admiral \V. V. Pratt, of the navy, wrote, 
The tfeaty cannot be considered by itself, apart from the 
agreements of the conference. To a person viewing the 
treaty as a whole, it appears satisfactory. To take it 
out, piece by piece, and dissect it, it does not appear so 
satisfactory. 
Public opinion is divided i1:1to three parts: first, the 
technical naval men, including those able to pass expert 
opinions. This class might include those of strong national 
leanings; second, the broadminded people within and without 
the service, who view the naval poltcy not as an independ-
ent problem, but :ln connection with international affairs;. 
third, the vvell-meaning class whose impulse, rather than 
reason, leads it to advocate complete disarmament,2 
A statement in the editorial section of the Atlantic 
Monthly about the same time stated, 
We have climbed to the throne of naval supremacy which, 
from the Spanish Armada to the Battle of Jutland, was oc-
cupied by Great Britain. We have successfully asserted 
our rights to have a Sub hea.d--Geneva conferences. 
"The problem confronting the conferenc~ at Geneva is 
better a.ppreciated after one has taken more than a glance 
at the naval line-up of today," is the idea of an editorial 
in the Independent, July 9, 1927, commenting upon that 
disarmament conference. "It can be seen that, with the 
exception of Italy, each of the members of the 1.:.rashL1gton 
treaty had a preponderance in some type of ~ighting craft. 
1 Taken from a speech given by Admiral Knapp on April 27, 
1922. 
2 Pratt, Admiral W. V., Case For The lTnval Treaty, 
Current Historz, April 1923, XVIII, 1-5. 
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Great Britain had light cruisers, Japan heavy cruiser 
submarines, France light submarines and the United States 
destroyers.l 
During the intervening space after the Washington con-
ference there was a marked increase i::1. building programs 
of craft not liW,ited by the treat~r. France for example, he.d 
six submarines when her delec;ntes sic;ned the treaty. At 
the opening of the Geneva conference she had forty-six 
built or building. During these same six years between 
conferences, Japan had increased her submarL1es 134~~. and 
had nearly 100•% i~1crease in destroyers. So from the line-
up of this construction, the move toward linli tat ion was un-
doubtedly wise, but failed because no one country could 
make the proper proposals for the other countries to 
.., 
follow."{..> 
The United States at~md at Geneva had been for eouali t y 
with Great Bri tai:1 on all lines of ships, but the English 
considered thnt the far--flung empire warranted a larger 
number of ships, especially cruisers. In connection with 
this, the Washington Post stated that 11 the hour was at hc"l.nd 
when it was necessary for Britain to decide to agree or 
refuse to agree that the United States have equal power, 
legally .n 
l World Strength and Geneva Problen:1s, Independent, July 9, 
1937. Vol. 119, PaGe 129. 
2 Ibid. 
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The day, this paper sta.ted., had passed when the United 
States vvas ·willing to sit bHck and see a.nother power talc-
ing commaY.J.d of the seas. The UniteC! States, in its opinion, 
could not tolerate such a cortdi tion as its requirements 
demanded that it be an eoual poner. 
Many editorial offices had the same opinion, according 
to the L,i ter:,arY, Dir;est of August, 19~~7, and held that the 
failure of the Geneva conference would mean larger navies 
for the world powers. The Winston Salem Journa~, stated 
that 11 England had challenged the rest of the world to match 
her in naval building, and 'there was little doubt about 
accepting the challenge. 11 
P~oposals of the Geneva conference were: 
By the United States--Cruisers, England and the 
States to total of 250,000 to 300,000 tons; 
150,000 to 180,000. 
Des~r0tets, Great Bri ~ain and United Stateo ~"'0( ons, Japan lr. .... O,OOO. 
United 
Japan 
total 
Submarines, Great Britain and United States 60,000 tons; 
Japan 36,000. 
Age limit for replacements, cruisers 20 years; destroyers 
15 to 17 years , submarines 12 or 13 years. 
By Great Britain-- Cruisers, acceptance of the 5-5-3 
ratio for cruisers of 10,000 tons car:rying (3 inch 
guns. Limitation of future cruisers to 7,500 and 
6 inch guns; the latter to come after limit of 
10,000 ton cruisers had been decided. 
Destrolers, leaders to be limited to 1,750 tons; 
destroiers to 1,400. · 
Submarines, fleet submarines lind ted to 1, 600 tons; 
smaller ones to 600 tons, and not mounting over 
5 inch gu..'1s. 
Battleships, suggest cod that battleships be reduced 
to 30,000 tons, guns to be reducecl to 13-} inch, a.:·.d 
future airplane carriers to 25,000 tons. 
.i<.~ 
~ 
By Japan--- Powers to agree U~)Oll a :::>eriod i:1 Vlhich 
there would be no building. 
Exclude from any agreement ships not exceedi::1g 
700 tons, surface ships and rcC..uce future air-
plane car:ders to 25,000. 
Replacements, Regulations on replacements to 
, avoid sudden displacements of naval strength, 
and equalizing naval construction. 
Useful life, Life of surface craft c.bove 3,000 
~one ~o be 16 years; under 3,000 tons to be 12 
years, submarines to be 12 years. 
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The United States stated that, as Fra!"l.ce and Italy 
were parties to the Washington conference treaty, and not 
members of the Geneva conference, nothing could be done 
that would affect the Washington treaty. 
Of course, as the three nations could make no arrange-
ments that affected the Five Power Treaty made at Washington, 
nor reach any conclusions bet\veen themselves the conference 
broke up. Great Britain had insisted upon an increase in 
cruiser tonnage, so it was evident there was no chance for 
agreements. 
Following this collapse of the conference, the Secretary 
of the 1--Tavy proposed a new, enlarced naval building program 
to Congress. Great Britain soon heard of this and had a 
revulsion of feeling concerning tonnages, and Lord Cecil, 
had to resign from the British cabinet, with the statement 
that he was out of sympathy with his instructions. The 
Congressional naval committee thereupon cut the naval pro-· 
gram, and added a provision that 11 should there be a..'1 
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international agreement made n.t any time concerning naval 
armaments, the President should halt e.ll worl~ under the 
program. 11 1 
In 1928 the British reaffirmed their proposals--cut 
battleship sizes, reduce guns used to the 13.5 inch size 
instead of our 16 inch maximum, extend battleship replace-
ments from 20 to 26 years. 
In other words, Great Britain had. completed two of the 
largest battleships ever made, and wished to mru~e others 
smaller so that theirs would stand out more preeminently. 
They were perfectly willing also, to aba.YJ.don, u g1m which 
due to the style of manufacture could not prove so satis-
factory as the same size in the neighbor's navy. It 
appeared, that although the trend of the time was toward 
limitation, there was great possibility that with the end of 
the Washington treaty in 1931, the1·e \vould be increased 
competitive building.n2 
According to the Literary Digest, the Japanese looked 
upon the Geneva conference with suspic:ton. They claimed 
that England had been building more ships, that the naval 
base at Singapore, and the United States naval practices 
in the Pacific were such that neither nation was .in position 
rz 
to call conferences.v 
1 Frothingham, Capt. T. G., Indenendent, Vol. 120, Page 426. 
2 Ibid. 42~8 
3 Japan Views of Second Disarmament Conferences, 
Literary Digest, Jan. 24, 1925. 
. i
·.i 
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In this connection the Uewarl~ lTews stated that there 
should be a real conference in the United St<?.tes first to 
get the sentiment of the people on the topic, not the loud 
claims of a few, but sentiments of the masses, and then let 
the leaders call conferences. The paper stated, "The naval 
officers say that disarmament is the bunk, the air forces 
that the Navy is all wrong, other spec:tal interests and 
politicians say one thi~1g and another, and the general 
public, which is to be either benefitted or harmed, saved 
money or taxed more, has little or no reo.l op:portuhi t~r to 
voice ~n opinion.nl 
London Conference 
The failure of the Geneva conference, not attributed 
to any one cause, put a lull on disarmament procieedi:c.r;s, 
as far as conferences were concerned for two yenrs. Then 
after a conference \'IJ'i th Premier MacDonald, of Great Britain, 
and President Hoover, of the United States, a naval confer-
ence was called for London in 1930. 
The naval powers gathered and viewed the conditions. 
I 
England and the United Sta.tes were agreed upon the princi-
ple of parity, Japan fnvored the same side due to better 
ratios obtainable, but France and Italy were holding bad~. 
In a preview of the conference, Frank H. Simonds wrote in 
the Review of Reviews that "it seems m:iomatic that the 
closer Great Britain and the United States worked together 
1 \Vhat Another Disammament Confe1·ence Could Do, Li terarr 
Digest, March 7, 1925. 
-on the question, the less likely any agreement could 
be.nl France had announced, he clr.irtlGd, had 'already an-
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nounced the fp.ct that she looked upon the conference as a 
relatively unin:portant prelude to the meeting in Geneva, 
:i.nsisting that no question of further armaments could be 
decided except by the League of 1-!ations. 
To face these :Problems Secretary Stimson, heading 
the American delegation had one of two possible solutions. 
If be desired to carry out the Hoover policy, it was 
necessary to persuade either Britain or a combination of 
Fra.nce and Italy. To obtain British su~)port would mean, in 
the minds of the British, a compromise of British security. 
Obtaining support of France and Italy meant oondenming 
those powers for all time to helplessness in the face of 
British sea power. 
If he triect to get France and Italy, he would be, in 
eyes of the Latins, an agent of an Anglo-American alliance. 
If he got the aid of Great Britain, the British could fig~e 
that he was trying to sacrifice British security to obtain 
., parity, and 'parity of the cheap.ttto 
Following the Washington conference the American people 
felt that the British had won a victory more complete than 
either Trafalgar or Jutland. Congress took up this cry, and 
1 Simonds, Franlt H., London, Review of Reviews, Vol. 81, 
63-64. 
2 Simonds, Frank H., What Can We Expect At London, 
Review of Reviews, Feb. 1930, Vol. 81, 71-73. 
:;JJ 
• 
was confronted by President Coolidge with the statement 
that it was possible to arrive at parity ivith·Britain by 
conference and not by construct~~n. Hie hopes were 
dashed at Geneva. 
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Then Congress passed the naval building bill, providing 
for doubltng c!'uieer tonnage, and Coolidge etgned the bill. 
The President announced in an Armistice Day speech (1928) 
that this countrY' could have parity only <3.t enormous pro-
grams of construction.l 
The London conference was set for fa.ilure. Hopes were 
held for a five power treaty, but on the eve of the meeting 
France revolted. Britain was faced with the need of a 
•two power• navy. America hoped for parity and reduction. 
Leaders in the United States Senate were OPl:>Osecl to the con-
ference, eo that meant that American delegatee faced a 
hostile group when they returned. 
Before the Americans landed in England, a. radio report 
was received that UacDonald had proposed abolition of 
battleships in an interview. Here the Americans were go-
ing to the conference and standing upon the battleship as 
the core of the fleet. Later, it was found the interview 
was mi souot ed. 
When the meeting opened in London the Tory press 
carried out extensive programs demand.ing retention of Eng-
lish current programs. Their argument ·was that England 
1 Op. Cit. 
-· .. 
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could not risk pa:r.i ty as sugp.:ested by Hoover and MacDonald. 
PUrported messages were also being :published as coming 
from Washington signifying different stands by Hoover. 
America stood for these things at London: 
lro discussion on battleship reduction; 
As long as the United States held the Phillipines 
we needed battleships;· 
We have only a process of parity, but no parity; 
Oapital ships must be retained; 
Some sort of equalizing strengths must be provided; 
All delegations were to be affected by failure of. the 
conference; 
No signing of any Mediterranean pact concerning 
French-Italian plans; 
Firm stand for a 60 percent ratio for Japanese cruisere. 1 
France held out for rights to fix her own limits, and 
that Britain did not have to lteep agreements with America. 
Thus the American fleet would be dependent upon the French 
fleet, in the opinibn of some correspondents. 
The main task of reductions was post])oned until 1935. 
As Mr. Simonds put it, to keep paritt with Britain America 
must build, · to keep pace with America Japan must build; to 
guard against German and Italian dangers France must build 
and to be equal to France Italy must build, and in the face 
of all this construction how could Great Britain stand still? 
As nothing could be done the American delegation left, 
as their instructions were for reduction. After sailing, 
Premier Tardieu of France put French figures to the meeting. 
British delegates notified American delegatee by radio that 
Hoover MacDonald agreement was off. 
1 Simonds, Frank H. Initial Skirmish At London, Review of 
Review~, March 1930, Vol. 81, Pages 80-81. 
1 
! 
I 
I 
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r 
I 
Ta:rdeiu returned to Frrmce ~.nd hie ministry \"1as de-
feated. Tbe conference awaited the Frc?nch election and 
a :return of a French clel ega tion, Tardi eu was returned 
to office with strong publ:l.c optnion with him. 
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When news was received, Hoover c.eclared to representa-
tives of peace societies, II catagorically a consultative 
pact was out of the question." At the same time Stimson 
announced, back in London, that the American delegation 
would consider any pact with an open mind. Hoover consid-
ered that politics were of no importance. He had done as 
Wilson had done, gone to :rnurope with ideals, and forced 
back by European eituatione.1 
A treaty was finally signed. In it the greatest nave~ 
power of history agreed to American pari-ty. This sho,ved to 
Europe that England had no intention of fighting America. 
This table will show total tonnages of United States 
fleet in 1930 and presumed tonnages in 1936. 
Ships 1930 1936 
Capital ships 533,000 462,000 
Aircraft carriers 90,000 135,000 
Cruisers 200,000 325,000. 
Destroyers 227,000 150,000 
Submarines 74,000 52,000 
Tata.le 1,124,000 1,124,000 
In discussing the treaty, objectors in the Seanat tried 
to work on the idea of II a billion dollar parity" as an 
1 Simonds, Frank H., What Was Wrong At London, Review 
of Revi ewe, May 1930, Vol. 81 no. 5, 40 -45. 
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appeal to the "small Navy" people. 
They are, according to the Hew York World, more inter-
ested in prej~dicing public opinion than in forming it. 
The question as to whether it was a good or bad bargain 
could only be answered by comparing agreements of the treaty 
with actual positions of navies involved.l Tru~e one item, 
8 incl! gun cruisers--
Great Britain had 186,000 tons, United States 
130,000, Japan 108,400. 
The next question could be 'What are the ratios of 
these figures?' They are 10 to 7 for Great Britain and the 
United States, 10 to 8.3 for America. and Japan. The 
treaty laid dmvn building limits for a period of six years, 
and authorized: 
Great Britain to scrap, without replacement, 40,000 
tons of big guns that would not be obsolete in 
1936. ---
Japan WP.s not authorized to lay down an~r new cruisers. 
United States authorized to lay down five new 
cru.i sers. 2 
Our statesmen entered the meet with an inferior big-
cruiser fleet, and came out with right to have superiority. 
W'hat was the price? It was to all0\"1 Great Britain. to have 
superiority in small cruisers, and Japan to have a better 
ratio than the 5-5-3. In small cruise11 s 1 t provided a 
working ratio of Great Britain 10, United States 7.5 and 
Japan 5.3. The charge that it was a bad bargain centers on 
1 That Naval Treaty, Review of Reviews, August 1930, 
Vol. 82, 83. 
2 Ibid, 89. 
the fact that America must build 70,000 tons of cruisers, 
armed with 6 inch guns instead of 8 as our Admirals 
wanted. 1 
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We are entitled to build 3 tons of aircraft carriers 
to 1 for Great Britain, and 5 to 1 with Japan; we are en-
titled to build 50,000 tons of l:>:ig gun cruisers to none 
for Great Britain and Japan; we are entitled to build 13t 
tons of destroyers to Bri tains 11 and Japan's 2. In other 
words, we are entitled to build more than it is probable 
that Congress Will appropriate for, so we do not see where 
it is a bad bargain.2 
Melvin Talbot said in the Review of Reviews, "We now 
have a treaty. It vindicates our claim to a fleet equal to 
the British, but that fleet we do l!DOt possess. If we are 
to partially consummate that progre~, we must enter into 
a policy program of building, steady, consistent building,' 
for six. years." 3 
Battleships and airplane carriers are by no means the 
fleet. Destroyers and submarines make up a fifth of our 
force. The modern cruiser is a torpedo car:r~ier. The cruiser 
is a ship of many uses. 
From a small frigate of Nelson's day to the heavy 
Constitution of 1812 ;· from a small non-descript steam boat 
1 
·Op. Cit. 89. 
2 Ibid 
3 Talbot, Lieut. Melvin F., Building Our ~reaty navy, 
Review of Reviews, Dec. 1930, Vol. 82, Ho. 12, 50-53. 
1;36 
of the Oivil War into the heavily armored cruiser of today, 
the cruiser has come into prominence in naval plans. 
Lieut. Talbot takes the view thnt compared to what it 
will protect, the program is not too much. In a land tha:b 
is able to spend nearly a billion dollars a year for cigar-
ettes, and over a quarter billion a year for hats, the a-1·-
mount ne4ded for a new navy is not much. Security is worth 
more than wealth, and without one the other might be use-
1 ess.l 
The London treaty gave preparedness for all, preponder-
ance to none. The historic balance. of power was rea.ffirmed 
in stronger form than ever, by navies that could attaclc in 
limited spheres only, if at all, but could be used for de-
fence. Such balances tend .for peace rather than war.2 
President Hoover connnissioned Ambassador Hugh Gibson3 
for a special mission of atten~ting to bring France and 
Italy into the fold. It was claimed that the need of Italy 
for a foreign loan was a stretigic c~rd. That was a danger-
ous part to play. That it could smack of coersion on one 
hand, or that United S.tatee was backing Italy against Fra.nce 
on the other. 
Mussolini in hie talk in November 1930, put Italy on 
l Op. Oi t. 
2 Talbot, Lieut Melvin F., Building Our London Treaty Uavy, 
Review of Reviews, Vol. 82, Pages 53-54. 
3 Ambassador Gibson at that time Ambassador to Belgium. 
~27 
the side of treaty revisions. Andre llaurois, writing for 
the New York Times Magazin.e,, October 26, 193o', said that 
the conference instead of proving for France an instrument 
of peace, would lead to dru1gerous controversies with Italy. 
In spite of testimony of twenty-three Admirals, testi-
fying before the Senate on the treaty, it was approved, 
Admiral Pratt commented thus: 
"I have a very defintte reason that has ocbme up lately, 
to make me see a greater advantage in 6 inch gun cruisers 
than ever before. You build up our navy under this 
treaty, and I would not swap it. It suits ·me. 1I say this as one who would have to do the fighting." 
Secretary Stimson was of the opinion thaT the United 
States had done well. Secretary of the Navy Adams siad the 
nation had gone as far as it could to get 21 e inch gun 
cruisers without breaking off negotiations. 
While our delegates were being assailed on all sides b y 
those claiming they gave too much to others, the new York 
World stated: 
lJ 
11 It would be most helpful if Mr. Winston Ohurchill 
could be imported to Washington to show the Senate 
how Mr. Stimson waylaid Mr. MacDonald and if the GenerriJ. 
Board could be sent to London to show how those wily 
Britons had seduced innocent American statesmen; if 
Senator Johnson could be wafted to Japan to show them 
how America had been bamboozled, and a few of the Japa-
nese Admirals could be brought over here to show what 
a terrible bargain the Yanl~ees had forced Japan to 
accept. For, by testimony of the 'big navy parties' in 
each country, the three-power treaty was a triangular 
disaster. Everybody defeated everybody else; we are 
The United States, a review, Current ·History, July 1930, 
Vol. 32, 763. 
~-­
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R.ll ruined and defenseless. rrl 
In a· special session of the Senate President Hoover 
spoke of the opposition group as a c;roup 11 which believed 
in unrestrictive military strength as an objective of the 
American Dation." He stated that the only alternative 
would be competitive building with consequent flow of 
suspicion. That the controversy of 6 gun or 8 gun ships 
revolved around "less than three percent of the fleet." 
11 It is not a. question, 11 he said, "of reducing tonnage, it 
is a question of whether we have this treaty or no treaty, 
a period of larger reduction, or competitive armament.n2 
1 Op • 0 it . , 7 64. 
2 Ibid. 984. 
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'GHAPTEH V 
lllOVEl·i.ENTS BEHINP THE HAVY 
It is presumed that, fron1 the foregoing pages, the 
reader has formeo. some opinion that there exists in the 
United States a 'Big Uavy Party.' We have had presented 
many arguments, and facts, concerning our condition on th·e 
sea, the growths and declines of the Navy, and some of the 
facts outlined and. laid down by the limitations conferences. 
There must be some well-groundeC. reasons for the de-
mand on one side for continual attention being paid to our 
Navy;- likewise there must be some reason that many people · 
discount much of this agitation. It is a tenable argument 
that if a nation enters a treaty with other nations, it is 
presumed that the nation desires the goals of the treaty 
and will abide by it. It is also possible that treaties 
may be forced upon any nation by circumstances that may not 
be clearly understood or explained. 
If there be undue agitation fo1· a Big Havy, then we 
must recognize the fact that there is a Big Navy Party. 
Naturally the ouestion must arise-- what sort of an 
organiz·ation is this, who composes it and what are its ob-
j ects'fr 
In partial answer we might divide it into 
Professional naval'men~ in active, service; or retired, who 
write or speak for the salce of public opinion;: 
;~ Iii 
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Technical pe!"sons who desire to see naval construction be-
cause of its glorifica.tion of mechanical skill~;: 
Nationalists who wish to see their nation actually supreme 
in power;: 
Munition and steel manufacturers who see increased business 
in a big Uavy; 
newspapers and journalists who support the big navy be-
cause of financial interests in their own business;: 
Preparedness advocates; 
Individuals, whether in public or private life, who sincerely 
believe in such course of e..ction. 
These may be classed in this so called 'party.' 
Organized effort behind the Btg Havy must have di-
rection. This direction-is furnished, to a great extent, 
by the lil'avy League of the United States. By this I do not 
imply that the navy League is an organization in existence 
to spread questionable propagan.da. Its purposes, as stated 
in its constitution, are to obtain and ·sl')rea.d information 
concerning the naval service and ~quipment of the United 
States. If there be over-enthusiastic operation by members 
of this organization, it is not necessarily a fault of the 
whole League. Condition for membership in the League,also 
from its constitution and by-laws, is that the man or 
woman be a citizen of the United States and in sympathy 
with the objects of the organization. 
According to infor:mation on the membership of the 
organization, there are several thousand members, both men 
and women. :Memberships are classified as active and 
associate. The active members are those who take a real 
., 
active part in the work, and many are men in the naval 
service of this nation. However, there are many more 
civilian members than service members. 
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Oharles A. Beard, writing in the new Republic, says 
there is a definite challenge in the activities of the 
League.l Its actions, he claims, raise two major issues. 
The first of these is, 'Who is to control the armament 
development of the United States?.' The other could be, 
'Exactly what is to be defended, and by what use of diplo-
macy and a:m1 s?' 
p·ersona:ti ties do not enter into this discussion, the 
challenge is throvrn down, according to Beard, as to whether 
the civil branches of the government or, ·l:l.@ he terms it, a 
•naval bureaucracy' will dictate the polio~es. His first 
article infers tha.t the latter statement is in direct 
reference to the General Board of the Havy Department, 
which is supported by an array of office-·seekers, arms 
manufacturers, merchant marine promoters, navy yard operators, 
special interest representatives and others who expect to 
reap a benefit directly from the action.s of this body. He 
claims that real estate boomers, like Brrtten and the 
jingo press owners, were working for seifish gains, or per-
sonal interests. This article, theref~~e, carries a wide 
accusation against the support of the General Board, which 
1 Beard, Oharles A., Big ltavy Boys, Hew Republic, 
January 20, 1932, LXIX, 258. 
has the control of the naval operations and setting up of 
naval policies.l 
There are, he avers, two general policies possible. 
One is to interpret the rights of citizens in all parts of 
the world, and have ready a large Army and Uavy to enforce 
decisions against any combination of nations on earth. This 
is the real issue of the lTavy League :propaganda, he cla:ims. 
The second policy is a consideration of adequate defenses 
of interests in the United States, a 9olicy embodied in the 
Kellogg Pact, in an agreement to limit armaments. 2 
There is apparently a great amount of misinformation 
upon all subjects of world defenses. The time is at hand 
when. the whole -question must be exr(.mined very closely by 
this country as well as other countries. A demand to this 
effect has been made by this nation on European nations. 
¥any naval base plans have beeri made in the past, most of 
them having gone no further in development. Possibly it 
might be that men in control have been following British 
leads. A big play has been made also upon 'national sense 
of honor.' 
Scores of times, in our national history, there have 
been feelings that this 'national honor' has been injured, 
with resu.l ting clamors for war. Preparations have been 
made in cont?equence to these demands. Often the prep~n.tions 
1 Beard, Charles A., Big Mavy Boys, New Renublic, 
January 20,1932, LXIX, 259. 
2 Ibid. 
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have involved many additional expenditures, perhaps with-
out genuine provoc~tio~. 
Often events have 'educated' the nation to give sup-
port to our nav~u bureaUCl'Hcy, claims Mr. Beard. A few 
of these 'educational' events might be cited. 
In 18'72 Aomirnl Meade dtscoverecl a strategic point 
for future sea power in the island of Tutuila, and per-
euad.ed the native chief to malce a treaty .to cede a naveJ. 
base at PagomPago. The Senate rejected the treaty. Presi-
dent Grant, an ardent annexationist, sent an agent, 
Colonel A. B. Steinberger, a gentleman with a dubious 
diplomatic post, to the island. 
This diplomatic agent of our altruistic government 
fomented a local revolution, elected himself Prime Minister 
and placed the island under American protection. Our 
Senate still refused to agree to any such action. The 
general public probably knew little of the activities, but 
our naval politicians were keenly avrare of the significance 
and potential values. 1 
In this connection England, Germany and the United 
States prepared for emergency action. The Pacific fleet 
was held in readiness. According to Harry T. Peck, a 
wave of excitement swept this country and an extremely 
'"I hostile tone toward Germany ap11eared in our papers. t:> 
1 Op. Oi t. 
2 Ibid. 
~· 
fl ... 
The event did serve the purpose of increasing the 
naval n.ppropriations. Soon events in tbe Ven'ezuelcm 
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disput,e with Great Britain proved to our people that if the 
authority of our government was to be exercised, provisions 
must be made for possible war Rctlvi ties. 
Hilary A. Herbert, Secretary of the navy under Cleve-
land, took. office in 1893. He continually urged upon 
Congress a naval program. He cle.imed: 
If our government is to have a naval strength in the future 
to command peace, and to enforce the to~'rEs dicte,ted by its 
sense o:f' justice, it must have more be.ttleships.l 
I ' The Congress at the time was under influence of the 
agricultural interests and refused to act. W'i th the re-
turn of the Republican party to power in 1895, Herbert a-
gain asked for two battleships and twelve torpedo boats. 
Congress answered his request with three battleships and 
ten torpedo boats. This was encouraged by the appeare.nce 
on the diplomatic horizon of the Cuban troubles. 
A rigid thesis that this conflict came because of capital-
ists in America, moved by a oonsciousmess of identical 
interests, forced the government to wage war on Spain, end 
annex her possessiQns would be in variance 'vi th the known 
facts of the case.2 
Many of the financiers of this country opposed the 
war with Spain,.but did support the action when it actually 
came. The background for this naval expansion of the 
p-eriod was laid on foundations placed by Theodore Roosevelt. 
1 Op. Cit., 259-260. 
2 Ibid., 260. 
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He, more than nny other individual, sold e1avalism to our 
nation. He believed that an occasional war would be good 
for the moral fiber of the nation, and that projects of 
internationa.l peace might be looked upon with misgivings. 
Roosevelt is credited with a remark to Lodge at the 
time of the Venezuela affair that, "Personally I hope the 
fight will come soon. The clamor of the peace fRction has 
convinced me that the country needs the war." l He was 
perhaps one of the outstanding exponents of a large Navy. 
He fostered pr~paration of the force from the time he first 
became connected with the navy Department. In most of the 
cases he was probRbly very sincere in his stand. He did 
have some private views on pre:Paration and fomenting u7r:-tr, 
expressed freely in confidential letters, but not in pub-
lic at which times he, in the words of Beard, "extolled 
peace and national honor, apparently without discerning 
.... 
the dichotomy explicitly involved.Q 
In a speech at the Jifaval College, June 1897, Roosevelt 
placed both sides, in this wise: 
In all our.history there never has been a time when prepar~­
tions for war were any menace to peace. Arbitration is ~n 
excellent thing. But those who wish to see this country 
a.t peace will be wise to place reliance upon a first-
class fleet of battlesl1ips, rather the .. n on any arbitration 
treaty \Vhich the wit of man can devise. A really grea.t 
people would fnce the disasters of war rather than pur- ~ 
chase base prosperity bought at the price of national honor."" 
l Op. Cit. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., 261. 
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It might be a significant thing to note, in passing, 
that navr"1.l eat:pendi tures increased pre.ctically' one hundred 
percent during the time that Roosevelt was in office as 
President. After this period naval eA~enditures steadily 
increased until President Wilson, with probable foresight 
of the coming conflict, committed this country to the 
second-to-none policy. This policy held sway until the 
Washtngton conference, and then was brought do\7n to 'normal 
levels' which, by the way, were five times above the levels 
of 1900. Now there is insistence, by the Navy League and 
others, that our Navy be brought up to the levels of the 
Lo~don treaty.l 
As mentioned, the Navy and the Merchant 11arine are 
parts of sea power. Provisions on .the statute books of 
our nation promote development of the Merchant Marine. 
Shipbuilding corporations, building warships, also build 
merchantmen. It would seem perfectly obvious t'hat, the 
more building promoted, the more profits to accruing to the 
builders. This might put a different angle on. the matter, 
more than if our ships were made in government-owned and 
operated yards. 
Analysis of parte of our discussion could not be made 
without possibly much more material being available than 
the portions accentuated by • interest propagation. 1 On 
page 653 of the publication Hearings of the Subcommittee of 
1 Op. Oit. 
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the Committee of naval Affairs of the Seventy-ftrst 
Congress, pursuant to Senate Resolution 144, 1 there appears 
a letter, labelled as exhibit 82, written by C. L. Bardo, 
Vice President of the American Brown Boveri Electrical 
Oompany, addressed to E. M. Herr, President of the Westing-
house Electric and Manufacturing Company. 
This letter requested :;~s, 000 as the Westinghouse con-
tribution toward the expense of promotion of merchant marine 
legislation in Congress. In part the letter stated: 
The Jones-White Merchant Marine bill passed by the last 
Congress is the most helpful and constructive nationo.l 
shipping legislation ever presented to the American shiP-
ping public. The legislation was made possible only by the 
help of Mr. \nlder2, and with the help of other shi:pning 
and shipbuilding interests. 
Several months were spent by Mr. Wilder, and his associa.ted, 
in explaini·:1g and educating Congress to the needs of an 
adequate Merchant Marine.3 
This. education of Congress cost ~~150, 000, it was dis-
closed, 1~25, 000 being credited to hotel expenses in Wash-
ington. The Boveri Company raised ~~41, 500 from the Newport 
1\Tews Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, Bethlehem Steel 
Corporation, Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Company, Worthing-
ton Pump and Machinery Company, General Electric Company, 
1 By the Government Printing Office, 1930. 
2 Mr. Wilder was formerly president of the American Brown 
Boveri Company, holding company of n. Y. Shipbuilding 
Co. 
3 Extracted from government reports, used by Mr. Beard 
in his article, II Big Navy Bo~rs, II page 261. 
Babcoclt and vVilcox Company and the Westi::1ghouse Electric 
and Manufacturing Company •1 
From this lineup of companies, it would be deduced 
that certain phases of education were given to Congress 
that would affect the interests o:f the shipbuilders. An 
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education as expensive as this seemed to be must have. been 
paid for with an eye to the potential profits that would 
accrue to the organizations at government expense. 
This activity must be deplored. It ts true that a 
contingency would arise wherein expert advice might be de-
sired. by Congressional committees discussing a measure, 
but it would not be likely·that such a fommidible array would 
be necessary. Such 'lobbying' is apparently carried on 
by other interests. A recent ec.i to rial in the Woman t s 
Home Compani,o~. stated it very aptly: 
As in almo~t every nbuse of public :funds, it is an organiaed . 
minority wna_ bully-__C! __ V'ote ... seeking __ congress-to-d-1-ve~-t--publ-ie-------· ---~ 
funds~ 
In commenting upon such situations recently, President 
Hoover remarked, "I refuse to believe that the country is 
unable to reflect its will in iegislation. 11 
Reference was just made to expert assistance for 
) 
committee discussions. In these naval affairs there comes 
to the front the expert, either by trainL.lg and experience, 
or by his won esteem. He often has help from the Havy 
Department bureaus that should be able, in themselves, to 
1 Hearin~ of the Subcommittee of the Committee on naval 
Affairs of the 71 Congress, Senate Reso}ution 144, 
page 682. 
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give all the information directly to Congressmen. Assistance 
is proffered, often through the expert, by the' Uavy League, 
Legion posts, Daughters of the Ar\lel'ican Revolution and 
other similar patl'iotic organizations. Journalists, vari-
ous classifications of newspapers and scores of individuals 
spurred on by various motives also ap~ear to give advice 
to help mold public opinion. 1 
The thesis held to by these t experts', Beard contends, 
is that the destructive efficiency of a ship is a known, 
or discoverable, factor--regardles~ of the commander's ability, 
or the men who may be handling the units of the fleet under 
combat conditione. The solutio~ should, therefore, be at 
hand as soon as determined. The problem cannot be handled, 
howeve!r, with such ease. Scientific treatment of the sub-
j ect will disclose that perfect results can be obtained to 
a high degree ohly when all factors are under control, &'1d 
the action of those responsible for the operation will be 
just exactly correct. 
Beard reprints, one section of a release by the Navy 
League, dated September 4, 1931, as follows:: 
It will be recalled that for years there has been a cam-
paign against capital ships, emanating originally from 
England, and carried on in the United States, principally 
by anti-navalists. In this the principal alleged pur-
pose is to relieve the world of the 'colossal cost' of 
about $39,000,000 for each of these monst~r ships, by 
reducing their size, or eliminating them.~ 
l Op. Cit., 287-' 
2 Ibid. 
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He contends that this is a typical statement by the 
:navy League. The statement of the origin of the propa-
ganda may be true, or may not, it cannot be proved. It 
may be a tenable argument that England did fear the rising 
tide of navalism in the United States. There may be found 
many people in this land -who were genuinely afraid of un-
restricted competition with England in naval construction.l 
The author states that his statements are not made to 
determine the soundness of proposi tiona of the Navy League, 
but to simply point out their formation, the loose state-
ments made often without scientific precision. He accuse 
thaT often the Navy League does not have enough history of 
warfare, nor does it express its ideas vri th eno~gh efficient 
language to be correct criteria for leacl.ership in ·the field. 
He would imply that this could be applied to others of the 
same category. 
Many times this country has been covered with propa-
ganda concerning the neciessi ty of naval incre:-Jses, but the 
sources of the information have not always been clear. VTi th 
the hearings in the Senate, already cited, the activities 
of W. E. Shearer at Geneva in 1927 were disclosed. The 
"Shearer type" consisted of four parts. 
The first type was that which llr. Shearer testified 
as laid down by contracts he held, in general, "fo use my 
best efforts in interest of the three-cruiser bill pendL1g 
in Congress." This refers to the activity in the autumn 
1 Op. Oit., 289. 
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of 1926. The second type was that used in Geneva in 1927, 
at the time of the Geneva Conference. The employers were 
not exactly clear in their testimony as to what they had 
required, except that he was to be an 'unofficial observer', 
and to report the •trends' of the conference. They denied 
he had been sent there with the intention o of s:preading 
propaganda to injure the conference, w1 th a big Navy in the 
United States as the ultimate view.l 
The testimony, of course, branded the entire procedure 
as that of intense 'lobbying.' This must have been for the 
interests of shipbuilders. In the fn.ce o;f this, he '"~as en-
gaged by a few of his former employers to talce part in the 
merchant marine propaganda for Congressional legislation. 
The third "'type of acti.vi ty was answering peace advo-
cates who criticised, for instance, Hoover's speech at 
acceptance of the Presidential nomination in touching on 
naval conci.i tiona. Shearer sent out material in the nc>JIJ.e of 
the Republican lTational Conuni ttee Publicity Bureau, funds 
n for which were supplied by the shipbuilders.~ 
1 
His last, or fourth type of activity, was carried out 
principally under the direction of William Randolph Hearst. 
Shearer was hired to write articles, mru:e speeches and send 
out material to patriotic organizations, many of which he 
1 Op. Oi t. 
2 Ibid. 
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was instrumental in organizing. This material was made up 
principally of arguments against joining the L'eague of 
~rations or the World Oourt.l 
In this connection Shearer said, in his testimony, 
"I started to send out my bulletins to these societies, 
a11d they sent in their resolutions against joining the 
World Court." The testimony of the officers of the vari-
ous employing companies, given in the Senate hearing would 
tend to show that these big corporations did business in 
a very loose manner, as the officials testifying 1 did not 
seem to remember the condi tiona surrounding Mr. She~.rer1 s 
employment.• An official would agree to put up a large 
sum of money, to pay for services which, according to 
testimony, he was not sure about, a.nd then later his board 
of directors would approve these expenditures apparently 
without adequate explanation being given.2 
In passing it might be consistent to observe that 
these srune blunderin~ actions on the part of highly-paid 
officials won apparent approval by directors who would 
probably dismiss ordine.ry employees for such lack of atten-
tion to duties. Although it may be a bit strange, yet 
this is the condition according to sworn testimony recorded 
1 Op. Oit. 
2 Hearings· of the Subcommittee, United States Senate, 
1930, page 174. 
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in the Senate hearings.l 
Mr. Beard comments upon the kind of person needed 
for this propaganda work, with probably the Shearer type 
in mind. He says that it ·would require a m.an having fluent 
use of tongue ru1d pen, a detnched person and used to casual 
employment, one capable to easy adaptation to varying 
opportunities. He claims that devotion to any one line of 
endeavor, settled habits of life, a specinlist on any one 
line, or a person of poor digestion which might prevent 
activity, all of this ty}Je would be handicapped in this 
business of lobbying, or as Hr. Ber=1rd calls it 'clandestine 
negotiation.' In this connection, he says further, that 
any association of citizens that might try to influence 
public policy is within the rights of democracy, until it 
advocates measures which would rebound to the benefit of 
special interes-ts.--- Then,- he claims, its structure and 
economic support must be open to pitiless public scrutiny. 
On December 15, 1915 Congressman Clyde H. Travenner 
attacked the Havy League, claiming that it was composed of 
eighteen men and one corporation at the time of its foundation.2 
1 Ibid,, · 211. Men whose testimony appears are Bardo of 
the New Yorlt Shipbuilding Company, Ferguson of the 
Newport lrews Company, Schwab of the Bethlehem Steel 
Corporation. 
g: The corporation was the Midvale Steel Corporation, which 
had furnished the government with over $20,000,000 
worth of armor plate; among the individual members 
were C. M. Schwab of Bethlehem Steel; J. P. Morgan of · 
United States Steel; E. M. Thompson of International 
Nickel; B. F.Tracy attorney for Carnegie Steel, and others. 
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The same man dug down into government records and found 
information on suits against steel companies for breaches 
of con tracts on armor plate. He shovred from the House 
Report 1468, of the Fifty-third Congress, that testimony of 
C. M. Schwab proved that evasions of specifications had 
been made with his knowledge. Presid.en t Cleveland finally 
assessed large damages against the company .in question--
Carnegie Steel--which \lV'ere promptly paid.l 
Both the 1'-Tavy League of the United States and the 
British Na.vy League fought ratification of the London treaty-
of 1930. After its acceptance they turned their attention 
to proposals to build to the treaty strength. That su.ch 
treaties might prove to been against their life, F. M. 
Thompson, President of the American Havy League said, after 
the Washington conference of 1921, there was no longer any 
use for the Navy League. Such recognition of the stand of 
the organization, by one of its wwn officers, might make 
the propaganda activities highly questionable.2 
Some activities of a few of the organizations apparently 
did not meet the approval of the United States gove1·nment, 
for it gave warning that an~ anti-disarmament agencies 
attempting to interfere ''i th the London conference would 
be ruthlessly investigated by the Department of Justice, 
and if necessary shipbuilding contracts would be withheld 
1 Op. Cit., February 3, 1932, LXIX, 315. 
g: Ibid, 316. 
from any private yards. that might engage in su.ch ctuestionalne 
agitation.l It is open to reasonable doubt e.s to the effective-
ness of such W<:~:rn.ings, but the fact remains that there was 
little propagandist activity in London during the conference. 
In the latter :pl'lrt of 1931 an attack was mad.e, by the 
!!Tavy League, on the :p(!)lictes of President Hoover and a 
personal attack on the President. The statements made were 
very strong, and could not be ignored. Hoover took the 
issue up, a:ppointed an investigation committee to h:.quire 
into the facts. The committee was composed of Admiral 
Hugh Rodman, retired; John Hays Hammond, mining engineer;· 
Eliot Wadsworth, fonner Assistant Secretary of the Treasury; 
W. R. Castle, Jr., Under Secretary of State; E. L. Jahncke, 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy; and some unnamed members 
of tb.e Navy League. 
The conuni ttee reported on Hovember 6, 1931, to the effect 
that remarks made by the President of the Uavy League con-
tained many false statements, and that the uttack on Pres:tdent 
Hoover was entirely unwarranted. At the same time the boa.rd 
of directors of the Navy Le<?cgue voted almost unaminously to 
uphold the assertions of its President. As a reeul t many 
Congressmen made statemelnts, in and out of Congress, denounc-
ing .the l:Ta.vy League. The f:iiscussion also brought out me.ny 
rema.rks in the newspapers on both sides of the investigation. 
1 New York Evening Post, November 22, 1929. 
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Chail'l11an Eri tten, of the Committee on HavD.l Affairs of the 
House, partially upheld the Navy League. 1 
:Mr. Beard summarizes his d:i.scussions in stating. tlu.~.t 
nobody is infa.llib-le, but thr:.t determination of a naval 
program cannot be 1 eft to one person or one body. There 
must be sufficient leadership on policy lines in Oongress, 
and tha~ fair, open education by disinterested persons--
presuming those not connected with special interests--
must be carried on to acquaint the people and Congressmen 
of the conditions and needs. 
Here are a few scraps of remarks, made dul·ing the 
Hoover-Navy League controversy, and prL1ted in the issues of 
the frmy: and Navy Journal: 
The Administration is not favorable to building up the 
~Tavy.--W. B. Howe, chairman of board of directors, liavy League. 
The Navy is strong enough to defend American interests. It 
is unwise to go into more construction.--President Hoover. 
Following the Washington conference a vote was recorded 
in the House on a naval bill, April 8, 1922, which aligned 
the members in two named classes, Big Hr>..vy and Li tt.le Navy, 
as follows: 
Little Navy--
Idaho 
Utah 
Colorado 
South Dakota 
Kansas 
Texas 
Iowa 
1 Op. Oit., 317-318. 
Nevada 
VVyoming 
North Dakota 
Hebraska 
·Oklahoma 
Minnesota 
Wisconsin 
Illinois 
Kentucky 
Arka.nsB.s 
Mississippi 
Georgia 
north Carolina 
Big Navy--
Wahington 
California 
Hew Mexico 
Missouri 
Ohio 
Virginia 
Delaware 
New York 
Connecti.cut 
Rhode Island 
Maine 
Florida 
l!ichir;an 
West Vir?:inia 
Tennessee · 
Alabama 
South Carolina 
Oregon 
Arizona 
l.!ontana 
Indi:.:1na 
Pennsylvania 
Maryland 
New Jersey 
Vermont 
Massachusetts 
New Hampshire 
Louisiana 
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no recorded vote is available on the totals of 287 for 
and 58 against the Fifteen-cruiser bill passed in the House 
on March 17,1928. The Senate did record ita vote however 
as folloY:s: 
For the bill-- (both Senators) 
Oregon 
Nevada 
Colorado 
Texas 
Missouri 
Louisiana 
Tennessee 
Indiana 
Kentucky 
Florida 
north Oal'Olina 
Pennsylvania 
Delaware 
Connecticut 
r.r ew Yo rl~ 
Vermont 
Maine 
California 
Wyoming 
new Mexico 
l{a.nsas 
Arkansas 
Lii ssi ssi~ppi 
Illinois 
1.:1 e: hi gan 
Geore;ia 
South Carolina 
West Virginia 
Maryland 
New Jersey 
Rhode Island 
Massachusetts 
New Hampshire 
Against the bill--(both Senators) 
Utah 1.-!ontana 
JITebraska 
Wisconsin 
Horth Dakota 
Divided--(one ·senator for) 
\Vashington 
South Dal~ota 
Io1lJa 
Al2.bama 
Virginia 
Idaho 
Minnesota 
Oklahoma 
Ohio 
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The votes may be interp~eted in several ways, politi-
cal, economic, social. In the Senate vote, it might be 
inferred that a few votes ·~were cast on personal :prejudices. 
There may be something refl~g,ted in the later vote of the 
feeling over the failure of the Geneva conference of 1927. 
In 1922 the people received with enthusiasm the Wash-
ington conference proposals. In 1927 the delegates went 
to Geneva with national backing for certain proposals, 
Which did not become acc}3pted. The feeling of the nation 
was reflected next year in the Congressional vote. As 
already mentioned, the bill was signed by President Coolidce. 
Sec·retary C. E. Hughes, in 1922, stated thH.t it was 
necessary for this cotmtry to mainta:!.n its relative strene;th. 
By relative I presume that he meant the one set up in the 
treaty. This did not seem to be so acc~pted by the nation 
until 1929, when a great change of feeling toward naval 
bills was easily apparent. It is also possible that the word 
t comparative' in discussions had been changed to 'competitive' 
which put new light on the ratio desires. 1 
As stated in the introduction to this work, I can dra\'7 
1 Uavy League publication, February 7, 1929. 
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no conclusions for the reader. If du:-i~1g the readh~g of 
this cr;mbi:1ation of ideas, you have fol~med your 0\7n con-:-
clusions, it were better that no '!)resumption of mine should 
impose upon them. If you huve not formed an opinion, then 
any attempt to form one for you here might not be in :;lace. 
It is earnestly hoped that fr' .. cts, figures, or state-
ments herein presented might have proved of i~terest to 
you. I will say, in conclusion, that· more material may be 
found that will pro\re of interest in a detailed way, in the 
following Appendix. This may help you to decide, if you 
so wish~~ if the Big Navy Idea In the United States is justi-
fied. 
-a-
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Tl~e abot-c 1uap .shotl's 1tow tlt..:: of Rcpt·c.scnfati:vcs f,·om eada state \.'()fed i: 
the finr illdividut~Hy 't'cconkJ 1.:otc (Ap,·il 8, 19u) in the Hous!! O)l the }\atl)' afur 
the WMhi,ngron Copf!!t·cucc. 
~k~B'~:-f·::,:;~l!IJERE arc far deeper cco~o1nic •nd social ·fi:_\",,1 :·.::.~ :v.-··: .,.J.uscs th~n some rccognu.c .har:k of the ' 'J·-,':.'. '.-;.'!,/I , • • -"'!.-::~ .t.~-A·,• .. J n~ccnt vote of6 .. ~ to 12111 thr UnJtcd States 
"·-:· ~f~It1\)'f~t.·;.ft·_~i: Senate to ~-uthcwh~ the laYing do\Vll of. 
i~t-~<;_._tf:S:~ five Jo,ooo-ton, 8-inch.-g:un c•·uiscrs a year 
during the next three yc:lrs-a \'Ote that v..·as p1·omptly 
confintH'tl by the house of Representatives, as \VUS to 
have been expected from the House's vote of 287 to 58 
last year in favo1· of these cruisers. 
The first of the above n1aps sho'\VS ho,v the House 
voted on. ihc navy in .April of 1922, immc~li.1tcly alter 
the \Vashington C' .. onf~rcnct", the d;u·k states hcihg .. little 
navy." Dy contrast, the .scconJ map sho,vs the recent 
vote in the Senate to authorh,c the ftftccn crui~rs. 
In 1922 thc'l"c \vere t\.vcnty .. fivc '"1ittlc navy"" sta.tcs 
out of the fony~cight. No'v thcr~ arc only five st:..u.s; 
from ·which no votes ,,,.c1·e expressed in support of ~he 
naval program and only nine states ·:whose .Senators 
indiviUually took oppositr. siJcs on .fhr qucsfion. In 
other \\'on.l.s, ·whereas ther'c '\VCrc (,.'\t>,l.ly twcnty .. three 
pro~uavy slates in 1922, 110'\V there ..arc ·t-hirty .. four 
wholly so and nine equally tlividc.J, ~with merely ftve 
-inste:\J of the formct· t\Vcnty.-{jye- -opposed to a 
greater navy. 
Much cnuhl be said a~ t.o how pt·o .. navy sentiment has 
Jcvclopctl throu~hout the southcnt anJ midland states 
;tnd has Lacked anti.-n:a,;otl fcdin!; up into mcr·cly fout· 
of the rather nu.tical ''~'nl~ .. ccntral states anJ Utah, in 
\Vhkh bttcJ' Scn"\?.r Ki.nJ(~. inveterate arHI virulent 
anti .. navalism rn;•y 1,\\,t. he ~r:.uly n:p1·cscntativc. Like..-
wisc, simibt· ptr·sonal \.'~C.'\\'S on the part of Senator Dill 
of \Va~;hington, and 1t1.f '·the life~lonr, padn~~l, Scnatot· 
But·ton of Ohio, arc kno\\'ll to be unJ·cprc.,;cnliHive of 
the stJ·ont; pl'o..-navy ~cntimcnt in thcit· l'l'spcctive {;tates. 
Such pcn;on;~l pr~ju\liccs make it t"afc to fiay that, in 
{a-:t, the pru.-navy. C.l'ntit~H ... nt of such tltatc.·!i, :tnd <'f the 
C'lHII\try as a \Vhn1c, is even stroqr,er than \Va); sho,vn 
hr .thc.vot1~,in<>t'lh: Senate. Som~ 1~'Y!H· ·t~~dh.·. this ;,Jnwr.t nation.-,vi~h· ,h:vclop .. 
mt·nt uf t.upport of mit' navy to it·l"it.Hion at tiH.• pro~o:L· .. 
t1un· the Hdii·;h Go\'CJ'IlllH'IIt ch01;c to :Hiopt i\t t.hc 
~~t'IH"\'a Conft•J'l'llt'c.' of l~P-7, an\1 to \vldd1 it ·PL"I"'ii':il\·d 
111 ;ulhcrin~~. in !->pitt of tiH'n L'>.:pn.·~~;\•d Anll·rkan oppo .. 
f'il j,ll, iu t lw :1hurt iv&: Ft·an('I)··BI'il j..,h N;,v.d A,~rcL·un·nt 
of J!)lH, It ,;houhl lw l'l.'Calh·d, ho\\'l'V~'I' 1 th;lt whcn·au 
tl11dn~ the \\'a:;hillglon Confcn:ncc of ry21, Amcric:m 
[tUIJiic opinion lh:n:ph·d \Vith cnthu':ii:~t.m Jli"I'J'~~'>~,;~I!I for 
'the reduction of annamcnts, irrespective of othes:- Amer• 
ican itttC!'rcSts, during the Geneva Co(tfcren~.e of '291.7 11 • 
the ,Ainedtan Naval Delegation had the «"~holc.-he.1rtcd 
suppot·.t of t~\c Amet·ic:~n Government, pr..:ss anJ ptople .. 
Sue it a complete change in pu hlk opinion, beyond ques--
tion, haJ mu~h deeper c:tuses than momentary irrituion .. 
9thcrs v:ill ascribe the present virtually unJnimOus 
.';upport of our naval buihling p1~og1·am to a some'\\·ha.~ 
~l3tcd rcalh:ation that l!x.-Sccrctary Hughes \VJ.S right 
\VhC'n he. s:dd in the autumn of 1922. that "it,is .esse:ntiaJ 
.that. '\\'C should nuintain the ,·datit:e naval strength of 
the United Statcs.n Relative naval strength •m!!an.s, 
c:ompat·ativc naval strength and, of necessity, involv·cs 
comparisons 'vith the navies of other l>t'"',..ers to see 
·whether the 5--5--3 ratio of comparative strength ,v·as 
being maintained. 
"!'his $itnple statistical procedure was tnuch beclouded 
by the deliberate or inadvertent substitution Of the 
\Vord "competitive" \vhcTC mer.cly comparisons \ ... ·ere 
made; and it '\Vas alleged that any comp.1risons in accord .. 
ance \Vith the 5 .. 5 .. 3 ratio implied cotrlpetition 3lttl an 
effort to excel othe1·s instl'ad of merely catching up to 
them, But the fact that in moden1 CJ-uiscn, for in..-
stance, the relative strength Of the United Stat.:s has 
been held under 2 1 instcad of up to 5, and that the prc~nt 
building prograrn of eight 8--inch~gun cruisers untlcr 
constl·Uction :tnd fifteen more just approved by ~mg:rcs.s 
Jocs not yet give par·ity merely in ~~ig gun cruisers h.ts 
gr·"du:dly ovc1·comc the specious allcsation of "comp~ti ... 
tivc" building. 
At th-is point it is worth recalling that ever sinc4! 
192.2 the Navy Lcaguc of the United States has conc.en.-
tratcd on pcn)istcntly athl cousistentl>• :u.lvoc<ttin~ the 
con~tructiott of t'\\'Cnty or nwrc such cn.1iscrs. Thif 
policy \\~as tleriv~,l f1·om con~t:-tnt :~nd can•Jul study 'o{ 
the situation an"J of i(s un~cdying f.t<;ton;i anJ an und.cr ... 
.stanllint; o( th&:!>l' :,c;~un:d and convinced u.~ th.H ~vhcn 
the puhlic hccilmC aliv..: to it, in "l'ite of domc,.rk anJ 
nlicn :mti .. naval mist:uidancc 1 the pressure u( puhli( 
opinion \Vouhl cvc11tu.1tc itt such :tction a~~> Ccmsr.:ss 
has ju<t tal<cll t•> t;ive the Unile<l :;t;lt<s 3 total of 
t w,·uty.-t hnt: 1o,ooo·ton, H~inch.-t:nn cruist•r·~. 
\VhiJ,. tHil:h ohj .. ·clivt• Hlatistic;lt' con·;idt:rati•Jn:S un.-
,louiHl'\lly 'oncl'i),ut"·~t to pn,..lucl" thi" 1'1!!\ult, it w;u tlh.' 
\IIHkdying fo•C>onl of J;l''JI:r.iphy, f:t)(ioln,:y ouhl ccorllliJti-:• 
th;ll gav~o.• t!·H' ~>ti'OI\1~'-'M lll·nu\i~:c of irs uhimacc in~vif.l'"' 
J>jJ~t}'j {nl' whitt: &:OIUJ'ill',tlivc)y (C\\.' kn,>\V if, tJH."rt." i• 
Sense Grows '• \ 
\ 
1J»c a have llttljl .~710IN by .stares Jww. &nat on voted (68 lo :u) 011 February 1• 19:19. 
10 mahoYi::;:;.;! rh..: building of fifteen more: cntiser.s. The House h .. 1J so voted (187 to 
s8 1 01\ M.m·ch 17, r9~s. but wilhout an individual!, r.:conlcl'l "Loote.. 
a s.ci..:ncc of sea pO\Vcr quite as broad and as basic' as tJ'Iat. 
of roliti..:al. economy. Nearly forty year~~:igo .~ts d·~~· :' 
}..Jah:tn,saul: ···-·l·~ 
"Th~ pri11.:ipal conJitio~ns :llf..::.:ting the: sc;a ~w..::r of nations may 
b:: cnumcrat.:d :as fotlo'\n: I. Gcogr;,rhk position.. 11.' Physi.:al 
~on(onnation, induJing, as connected therewith, n.1.tur.1l proJue--
lion :ud dimate. Ill. ExteJH of territory. IV. Number of popu .. 
btion. \'. CharJ.ctcr of the reople. VI. Chaz;!1ctc.r of the govern .. 
m.:1lt, in.:luJing thcl'cin the n;\tional institutiol\s," 
Studv of these elements of s:ea power bdngs a rcali"t.a .... 
tion tl;~lt the midoccanic position of America, \.vith all of 
.out· r~bcinns '\Vith other pat·ts of the '~·odd immutably 
nycr:;..:a~ a.ffain;;, is by fa1· the best {rom \\•hich to carry 
on ....... ·odd~v .. ·i,l~ seafaring. For no,vherc else is there a 
sin~;l~ country '"ith the conjunction of sucl! a ccntl·:tl 
maritin1c position, such natural rc:..ourccs, s~ch extent 
of ten·itory, arnt ~o nume1·ous a population:.~ Ant.l fur.-
thennon:1 with 1·csp1!ct to the character of a people., 
~f.,han said: 
"The h·ndcncy to tr;utc, iTn·olving of necessity the production 
n( f<~rn.:thing to tr:1dc with, is rh~ natioual,ch:lracteri~tic most im .. 
I'<'Jrtant to the ~t.:.,·dupmcut of sea power. 
\\'h~·n \VC reali:c that our economic. productivity 
,tbuut ~~1uals th=lt of all the nations of Europe \\'CSt of 
l~u~"i.l nn the one haml. arhl th;tt of all the othc1· p•trts 
of tho..:. \vorhl, on the other, '\.ve 1;c.t Bc>me sense of the 
.;olo.:o.:;.t1 c'onotnic forCe here pressin!~ to cxpn:::s~ itself 
in ovc 1"::;(.~;\S trade. 'rhere is nothing surp•·.bint~~ tl'l~~·c ... 
fiJr~. in the faCt thi\t o~t.!· cxtcl·nal •. tl'adc is alr·call_y :IS 
worlJ '\Vhll! and ;t:; gn.'::\t as that of ;1ny othct· SU'I!~Ic 
countl·y. I1H1cl~d, o;tr exports arc. all·c;u1y ovc1· twenty 
pc•· ~-.,:nc ~n.·atc1· than those from any other vnc nation 
and thdt· ·production is said to suppo1·t dirc~tly about 
a t~.:r1th <>f ou1· popul;ttiml. 
Sc;t J~,H·nc c.xportr. and impor·ts to and fJ'l)ll\ all parts 
of tlh· ":odd amo1111ting to ovct· ci1;ht hillioll dol1ara a 
year, atHl ;t coao;t\Vi~c tt·adc car-ryint{ r.omc six. billinn 
umn·, J;i vc u:; a "ca hofnC commcn·c that :\ lt·c:ul y ex ... 
(t:cd-. ftnlt"tccn billion ,)ollars and i:-4 vitally imJ'OI'tant 
Ill t'\'Cr)' indu•;tJ'Y and humc and pt:I'HOI\ in th'! br11l. 
Saturally, :;ud'l an \lllpr&:~edcntct1 t.:a1t \Vah'f fl·alfl.; n:.-
qttin:~ ~no1t ... hippin!~ (adlitit·."· AnJ with rnmpt•tition 
fol' m.tdH·ts otl'ld f11r ~upplic!i bt:l'(JJllil'll~ cv..:r l<L't.:llcJ·, th~ 
tr,, 11 •.pnl·f o( nwrcly a third o( wu· tl'an.·•n~~c;tni..: tr·.111ic 
1!.11 1"'·,1 to l'c~uJ.,,. Jinc!l (If Aun:rkonl JihippinJ: n.:.t\.·hin,.; 
Jn,m our· rnid<h~C.ll\k h:H~ to al1 pan'i u( th~~\\vodll o\'t'l' 
o(tl!~l"t'IIC L!tH':i th.tt (Oii\1 UIOI'C th;ln i\ hundl'l'lJ .tHd fl(ty 
thousand miles in length an<l that require nav3l cn1iser 
·protection; . 
1:n short:, thP. ,::rq\:.~.1)"~ in .c:l?'a 1'10'\.vi'"r it: prnno~ic._{.r,......: 
du.:tion ashore,. then overs ~as trading, the.n more and 
1nore ships to c~rry it, and finally naval po\YC:l" support.-· 
cd by the internal ccot'l.omic interests that are expressing 
themselves externally in overseas tr:tde and by a f1·ac.-. 
tion of the profit o( that trade to the country. : 
Under the c.conomie nnd social conditi9ns notv exist.-
idg in our g1·c:tt midoceanic, fnsulat· .America, it was 
natur3l that the undc;-stan\1ing editor of the. New York 
Hcrald.-Tribunc should conclude his comment on the 
action of Congress for the naval building progr;:un by 
saying: 
The most gr;atifying thing·about the di:;.:ussion in the Senate 
\\.':!.& the wiJe :~p 1~reciation tht:re that our economic interest-the 
expansion of our ovcn~as trade anJ oversea<; invc:stmcnta--rcquirel 
the m.aintca'\an..:c of a. navy equal to th:\t of any other na.val power. 
We arc simply yicl11ing to economic forces in crc:ttin~ such a navy. 
Our n.1 ti~m;\l rsychology ha& not yet: aJaptt'd i1sclC fully to the 
change. But economic force& control in the end, \Ve are g:oing to 
Juve a t 1·caty n:IVy whctht:r we consdo}ll'i1y wish to or not. \Vc 
arc s;oing to h:ave a grc.lt merchant marine whether \ve con~iously 
wi~h to or not. Those thing' arc written in our :;tan, {or: the 
Unitl'd St;ltt'S 2-.p:s b.::comc an ouut:-ndin~ ·insular and traJins: na.-
tion, with its futur-'e more ancl more on the !'.e;u. 
Ten or twcnt)' yo:Ms hence the he.,it:-tioll shown by Congrul 
to t:urport our tJ'C;It)' navy will he h:.rJiy cornprchcusihle, It it 
a. timorous inhcrit;tnce from the past, Dut it is vanir.hing. Piftcen 
mnre cnli:.crs will nut rc:stQre. Arncrkan nav,\1 p.uity. Yet' they 
will make it c:I'>Y to attain C'V('ntu;l) parity. The nuin thing it 
that ConE;rc~~ anJ public opinion arc now di~ountin&: the inevf ... ..,/ 
table and beginning to repair the errora o( nav,\1 policy committed 
GiJl.:e 11911., 
Thus the tn:nJ of the fundamental ceonotnie anll r.ocial 
conditions within the country that some,vhat gropingly 
01rc ~eckin,.; comm('nsuratc expres~;ion on the r.c.as is be .. 
f~innin1~ tu make it:-.clf dcf1nitely (dt. Thnt \vithin so 
(1!\V ycar:J after the illuc;ions of the \Vashington Con .. 
(crcn..:e r;o many of the JH:opl·~'~ t'ctu·c~ntativcs have 
rcco1 ~ni.:cll .Inti an; ahling thio; vit;tl traltl, giw~.s promise 
that virtually all \vi11·soon cca~:c Ol'l"l::>ing the mct·c.:tn .. 
tile and nav;al expansion r.o incrl'a.'iillJ~Iy important to 
the prmpcrity "'"' security n( the pcopl< of the United 
StHc•. 
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